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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
BRITAIN CAN TAKE IT: CHEMICAL WARFARE AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL
DEFENSE IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1915 - 1945
by
Jordan Malfoy
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Gwyn Davies, Major Professor
This dissertation argues that the origins of civil defense are to be found in preWorld War II Britain and that a driving force of this early civil defense scheme was fear
of poison gas. Later iterations of civil defense, such as the Cold War system in America,
built on already existing regimes that had proven their worth during WWII. This
dissertation demonstrates not only that WWII civil defense served as a blueprint for later
civil defense schemes, but also that poison gas anxiety served as a particular tool for the
implementation and success of civil defense. The dissertation is organized thematically,
exploring the role of civilians and volunteers in the civil defense scheme, as well as
demonstrating the vital importance of physical manifestations of civil defense, such as
gas masks and air raid shelters, in ensuring the success of the scheme.
By the start of World War II, many civilians had already been training in civil
defense procedures for several years, learning how to put out fires, recognize bombs,
warn against gas, decontaminate buildings, rescue survivors, and perform first aid. The
British government had come to the conclusion, long before the threat became realized,
that the civilian population was a likely target for air attacks and that measures were
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required to protect them. World War I (WWI) saw the first aerial attacks targeted
specifically at civilians, suggesting a future where such attacks would occur more
frequently and deliberately. Poison gas, used in WWI, seemed a particularly horrifying
threat that presented significant problems. Civil defense was born out of this need to
protect the civil population from attack by bombs or poison gas. For the next five years of
war civil defense worked to maintain British morale and to protect civilian lives. This
was the first real scheme of civil defense, instituted by the British government
specifically for the protection of its civilian population.
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Introduction

On September 3rd, 1939, just minutes after Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
announced that Britain was now at war with Germany, the air raid sirens sounded for the
first time. Many people immediately rushed to their shelters, convinced this was the
beginning of the end.1 Some thought they were about to be attacked with poison gas.2
One young girl was bundled up in her coat and sent to shelter under the stairs.3 In
Southall, people out on the streets, many just returning home from Sunday church
services, began running. Air raid wardens shouted at people to get off the streets.4 One
young woman rushed home to find her parents and siblings sitting inside with their gas
masks on.5 Ultimately, this first sounding of the sirens turned out to be a false alarm and
no bombs fell on Britain that day. The reaction of the population, however, showed not
only a general anxiety over war, but demonstrated the significant government effort that
had already been put into civil defense. People had reacted the way they were supposed
to—anxious but with a purpose.
The air raids did come eventually and with them a serious threat to civilian life.
During World War II (WWII) millions of British civilians performed these same actions
thousands of times, using their training in civil defense to protect themselves and their
fellow citizens. By the start of the war, many civilians had already been training in civil
1

Imperial War Museum: 12/29/1, Raymond Fry, Wartime Schoolday in Surrey, 1.

2

S. Gaylor, “Wartime Memories,” BBC’s People’s War, accessed August 14, 2017,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/30/a3545930.shtml.

3

IWM: 99/66/1, Heather Macdonald, Wartime Memories 1939-1945, 1.

4

Doris Anderson, “And So War Began…,” BBC’s People’s War, accessed August 14, 2017,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/61/a3699561.shtml.

5

ibid.
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defense procedures for several years, learning how to put out fires, recognize bombs,
warn against gas, decontaminate buildings, rescue survivors, and perform first aid. The
British government had come to the conclusion, long before the threat became realized,
that the civilian population was a likely target for air attacks and that measures were
required to protect them. Civil defense was born out of this need to protect the civil
population from attack by bombs or poison gas. For the next five years of war civil
defense worked to maintain British morale and to protect civilian lives. This dissertation
argues that the origins of civil defense are to be found in pre-WWII Britain and that a
driving force of this early civil defense scheme was fear of poison gas. Later iterations of
civil defense, such as the Cold War system in America, built on already existing regimes
that had proven their worth during WWII. Similarly, later schemes simply replaced
poison gas as a tool for the implementation and success of civil defense with the nuclear
threat as the source of fear.
Civil defense at first glance might not seem to be a topic with great importance in
the grander scheme of war or the history of the organization of the the home front.
However, this dissertation will show that civil defense has far wider-reaching
implications than might be immediately apparent. Civil defense is not merely a
governmental policy or a component of national defense, but also touches on many
different, important topics across society. As a scheme created and implemented by the
government, civil defense can provide insights into various aspects of how the
government perceives the homefront at a time of war and what it and its actors see as a
vital part of the nation that must be protected. Similarly, as a scheme intended for
civilians, civil defense touches on many thematic aspects of civilian life in a wartime
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society. As a program that permeated most aspects of a wartime society, civil defense
traverses topics such as war and policy, war and gender, war and technology, and war and
health.
Civil defense is particularly intimately connected to the topic of war and policy. In
WWII Great Britain, civil defense showcases the government’s wartime policies and how
civilians adapted to these policies. Civil defense was a governmental scheme directed
specifically at civilians and thus a close look at civil defense practices and the policies
that underpinned these, offers insight into the intersection between policy and civilian
life. An exploration of civil defense schemes can show the government’s understanding
of its own civilians, as well as civilians’ perception of their government. Such studies can
answer questions as to civilians’ roles in government and society during wartime, the
government’s plan for its civilians, and the overarching priorities of wartime policy.
Additionally, comparisons of civil defense iterations, such as the discrepant experiences
in both WWI and WWII practices as this dissertation explores, can provide insight into
how prior practices shaped contemporary approaches. A study of civil defense also
demonstrates how war mobilization efforts impact society. Because civil defense is
directly linked with the war effort on the home front, studies of civil defense can offer a
better understanding of how civilians interacted with the concept of war, their
government’s response to war, and their own role in a wartime society. As civil defense
was used by the government as a tool to control or direct civilian behavior, a study of
civil defense also touches on the topic of psychology, and particularly psychology as
reflected in governmental policy. The concept of psychology as policy is a consistent
theme across regimes of civil defense and is an important component of any study on war
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and policy, and how such policies affect civilians. Such an exploration of governmental
aims, civilian responsibilities and roles, and the intersection between the two are a vital
component of any scholarship on war and policy.
Civil defense also pertains to the topic of war and gender. As many other studies
have shown, war and mass mobilization had a direct impact on the life of women,
especially through the entry of women into the workforce en masse. Civil defense offers
another insight into how women participated in and navigated wartime societies. In civil
defense schemes across the world and throughout the latter half of the twentieth century,
women played a pivotal role. The success of civil defense practices and the acceptance of
such practices by the public often hinged on the participation of women. Unlike the labor
force, where women simply replaced male workers, in civil defense women were able to
create and define their own roles. Additionally, civil defense jobs often represented
significant dangers or required a certain authority, allowing women not only to
participate in the workforce, but to do so in a manner that often ran counter to
contemporary notions of female vulnerability. Participation in civil defense also offered
women the opportunity to be directly involved in the war effort and national service,
allowing them the opportunity to become more complete citizens in societies where
citizenship was often defined by national service and ability. Studies of civil defense can
thus offer valuable insight into the role of gender in wartime societies, but also explore
the relation between women and their government.
Civil defense also incorporates issues of war and health. Civil defense particularly
touches on aspects of public health and can perhaps be seen as a program of public health
in and of itself. As a scheme intended to protect civilians from both bodily and
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psychological harm, the primary purpose of civil defense is to maintain civilian health.
Across all aspects of British WWII civil defense, issues of health were a persistent
concern. Worries over diseases, vermin, and nutrition permeate British responses.
Children’s health was a particular concern, as is evidenced by the evacuation plan and
special programs directed at youth. Maintaining the psychological health of civilians
during times of crisis was a major purpose of civil defense. Studies of civil defense
therefore offer insight into how the government perceived issues of health and disease,
what aspects of health they considered more important than others, and the means by
which the government sought to address such issues. Additionally, civil defense shows
how civilians dealt with their own concerns over health, as well as how they perceived or
interacted with their government’s plans for their health.
Lastly, civil defense relates to the topic of war and technology. Many technologies
owe their existence or improvement to war, and civil defense, as a component of war,
similarly has influenced and incorporated technology into its practices. Poison gas, a war
technology born out of WWI, was a major influence on Britain’s WWII civil defense
planning. In this case, new technologies were required to combat the threat that was now
menacing civilian lives. The gas mask, in particular, was a technology that saw
significant improvement and evolution in the lead-up to, and during, WWII. Anti-gas
technologies, such as powders, creams, and protective garments, sought to combat the gas
threat. A study of civil defense is thus particularly useful for understanding how war and
military technologies came to see application in civilian life and how such technologies
may have been altered or adapted for civilian use. Similarly, civil defense technologies
directly aimed to counteract military technologies, such as high explosive bombs, through
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various means. The evolution of the various British air raid shelters shows the importance
of technology, and its continuous improvement and adaptation, to civil defense.
For a study on WWII civil defense the technology of poison gas plays a particularly
pivotal role, as it informed not only every aspects of civil defense programs and training,
but was also a driving force of the civil defense scheme itself. Poison gas as a tool of war
has been examined in scholarly literature, but no scholar has drawn causal links between
gas and the creation of civil defense as I argue here. Scholarship on poison gas revolves
heavily around WWI, the only major war where such weapons were used. Such studies
tend to focus entirely on the military or technical aspects of chemical weapons without
considering wider societal implications or exploring the cultural effects such weapons
had on wartime populations.6 While Donald Richter’s use of private letters and diaries of
the men in the Special Brigade provides unique and valuable insight into the minds of the
soldiers engaged in gas warfare, the scope of the study does not include the impact on
British society at large. Richter’s work does, however, provide context on how soldiers
viewed the use of gas and how these soldiers may have conveyed their own perceptions
to families back home through letters and diaries. While the effect of gas warfare on the
home front is outside the scope of his study, Tim Cook’s monograph does seek to explore
the psychological impact chemical warfare had on the Canadian soldiers in the trenches.
Two exceptions to this narrow period focus are monographs by Marion Girard and
Edmund Russel. In her monograph, Girard explores the impact of poison gas use during

6

For literature on WWI poison gas use see: Thomas Faith, Behind the Gas Mask: The U.S. Chemical
Warfare Service in War and Peace (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2014); Donald Richter,
Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War One (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2014);
Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War (Vancouver
and Toronto: UBC Press, 1999); Albert Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army
& Chemical Warfare in World War I (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).
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the war had on British society at large and traces the public consciousness of the new
weapon.7 Russell’s study details how the use and development of chemical weapons was
reflected in the civilian use and development of pesticides. He argues that chemical
warfare in WWI had a positive effect on the American chemical industry, which not only
grew in size and production capacity, but also bestowed upon it a certain prestige
unknown prior to 1915.8
Girard, Russell, and other scholars have largely failed to address how chemical
weapons impacted military and civilian populations culturally and psychologically during
a later war, when those weapons remained a threat, but were not actually used.9 Russell
succeeds in showing how chemical warfare directly impacted civilian chemistry and
civilian terminology, but exploring the wider cultural ramifications of this is outside the
scope of his study. While William Moore focuses more heavily on the political decisionmaking and the work of chemists after WWI, he does address the impact chemical
warfare had on civilians during the interwar years and WWII.10 Olaf Groehler’s account
of German preparation, production, and use of chemical weapons provides valuable and
necessary insight into both world wars and the interwar period.11 He has provided a
detailed study in particular on German chemical warfare research, as well as political and

7

Marion Girard, A Strange and Formidable Weapon: British Responses to World War I Poison Gas
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 10.

8

Edmund Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to
Silent Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 20.

9

For more on chemical weapons in general see: William Moore, Gas Attack (London: Leo Cooper, 1987);
Olaf Groehler, Der Lautlose Tod: Einsatz und Entwicklung deutscher Giftgase von 1914 bis 1945
(Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1989); Edward Spiers, A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons (London:
Reaktion Books, 2010); Kim Coleman, A History of Chemical Warfare (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005); Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing (New York: Random House, 2002);
Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al Quaeda (New York: Anchor
Books, 2006).

10

Moore, Gas Attack, 44.
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military planning after WWI and through 1945. His focus is, however, primarily on the
military and governmental decision-makers, with only brief mentions of civilian impact
and preparations. Edward Spiers does not offer detailed insight into any time period or
aspect of chemical warfare, although his chapter on chemical weapons in third world
conflicts provides a view often ignored by other scholars of the topic.12 While a
significant amount of literature exists on the topic of chemical warfare, there is a notable
lack of academic focus on the topic post-WWI. Susan Smith’s Toxic Exposures provides
one of the only academic explorations of the topic post-WWI and discusses the mustard
gas experiments carried out on soldiers prior to and during WWII.13 Her monograph,
however, focuses primarily on the United States and the experiments carried out by the
Chemical Warfare Service. A much larger selection of the body of literature is aimed at
popular audiences and often lacks rigorous academic standards. Harris and Paxman have
provided what is often considered the most comprehensive account of chemical warfare,
tracing the use of chemical and biological weapons from WWI through Desert Storm.
However, their account lacks academic rigor and is rife with personal opinions and
sometimes misinformation.14 Jonathan Tucker offers a readable narrative of chemical
warfare from WWI to Al-Qaeda, but as a political scientist his focus lies entirely on
political decision-making regarding the use, research into, and abolition of chemical
weapons, offering no insight into cultural or larger contextual questions.15

11

Groehler, Der Lautlose Tod, 62.

12

Spiers, History of Chemical and Biological Weapons,

13

Susan Smith, Toxic Exposures: Mustard Gas and the Health Consequences of World War II in the
United States (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2017).

14

Harris and Paxman, Higher Form of Killing, 22.

15

Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves, 22.
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World War I saw the first aerial attacks targeted specifically at civilians, suggesting
a future where such attacks would occur more frequently and deliberately. British
civilians found themselves the targets of zeppelin and bomb attacks that, although limited
in their effect, caused enough casualties and damage to prove a serious concern for
government and civilians alike. As early as 1915, the government issued the first air raid
precautions (ARP) instructions to its citizens. While the government provided some
advice and people sought shelter from zeppelin raids in basements or underground
railway stations, there was not yet a concerted scheme or coordinated effort to protect the
civil population from harm. Even after the war, government officials worried about ways
to protect civilians from future threats should war come again. Poison gas, used for the
first time in WWI, seemed a particularly horrifying threat that presented significant
problems (see Chapter 2). How could the British government ensure the safety of the
country’s civilians if war came, especially if a ruthless enemy were to employ poison gas
against a vulnerable population? Civil defense was the chosen solution.
Civil defense can be defined as a government-directed scheme intended to protect
civilians from enemy attack. The key component that separates civil defense from regular
military defensive measures is that civil defense relies entirely on civilians to participate
in their own protection. While the government provides for various aspects of civil
defense, such as equipment, facilities, plans, and training, the level of involvement by the
government and its officials varies between the different schemes of civil defense and the
nations implementing it. Civilians are asked to volunteer their time to be trained, to
practice what they have learned, and, if willing and qualified, to perform the job of one of
the many civil defense workers. Relying on civilian labor, largely volunteer and mostly
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unpaid, allows the government to redirect much-needed resources and frees up soldiers
who might otherwise have been tasked with protective duties. Civil defense also provides
civilians with a real investment in the government’s plans and foreign policy.
Participating in the war effort, whether an actual or cold war, invests civilians and ensures
their continued interest in affairs. Apathy among the population could prove detrimental
to the government’s overall plans and prove harmful to civilian work that directly
supported the war effort. Civil defense was therefore one tool to combat civilian apathy
by offering a job of importance to the nation. Relying entirely on civilian participation,
however, could often prove problematic for civil defense programs if interest was
waning. A large component of the plan of each government implementing civil defense
thus also revolved around publicity and creating civilian interest in the program. To
present civil defense work as a job vital to the nation was often a good recruiting tool, but
fear worked even better. Governments that instituted civil defense schemes exploited
their population’s anxiety over a potential attack to stimulate interest and participation in
civil defense. Key elements of civil defense have played an important role in the war
effort and governmental decision-making of nations engaged in war since WWI, with the
focus and effort invested in civil defense increasing as civilian populations became more
vulnerable.16

16

Andrew D. Grossman, Neither Dead Nor Red: Civil Defense and American Political Development
During the Early Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2001); Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at
Home (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000); Kenneth D. Rose, One Nation Underground:
The Fallout Shelter in American Culture (New York; London: New York University Press, 2004);
Spencer Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012); Paul
Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994, Kindle eBook); David Krugler, This Is Only
a Test: How Washington D.C. Prepared for Nuclear War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006,
iBook); Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995); Matthew Grant, After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in
Britain, 1945-68 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
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The topic of civil defense generally conjures up images of students hiding from
atomic bomb blasts under their desks or prepared householders building a fallout shelter
in their backyards, but this view of civil defense ignores the very real and successful civil
defense schemes that were precursors to Cold War programs. Cold War civil defense
often enjoys an iconic, and often slightly humorous, image, that reflects contemporary
interest in atomic culture and the America of the 1950s and 60s. American Cold War civil
defense was defined by elements such as fallout shelters, gas masks for the civilian
population, warning sirens, training volunteers, and an organized governmental scheme
of civil defense services. Popular anxiety over radiation and complete annihilation greatly
influenced the purpose and execution of American civil defense.17
What such a concept of civil defense fails to grasp, however, is that these wellknown schemes of civil defense had their origin much earlier than the advent of the atom
bomb. Focusing entirely on Cold War civil defense efforts ignores the origins of such
programs and the foundation for the many later civil defense schemes that was laid in the
1930s in Great Britain. Scholars of civil defense have often ignored entirely, or only
mentioned in passing, the British civil defense scheme prior to 1945, allowing no
correlation between these early measures and the civil defense schemes of the Cold War.
Similarly, the literature on chemical warfare has failed to address the impact poison gas,
or the anxiety thereof, had on the creation and execution of early civil defense schemes.
The existing literature primarily focuses on the use of chemical weapons or their
production and preparation after WWI, but has not addressed the very impact a weapon
can have on the public consciousness and government policy even if it is not used. To
17

For more on atomic fears see Boyer, Bomb; Oakes, Imaginary War; Rose, Underground; Grossman,
Neither Dead Nor Red; Grant, After the Bomb.
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gain a proper understanding of civil defense, its purpose, its execution, its successes and
failures, as well as its place in the public consciousness, it is necessary to explore the
conditions that led to the first implementation of a comprehensive civil defense program
and the institution of this first civil defense scheme. This dissertation aims to fill the gap
in the literature by exploring the origins of civil defense in the British efforts to protect
civilians in the lead-up to, and during, WWII.18
The civil defense programs of WWII and later the Cold War both were driven
by the same ideology and share many elements. Arising out of WWI ARP measures,
British civil defense in the lead-up to, and during, WWII sought to protect the population
from an existential threat through protective measures and modification of behavior. This
was the first real scheme of civil defense, instituted by the British government
specifically for the protection of its civilian population. While Cold War civil defense,
both in Britain and America, was distinctive for its nuclear war survival preparations, the
major themes of civil defense remained the same. Civil defense certainly sought to
protect civilian lives, but psychological and political aspects were often just as important.
Civil defense programs throughout the 20th century sought to control civilian behavior, to
ensure the psychological soundness of civilians, to encourage self-help, and to garner
support for governmental policies. Additionally, all programs shared similar key concepts
in their approach to civil defense, such as employing anxiety as a tool to ensure
compliance and dispersal as a primary form of protection.

18

Among the limited literature on pre-1945 civil defense are: K.W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Susan Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in
Britain from the Great War to the Blitz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Peter Laurie,
Beneath the City Street: A Private Enquiry into the Nuclear Preoccupations of Government (London:
Penguin Press, 1970).
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Civil defense was the face of war on the home front. During the Cold War, the
American government made direct and purposeful links between civilian preparedness
and the war effort. Tracy Davis argues that it was nuclear weapons that shifted the theater
of war to the home front, but this argument entirely ignores the strategic bombing
campaigns of WWII that saw civilians targeted purposefully.19 The Truman
administration specifically linked civil defense to its Cold War grand strategy, so that
home front and civilian preparedness, as well as moral fortitude, became necessary
components of nuclear deterrence.20 Additionally, civil defense training programs
specifically sought to militarize civilian life.21 The home fallout shelter specifically tied
the family home to a global threat. The government’s encouragement to its citizens to
build home shelters both admitted that the home itself was no longer adequate, but also
implied that the home, in its improved form, was a vital aspect of national security.22
Civil defense also served as a tool of militarization of the American home. Civil defense
was the domestic analogue of a militarized foreign policy and although the Cold War
U.S.A. was not a garrison state, American culture nevertheless absorbed the ideology of
war.23 During WWII, however, civil defense was not merely symbolic of war on the
home front, but allowed civilians to directly participate in the war effort. British civil
19

Tracy C. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, N.C: Duke University
Press Books, 2007. eBook), Introduction.

Lord Cherwell specifically argued for the bombing of German civilians as a dehousing strategy, which
would in turn break civilian morale.
Sir Charles Kingsley Webster and Noble Frankland, The strategic air offensive against Germany, 19391945, Vol 1 (London: HMSO, 1961).
20

Grossman, Neither Dead Nor Red, 2.

21

ibid, 104.

22

Tom Vanderbilt, Survival City: Adventures Among the Ruins of Atomic America (Chicago ; London:
University Of Chicago Press, 2010), 108.

23

McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, 5, 10.
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defense recruitment specifically emphasized this concept to draw volunteers who could
not fight with the armed forces (see Chapter 4).
Psychology played a major role in the creation, execution, and success (or failure)
of civil defense programs. The atom bomb, and later the even more powerful hydrogen
bomb, presented a threat of complete annihilation that was certain to cause anxiety, or
even terror and panic, in the general population. During the Cold War civil defense was
specifically created to ease nuclear anxieties.24 David Krugler points out one of the root
problems of civil defense: civilians needed to be just the right amount of scared, because
if they became too scared they might panic and would not participate in civil defense.25
Guy Oakes has argued that civil defense planners were more concerned with the atom
bomb as a weapon of mass terror and the maintenance of public morale and thus civil
defense became a program to teach civilians to resist panic and manage their emotions.26
Dee Garrison has referred to American civil defense as a massive federal failure to
control public perception.27 As emotional reactions came to be seen as disruptive or
immobilizing in a potential nuclear war, many psychologists and psychiatrists actively
engaged in civil defense planning.28 Such medical experts applied themselves to
convincing the American population that the atomic threat was not as bad as had initially
been suggested and that hysteria was uncalled for and counterproductive.29 In Britain, as
Matthew Grant has argued, by the 1950s civil defense had become a facade and was used
24

Krugler, Only a Test, Introduction.

25

ibid, Chapter 1.

26

ibid, 42, 52.

27

Dee Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (Oxford ; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 28.

28

Boyer, Bomb, Loc6957.

29

ibid, Loc7020.
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solely to prop up public confidence.30 In contrast to the American focus on civilian
morale, however, British civil defense planners had few concerns their citizens could
handle bombardment and war since they had just successfully withstood German bombs
in WWII.31 During WWII, the threat was on a lesser scale, but serious and persistent
bombarding of civilians, such as occurred during the Blitz in 1940, was just as likely to
lead to poor civilian morale and panic. Civil defense programs during both time periods
thus aimed to employ such anxieties for a more useful purpose, such as volunteer work or
preparations in the home. Through controlling civilian behavior, achieved by training and
repeated exposure to relevant information, governments also aimed to control civilians’
psychological response to danger. Panic and the subsequent chaos and loss of morale
were major concerns for both British and American governments. In Britain, in particular,
panic was likely to undermine the war effort through civilian inaction and apathy. Panic
and chaos could also overwhelm existing services, such as police, fire, and first aid, so it
was necessary that governments could ensure their civilians acted in a calm and
predictable manner in the case of an emergency.
Civil defense also often aimed to shift civilian psychology. The themes of self-help
and personal responsibility were key components of civil defense programs throughout
the 20th century. Americans during the Cold War were almost entirely reliant on
themselves for protection, and, although the government offered some fallout shelters,
citizens were generally asked to build their own shelters and supply their own gas masks.
Self-help and community preparedness were the first theme of American civil defense.32
30

Grant, After the Bomb, 7.

31

ibid, 59.

32

Grossman, Neither Dead Nor Red, 41.
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Education campaigns usually began with a shock treatment that delineated the realities of
nuclear war and then countered this with information on self-help and civil defense
training to stimulate volunteerism and a can-do attitude.33 The push by the U.S.
government for its citizens to build their own shelters was also intended to disincline
them to rely on the federal government and to deflect resentment they might feel at the
neglect of civil defense by Washington.34 The emphasis on self-help ensured that civil
defense appeared as “home-spun” and “grassroots” efforts disconnected from wider
policy.35 Laura McEnaney has suggested that civil defense defined Cold War
militarization as a personal responsibility and by blaming citizens’ emotional reactions or
unpreparedness for threat of attack it absolved the government from blame.36 British civil
defense called on citizens’ sense of duty and patriotism to enjoin them to enroll and
engage in the civil defense services.37 Post-1951 the emphasis on individual
responsibility became a key theme of British civil defense recruitment.38 In WWII
Britain, self-help was defined mostly by civilians taking the initiative to participate in, or
make use of, government-provided protection and civil defense training. Civilians needed
to participate in civil defense willingly, they needed to learn, train, practice, and
ultimately perform civil defense. Emphasizing personal responsibility and self-help thus
instructed civilians that their protection was as much their own responsibility as the
government’s.
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Anxiety over a type of weapon that appeared more gruesome than any other was a
key component of civil defense. Nuclear anxieties comprised fears of mass extinction, not
merely personal danger, and this drove the civil defense narrative. Nuclear fallout, which
inspired great anxiety during the Cold War, reflected similar fears of extinction and of
insidious invisible threats as had poison gas prior to 1945. The threat of an invisible
danger is to be particularly feared as it represents an unknowable reality outside the realm
of normal experience.39 Americans’ immediate reaction to the atomic bomb was one of
intense fear and a somewhat undefined conviction that an urgent public response was
necessary.40 Scientists and government leaders purposefully employed fear to break
public apathy.41 Radioactive fallout was presented as just another household germ,
turning anxieties about cleanliness into the wider discourse on civil defense.42 Kenneth
Rose exploring the effect nuclear apocalyptic films and fiction had on the American
psyche, has suggested that such media undermined civil defense efforts because survival
did not seem plausible, a major factor in why American civil defense was not wholly
successful.43 Grossman has argued that the American government sought to use this mass
fear as a tool of control and to channel it through training regimens, such as military
combat programs.44 For civilians to volunteer for civil defense they needed to recognize
the threat to their lives, fear it, but still feel that they could do something about it. The
threat presented by nuclear war was often too overwhelming and thus American civil
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defense programs suffered as a result.45 Paul Boyer, however, has argued that while
atomic fears predominated the American psyche and civil defense in the 1940s, this fear
was displaced by anxiety over Soviet threats and communism.46 From an early stage a
majority of British civilians felt moral repulsion at the atomic bomb and believed if an
attack occurred on the island nowhere would be safe.47 After facts about fallout became
widely known, the British outright rejected notions of survivability, thus undermining the
success of Cold War civil defense at an early stage.48
Unlike Cold War civil defense, where radiation presented a terrifying threat
intended to ensure compliance with civil defense measures, in WWII, poison gas
presented a similar enemy. First used during WWI, poison gas was not only a novel
weapon of war, but seen as especially brutal and barbarous compared to conventional
weapons. While this weapon was not used against British civilians in WWI or after, there
nevertheless was a persistent worry that poison gas could be used against the British Isles
and this worry influenced every aspect of civil defense. Anxiety over a weapon seen as
horrifying, such as gas or radiation, was vital to stimulate civilian interest in civil
defense. Poison gas provided the impetus for civilians to engage in civil defense by
presenting a threat that was not always easy to understand and generally seen as much
more terrifying than conventional bombs. This anxiety over gas permeated everyday life
and civil defense service, from building a gas-proof room in one’s house to training in
anti-gas measures, either as a civil defense volunteer or as a civilian wanting to be
prepared. Additionally, in WWII especially, poison gas also provided one of the very
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symbols of civil defense that served as both a reminder of an existing threat and also as a
reassurance as an item of protection—the gas mask.
Chemical warfare may have been outlawed and its use described as inhumane, but
scholars and authors cannot always agree on why gas, in particular, has obtained such
notoriety. Girard has tied the gas taboo to early twentieth-century notions of civilization
and progress. Since the 1899 Hague Convention sought to make war less cruel and as gas
directly violated the Convention any deployment of this weapon was automatically
considered as a barbaric act. Thus, when Germany used gas in 1915, the perception was
that this represented a serious breach of international law and the use of such a barbaric
weapon represented a reversion to less civilized times.49 This idea of gas undermining
civilization and progress continued through the interwar years and led to renewed
chemical weapons bans.50 Girard also argues that because gas inherently triggered an
intrinsic fear of suffocation, its perception among the general public was much worse
than for other weapons.51 Albert Palazzo has argued similarly that because gas robs its
victims of the ability to breathe it has been condemned as unacceptable.52 James
Hammond suggests instead that the perception of gas as inhumane was engineered by the
British, who controlled information reaching North America, in response to German gas
attacks.53 More questionably he also argues that it was the effect of gas on unprotected
horses, not soldiers, that so outraged the British public, in particular the English gentry.54
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Russell’s study of chemical war against both humans and insects suggests that it was the
similarities between poisoning humans with gas like vermin that drew such visceral
reactions. He argues that to observers on both sides of the war, chemical weapons looked
a lot like pest control, singling out poison gas as a weapon far more inhumane than shells
or bullets.55 Thomas Faith has suggested that it was a culmination of German actions
(invading Belgium, sinking the RMS Lusitania, and the first use of gas) that allowed them
to be depicted as a barbaric enemy and thus automatically condemned chemical weapons
in a similar light.56 Richter puts forth the idea that, unlike conventional weaponry, poison
gas was seen as ‘unsporting’ by the British and thus quickly condemned.57 Cook has
argued that poison gas was vilified because it robbed soldiers of their ability to stay alive
by virtue of their training and their intrinsic valor. There was nothing heroic or brave
about dying from gas exposure and this alone separated chemical weapons from other
lethal weapons of war.58 Moore makes the case that, particularly after the first gas attack,
the British government condemned poison gas because it knew Britain did not have the
manufacturing capabilities to carry out large-scale gas reprisals.59 It was the image of
troops fleeing in panic that caused such negative opinions of gas, argues Palazzo, because
such panic undermined the notion of morale on which the British Army was so reliant.60
Such chaos would only lead to broken soldiers who had no military value.61 Harris and
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Paxman point out that only chemical weapons came to encapsulate “frightfulness,”
because gas, unlike other new weapons of war, became the symbol of a modern war that
was evil and disgusting.62 Spiers offers a more pragmatic reason, suggesting that gas
served the purposes of anti-German propaganda, which quickly exploited Germany’s first
use of the weapon.63
While fear served as a tool to implement civil defense programs during both WWII
and the Cold War, civil defense itself was used as a political tool by both the British and
American governments. The rehearsal of emergency plans was intended to ensure
citizens could perform their expected roles even in the confusion of an attack.64 Adding
sounds, such as sirens, to expected actions ensured citizens behaved in predictable and
acceptable ways at a time of crisis.65 Davis has also suggested the “indoctrination” of
children into the civil defense movement ensured a widespread interest and belief in the
Civil Defense Program in the United States, contrary to allied countries, such as Britain
and Canada, who had stricter rules on how children could be involved.66 Davis’
monograph focuses specifically on civil defense as performance and rehearsal,
elucidating how governments sought to control their citizens’ behavior. Cold War civil
defense also sought to demonstrate that the behavior of good citizens in everyday life was
a model for how they ought to behave when under attack.67 Government planners
presented civil defense training as the means to control one’s nuclear fear and to achieve
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self-mastery.68 Government leaders worried that Americans would react fearfully and
unpredictably to a Soviet atomic attack, which would undermine U.S. military and
political strategy, so they sought to control civilian reactions through preparedness and
public relations programs.69 Grossman specifically defines civil defense as a blueprint for
social control.70 Urban planners saw in civil defense an opportunity to promote the idea
of decentralization they had failed to successfully sell to populations in the mid-1940s.
They employed the threat of nuclear war to convince cities and their citizens of the
importance of comprehensive planning.71 In both cases, providing a scheme of civil
defense for civilians to engage in was partially intended to garner support for
governmental policy. To encourage support of a central policy decision, such as entering
WWII or ensuring nuclear deterrence, the government needed to reassure its civilians that
means of protection existed and that the government was doing everything it could to
help. In Britain in particular, government officials consistently took public opinion into
consideration when deciding on implementing measures of civil defense.
Civil defense programs were therefore also tools to manipulate public opinion to
align with the government’s interests and decisions. In turn, a failure to institute such
programs could suggest to the civil population a lack of concern by the government for
its people. Oakes has argued that civil defense was the instrument chosen to convince the
American public of the price of any failure in the policy of deterrence.72 NSA planners
specifically sought to align public psychology with the requirements of the national
68
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security policy of deterrence through the mitigation of fear.73 Emotion managers would
control nuclear terror through the promotion of civil defense.74 The American
government used civil defense to make the policy of deterrence palatable to the
population by assuring them that through these programs a meaningful number of citizens
and the basic social structure could survive.75 Civil defense provided citizens with a sense
of security and a sense of normalcy in anxious times76. Paul Boyer has argued that civil
defense participation was intended to calm public fears, “[t]he “constructive activity” of
building a shelter would counteract anxiety and “contribute to the feeling that ‘I am really
able to do something about it.’”77 Civil defense thus served as a means of “inoculating”
the populace against panic in the event of a nuclear attack, by both confronting citizens
with the harsh reality of nuclear war and simultaneously reassuring them of their chances
of survival.78 Civil defense measures thus also aimed to convince civilians that their
government was there to protect them. Civil defense itself was also often touted as a form
of deterrence, particularly in reference to chemical warfare. A population well-protected
from poison gas, it was argued, would present an undesirable target for gas warfare and
thus the protective measures themselves might serve to prevent any such attack.79
Despite the equalizing force of civil defense, social issues nevertheless penetrated
all aspects of these programs. American civil defense programs were required to continue
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segregation practices in the event of nuclear war, with segregated fallout shelters and
dispersal plans that would keep blacks out of white neighborhoods in the event of
evacuation.80 Such fears over African American migration out of cities, which were
considered the main target in the event of nuclear attack, were sometimes more
concerning to white Americans than nuclear annihilation itself.81 Civil defense films
generally excluded non-white families or shelter residents, as well.82 Others saw a
potential nuclear attack on American cities as “Nature’s slum clearance program.”83 In
hypothetical attack scenarios such crowded, poor, urban, ethnic neighborhoods were
generally destroyed. 1950s civil defense narratives often echoed fears of racial slums,
contrasting the elimination of cities with the survival of the idealized white suburban
family84. Reports of racial bias in civil defense programs, such as among the wardens,
significantly hurt recruitment and undermined the success of these initiatives.85 In
Britain, class biases, in particular, provoked some tensions in the civil defense realm,
particularly in the shelters. Civil defense also domesticated war and ensured that military
preparedness became a family affair.86 McEnaney has argued that civil defense therefore
had a dual personality that combined both military ethics and an idealized version of
domesticity.87 The heavy focus of the family as the center of civil defense unintentionally
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feminized preparedness.88 Garrison, who focuses heavily on the role of women in civil
defense and anti-nuclear protests, suggests that women played a much more significant
role than is usually ascribed to them in civil defense programs.89 In Britain, appeals for
volunteers were heavily gendered, as were the civil defense services, but a majority of
volunteers by the mid-1950s were female.90 In the lead-up to and during WWII, civil
defense offered many women freedoms they had not been able to enjoy before, but their
ability to work civil defense jobs or to seek shelter was nevertheless restricted.
Dispersing the population to prevent mass casualties was a key component of all
civil defense programs. The morale of citizens under attack was always a pressing
concern and government officials worried about the toll that mass casualties, or the death
of vulnerable populations (such as children or pregnant women) would have on overall
morale. During the Cold War, due to the massively-destructive nature of atomic weapons,
dispersal was more of an idealistic solution than a practical one. To effectively disperse
Cold War civilian populations a sweeping reconfiguration of American cities and their
suburbs was necessary.91 The American government actively supported dispersal, with
the 1956 Defense Production Act offering tax incentives to diserpsing industries.92 Urban
planners also believed that dispersal could speed up slum clearance, diminish industrial
pollution, and create parks.93 Dispersal was effectively seen as a defense mechanism,
both to minimize the destructive effects of an enemy nuclear bomb, but also as a deterrent
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by suggesting to the enemy an attack would produce little result.94 David Monteyne has
argued that dispersal also served as a process of selection that would emphasize, and
ensure the survival of, the idealized American national identity: white, male, and
patriarchal.95 In Britain, dispersal took several forms, from limiting the size of air raid
shelters to physically removing vulnerable populations from areas of danger. In Cold War
America, threatened by a weapon that would wreak destruction for many miles, dispersal
was not as easy, but nevertheless was a major theme. Dispersal operated on a much
larger scale, as the potential radius of destruction of an atom bomb was significantly
larger than conventional bombs.96
To demonstrate not only that WWII civil defense served as a blueprint to later civil
defense schemes, but also that poison gas anxiety served as a particular tool for the
implementation and success of civil defense, this dissertation will explore several aspects
of British civil defense. Chapter 2 explores the historical background of chemical warfare
and how such weapons were adopted into the British public consciousness. Additionally,
this chapter demonstrates the rising concern among the population and the British
government that poison gas would be used against civilians. Chapter 3 deals with the
general protection of civilians from enemy attack, from WWI through WWII. The
particular focus is the government’s plans for instruction, training, and ARP measures to
ensure that civilians knew how to protect themselves from harm. Chapter 4 provides a
detailed examination of the various civil defense services, such as air raid wardens,
auxiliary firefighters, and first aid parties, and their roles in the overall scheme of the
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home front war effort. Chapter 5 discusses the British gas mask program in WWII that
distributed masks to every man, woman and child. Additionally, this chapter provides a
historical overview of British gas masks from WWI through WWII and the persistent
issues and concerns in developing and providing masks for the population. Chapter 6
deals entirely with the physical protection of civilians and the British shelter program.
This chapter discusses the various types of shelters available to British civilians, such as
communal or domestic shelters, and the many ways in which the government and
civilians themselves sought to make shelter life more comfortable. Chapter 7 focuses on
the social aspects of wartime living and civil defense, particularly issues of class and
national origin. Additionally, the chapter explores how vulnerable populations, such as
women and children, fitted into civil defense schemes. These components of British civil
defense not only protected civilian lives during WWII, but they also served as a vital
‘dry-run’ for the civil defense programs of the Cold War.
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Chapter 2 - “The Very Devil:” World War I Chemical Warfare and its Legacy

The first use of chemical weapons in war occurred on April 22, 1915 on the Ypres
salient in Belgium. Here, the Germans deployed chlorine gas against the Allies and while
the attack caused significant casualties, it did not prove more than a limited tactical
success. Similarly, subsequent uses of chemical weapons by either side in WWI did not
materially alter the outcome of the war, grand strategy, or even individual battles. Despite
the transient tactical advantage chemical weapons provided and their limited impact in
inflicting casualties, poison gas occupied the minds of military commanders and civilians
almost immediately. The idea of a silent killer that stalked the unaware across
battlefields, a weapon that choked, burned, and blinded its victims, had taken a hold of
the public consciousness. Additionally, the advent of aerial warfare brought another
dimension to the potential usage of chemical weapons — attacks against civilian
populations on the home front. Newspapers and popular magazines served a particular
role in inculcating the fear of poison gas in the public consciousness and in creating the
specter of a sinister threat that exerted disproportionate sway both during and after WWI.
Although chemical weapons were used for the first time in 1915, apprehension over
the deployment of such weapons had existed in prior decades. The Hague Convention in
1899, especially, sought to prohibit the potential use of weapons of war deemed “contrary
to the laws of humanity.”1 Article 23 prohibited the use of poison, poisoned arms, and
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weapons “of a nature to cause superfluous injury.”2 The subsequent Declaration II more
specifically prohibited the use of “projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”3 Neither the British nor the American delegates signed
the poison gas provision, a fact welcomed by some commentators during the Second
Boer War when Britain was fighting an enemy not bound by any part of the Convention.4
The British armed forces already had their eye on a new weapon, called “Taxpayer,”
which was rumored to be a rocket projectile more powerful than the best contemporary
guns, powerful enough to sink an ironclad with one hit, and releasing asphyxiating gas
upon impact.5 An American writer imagined a future war between America and Britain
where a noxious cloud of “greenish white fog” envelops the battling fleets, suffocating
everyone on deck, the survivors and their ships left adrift and ramming into one another
aimlessly.6 One British chemist’s speculations about gas weapons in 1900 read more like
science fiction than science: a bomb that would release a gas to create a forty to sixty
yard radius of temperatures so low anyone walking through would instantly freeze to
death, a gas that would quadruple a man’s heartbeat until his blood vessels burst, and a
bomb containing a sleeping gas that could render unconscious an entire city.7 Actual
science fiction writers, too, used the idea of a noxious gas to terrify. The most popular
example, perhaps, being H.G. Wells’ 1898 novel War of the Worlds, where Martian
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invaders fire canisters that, instead of exploding, discharge a black vapor which spreads
across the countryside and the “touch of that vapour, the inhaling of its pungent wisps,
was death to all that breathes.”8 Although before WWI such weapons were still fictional,
ideas about systems that might cause instant and invisible death may certainly have
impacted the public long before chemical weapons were actually used.
In the months prior to the Second Battle of Ypres, reports in British newspapers were
already stoking fear in the public over weapons that had yet to be used—and, in their
reported form, did not even exist. A news report in early April 1915 suggested the
Germans were practicing the use of new asphyxiating gas grenades on dogs.9
Newspapers also leaked reports of German POWs who divulged to their Allied captors
secret plans to release gas from buried cylinders against enemy trenches.10 Headlines of
these reports ranged from the factual and direct, “Suffocating Gases: New German
Threat” or “A Modern Battle,” to the more provocative “The Suffocation Plan” and “To
Choke Our Men”.11
By the end of the war in 1918 poison gas had become a commonly-used tool in the
arsenals of the belligerent nations, Great Britain and Germany, especially. Chlorine gas,
effective in its initial use but soon negated through the use of proper protective
equipment, was supplanted by new chemical weapons that exacted a horrifying effect on
the human body. Phosgene, like chlorine, attacked the lungs and caused inflammation
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that drowned the victim in his own fluids.12 Lachrymators, such as K.S.K., C.A.P., and
B.B.C., caused profuse tearing of the eyes and pain, to the point where vision became
impossible.13 Chloroarsine gases like D.M. were not lethal on their own, but produced
intense pains in the throat and chest, nausea, headaches, and mental depression, causing
considerable temporary disability.14 The gas most symbolic of WWI, and its most
effective chemical weapon, was mustard, a vesicant gas that caused blisters and burns to
the skin of anyone who came into contact with it.15 The Germans systematically colorcoded their gas shells: Yellow Cross for mustard, Blue Cross for chloroarsines, and Green
Cross for phosgene and diphosgene.16 While initially attacks were made by releasing the
gas from cylinders placed in the trenches, by mid-1916 the combatants were firing lethal
gas shells.17
While contemporary and modern scholars have often argued that the use of gas was
ineffective, it is difficult to discern the true impact of chemical weapons based on
casualty statistics alone. Casualty statistics include only those treated at Casualty
Clearing Stations or Field Ambulances, but some soldiers may have been mildly gassed
without seeking treatment. In the confusion of a battlefield the Field Medical Card, filled
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out by medical personnel at aid stations, may have been filled out erroneously or
inadequately.18 Other soldiers may have suffered from serious physical wounds and were
counted as a shell or bullet casualty although they may also have been gassed.
Additionally, it was not always possible to tell whether a soldier who had died had been
gassed, especially if he also suffered from other injuries. Some gassed casualties may
have been taken prisoner by the enemy and never counted. Casualty statistics are
particularly lacking for the early gas attacks in April and May 1915.19 Casualty statistics
also do not account for the harassing and neutralizing power of gas. Soldiers wearing
cumbersome masks or other anti-gas equipment are less efficient than soldiers without
such paraphernalia.20 Fear and anxiety can also seriously hinder the effectiveness of
troops and just the thought that gas could be present often caused apprehension in
soldiers.
Casualty statistics show that gas was less lethal than conventional weapons of war.
Prior to July 1917, gas casualties accounted for just under 2% of all British casualties in
the war.21 After the introduction of mustard gas this number rose alarmingly to 14%, yet
gas-related deaths accounted for only 2% of the overall British combatant fatalities in
WWI.22 Just over 3% of all 180,981 British gas victims that had been counted by the end
of the war died.23 The French, however, with less effective anti-gas protection than the
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British, were a preferred gas target of the Germans and this combination of poor
equipment and frequent attack may have caused a gas mortality rate as high as 20%.24
Mustard gas was the most effective chemical weapon used by either side in the war.
First used in July 1917 by the Germans against the British, mustard gas caused more
British casualties in its year of use than all the other gases combined.25 Between the first
use of mustard gas in 1917 and the end of the war, a total of over 160,000 gas casualties
were admitted to medical units, over 77% of these were mustard gas cases, although this
number may be higher due to underreporting.26 Mortality rates for mustard poisoning
may not always be accurate because of the long period between exposure and death, as
well as the underreporting of cases, however, the mortality rate of gas shell victims
during the yellow cross period was 2.6%, less than half the gas mortality rate of the
period before mustard was used.27 The effectiveness of mustard gas lay in its casualtyproducing power, not its killing power. While estimates suggested 80% of mustard
casualties could be returned to duty in eight weeks, the average mustard gas case was
unfit for duty for two to three months; this meant a significant loss of manpower for the
British Army for often lengthy periods of time.28
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One British officer claimed mustard gas shelling was the first “undoubted success” the
Germans had had with gas.29 Sall’s Manual of Chemical Warfare referred to mustard gas
as the most effective casualty-producing agent.30
How did a weapon that was seemingly ineffective and actually less lethal compared
to other weapons of modern war come to be vilified and feared long after its last use in a
major conflict? Media coverage of gas weapons, via newspapers, magazines, paintings,
photographs, novels, and radio, strongly influenced public opinion in Britain almost
immediately after Second Ypres. The experiences of soldiers in the trenches who had
been gassed or lived through a gas attack also contributed to how the public at large came
to see the new weapon. Additionally, the very nature of chemical weapons, conjuring
fears of invisible killers and suffocation, added to their extremely negative perception. It
was a weapon that seemed inherently more unfair and horrifying than conventional
weapons such as bombs or bullets. The media coverage of gas weapons in WWI ensured
that chemical warfare entered the public consciousness as something to be feared and set
the tone for how the public and government decision-makers alike would come to dread
its use in the interwar years and WWII.
After Second Ypres Germany was immediately vilified in the press for using chemical
weapons. Because Germany had signed the Hague Convention’s ban on poison gas their
very use of this weapon, and the gas’s horrifying effects, provided new impetus to the
depiction in British media of an especially treacherous enemy.31 The use of asphyxiating
gases ran counter to all rules of warfare, wrote one paper, and directly defied the Hague
29
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Convention.32 One special correspondent wrote that subsequent to the use of poison gas
at Ypres, Britain and her allies were “no longer fighting against a nation, but against a
scourge such as cholera or pest.”33 A headline in the Daily Mirror read “Devilry, Thy
Name Is Germany.”34 A captured German soldier was reported to have laughed at the
suffering of gassed British troops struggling for breath as he was led past.35 While
reports of the enemy killing prisoners or the unarmed were common on both sides, at
Ypres the Germans taking the gas-heavy trenches were accused of telling suffocating
Allied soldiers to lie down, where the gas concentration was highest, in order to “die
better36.” Similarly, a lack of clear understanding of chlorine gas, amongst soldiers in
particular, led some to believe the gas had simply put soldiers to sleep, where they were
then bayonetted by the Germans entering the trenches.37 Some British troops reported
that the gas attacks personalized their anger against the Germans, while one soldier was
now convinced of supposed German war atrocities in Belgium after having been gassed
himself.38
Newspaper reports detailed the horrors of a weapon that seemed to kill without
leaving visible wounds and the suffering of those who had been exposed. The Daily
Mirror ran an image in May 1915 claiming to depict gassed soldiers unconscious in a
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trench.39 While it is impossible to tell from the image whether the soldiers depicted had
been gassed or were merely sleeping, the image worked to convey to the British public
the idea of an unstoppable, invisible weapon, that left no marks on the bodies it touched.
A chaplain of a regiment annihilated at Ypres summed up best the fear this new weapon
evoked: “War! Glorious war! Not one of these men even saw an enemy; they had no
chance to fight man to man, but were killed like poisoned rats in a trap.”40 Sir John
French, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force, in describing the attack at
Second Ypres, was quoted as saying: “What follows almost defies description. The effect
of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line […] practically
incapable of any action at all. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and
hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose and dying condition[…].”41 Survivors of
gas attacks described the spectacle of a greenish cloud drifting along the ground towards
them, as tall as a man, with an acrid smell that burned their lungs. Many fled and were
found later dead on the sides of the road with no visible injuries.42 Men who thought they
had escaped the gas clouds often died more than a day later from its effects, only
contributing to the fearsome reputation of this invisible killer.43 Sir John French
countered German claims that the gas was painless, arguing instead that its victims
suffered acutely and a large number of the cases died a “painful and lingering death.”44
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John Scott Haldane, a Scottish scientist renowned for his work on the causes of mining
disasters and eventual inventor of the British gas mask, was sent to the front to examine
the Canadian victims of the first gas attack. Upon arriving at the casualty clearing station
Haldane found the victims struggling to breathe and blue in the face. He determined the
deaths were the result of a slow asphyxiation and called the use of the gas “brutally
barbarous.”45
While Haldane and French’s observations were relatively subdued, other
correspondents ensured readers could fully visualize the horrific nature of the new
weapon. A gassed officer of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers referred to poison gas as “the
very devil.”46 One unnamed Times correspondent wrote specifically to inform the world
of this new horror after visiting French Senegalese troops who had been gassed at Ypres.
The victims, he wrote, sat propped up against walls, “with mouths open and lead-glazed
eyes, all swaying slightly backwards and forwards trying to get breath.”47 Gas warfare,
the correspondent informed the British public, was the “most awful form of scientific
torture.”48 A Canadian private described the suffering of gassed soldiers, who had fled
without rifles and equipment, falling over on the road, tearing at their eyes and chests,
kicking and struggling until they died. “Tell you what,” he added, “it was just like a fish
does when you take him out of the water.”49 Another correspondent wrote of those
fortunate enough to survive the gas coughing and spitting blood, while the dead left
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behind “turned black at once.”50 Some victims showed no significant symptoms until
thirty hours after exposure they suddenly developed severe pneumonia, their bodies
turning purple.51 The gas’s effects were so horrific, one paper suggested that the
Germans ought to fire diphtheria, enteric fever, or cholera germs instead.52 French writer
Pierre Loti gave a detailed account of the suffering of gas victims, translated and printed
by the New York Times in 1916. Loti described a makeshift field hospital housing gas
victims as a place of “horror which one would think Dante had imagined,” where stoves
burned furiously to ease the patients’ labored breathing, and men “who are struggling in
agony stretch out their poor hands to beg for [air balloons filled with oxygen].”53 The
most seriously injured, he wrote, swollen in the chest, face, and limbs, looked like “India
rubber dolls blown up.”54
The media also contributed to society’s newfound fear over chemical weapons in
other ways. Just days after the initial chlorine gas attack, the British War Office issued a
call to the public for homemade respirators that could be sent to troops at the front.
Although dubbed the “Daily Mail Respirator,” the call for this early type of gas mask ran
in other publications as well, asking the public to make pads of bleached cotton-wool to
cover nostrils and mouth.55 The public’s response was overwhelming: Families,
hospitals, girls’ schools, and women’s societies all rose to the occasion and wagon-loads
of respirators arrived at the Royal Army Clothing Factory. Churches used their weekly
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collection to purchase materials and make respirators.56 Just one day after issuing the
request for half a million respirators, the War Office made an official announcement that
needs had been met.57 Such calls to public action not only allowed the British public to
contribute in some way to the war effort, but here it also cemented in the national
consciousness the horrors of a new type of weapon that could asphyxiate unprotected
troops. Although the Daily Mail Respirator was ineffective (even dangerous as it could
cause asphyxiation) and was recalled almost immediately from the front, its importance
lay not in providing protection for the troops, but in forcing the British public to interact
with the concept of chemical weapons.58
The public and government also quickly realized the potential of this new weapon to
be a direct threat to civilians. With the advent of aerial warfare and the ever-increasing
range of planes and airships, civilians suddenly became potential targets. German
zeppelin bombing raids, while limited in scope and destructiveness, had done enough
damage to cement a newfound fear of aerial raids in the British public.59 Although there
is no record of chemical weapons being used on civilians during this war, the potential of
such an attack became readily apparent. Civilians, having been introduced to the menace
of chemical warfare through the experiences of soldiers and their mobilization in the war
effort, suddenly had to worry about their own safety from poison gas. The Chemical
Warfare Department discussed what the public ought to be told in the case the Germans
were to start “dropping poison in London.”60 To use poison gas in London, one member
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of the department argued, would be “sheer civilian slaying” but did not think this would
deter the Germans.61
British newspapers almost immediately combined the legitimate threat of zeppelin
bombing with the less-realistic use of chemical weapons. Just a few months after Second
Ypres rumors circulated that the Germans had developed, and were testing over the
Baltic, a “gas-emitting zeppelin,” that was heavily armored, with several reservoirs to
hold poison gas.62 Other reports claimed the new zeppelin was also fitted with a new
“bomb dropping apparatus,” and could drop its poisonous load mechanically, while a
small crew worked to fill more bombs with gas.63 While the majority of these reports left
the potential of a civilian gas attack unspoken, others specifically informed readers that
these new zeppelins were intended for the “proposed ‘aerial invasion’ of England.”64
Officials fully expected zeppelins, already dropping explosive and incendiary bombs on
Britain, to employ asphyxiating gases on the civilian population, as well.65 When, in
October 1917, bombs from an air raid in Shoreditch released noxious fumes that affected
sheltering civilians and even killed a ten week old baby, it gave renewed weight to claims
that the Germans would carry out gas attacks against civilians.66
Chemical weapons had earned a negative reputation during the war and ultimately
became the only one of the new war technologies to be banned. Gas weapons were seen
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as an unchivalrous form of warfare, able to be deployed from cover and out of sight.
British Lt. Gen. Charles Ferguson referred to chemical weapons as a “cowardly form of
warfare.”67 Newspaper and eyewitness reports had driven home the idea of poison gas as
an inhumane weapon that silently choked or burned its victims without their knowledge.
The London Medical Society called for a prohibition against chemical weapons.68 By
1925, 27 nations had signed a ban on gas weapons, including Great Britain and
Germany.69 While official opinions were often split on the use of gas weapons, public
opinion was overwhelmingly against chemical warfare. Imagery of troops in gas
protective equipment, their human features all but obscured, also impacted public
perception of the new weapon. One writer worried that, because “chemistry makes no
attempt to preserve manly beauty,” women would find it especially difficult to deal with a
war where poison gas would obscure the features of their husbands and sons.70
Not all agreed with the notion of gas as inhumane. One officer argued that the
mortality of gas was much lower than that of shell wounds and the suffering it caused not
necessarily greater. He added that if gas were to be abolished it would have to be on
grounds other than its inhumanity.71 The Commandant of the Royal Engineers claimed
that calls to abolish gas were based on “foolish sentimentalism” and that gas was actually
the most humane weapon used in war, because it led to a decision with the least amount
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of human suffering.72 A scientist argued poison gas was misunderstood and represented
the most humane weapon of war, citing the low mortality rate of gas casualties as proof.73
Whether seen as a horrible and cowardly scourge or as an effective and humane
weapon, all those who talked about poison gas assumed it would play a significant role in
future wars. American Maj. Gen. William Sibert, Director of the Chemical Warfare
Service at the end of WWI, considered chemical weapons one of the most effective
instruments of war and that they would play an important part in any future conflict.74
Months before the Treaty of Versailles, there already existed a collective fear over the use
of new war technologies on a grander, more destructive scale in a future conflict. Lord
Grey, Britain’s foreign secretary, suggested that in the next war there would be no
fighting in the normal sense and everything would be done by poison gas.75 Others
suggested poison gas had proven superior to explosives and that a future war had the
potential to be a war of gas entirely.76 Speculations saw the poison gas of the future as
colorless, odorless, packed into compact pill form and able to be shot from guns or
hidden in the ground, with the power to contaminate acres of land for months, forcing
infantrymen to stagger about hidden behind masks and rubber coats.77 The Germans
were rumored to have invented a gas that remained deadly for up to eight days and could
be sprayed in a dried form from airplanes, making the strategic occupation of territory
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nearly impossible for troops.78 One American speculated a future war where scientists
piloted unmanned wireless planes with the capability to drop poison gas onto vast
amounts of the civilian population.79 The somewhat sensational Liberty Magazine
dedicated several pages to speculation on a horrific future poison gas war in Europe. The
nation under attack, the magazine wrote, would not know what had happened until “the
streets and homes, cellars and subways, houses and business buildings of some great city
[are] filled with gasping, twisting, choking men, women, and children or littered with
tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of dead […].”80
The news media also ensured the public was reminded of the danger of poison gas
even during peacetime. The plight of veterans who had been gassed during the war
regularly received public mention after 1918. A case of a veteran destroying his house,
attempting to murder his wife, and ultimately committing suicide, was attributed to his
exposure to chemical weapons during the war. The coroner suggested poison gas victims
were often “afflicted with impulsive insanity.”81 The British Legion, aiming to abolish
the seven years’ time limit a soldier had to file for disability pension, drew attention
particularly to gas poisoning victims, whose condition often deteriorated most noticeably
when they were outside the time limit.82 Soldiers who succumbed to gas injuries years
after the war still received attention in the papers, with headlines that could have
stemmed from the war as easily as from the 1920s or 1930s. One disabled veteran, who
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died more than ten years after the end of the war, had his death directly attributed to gas
poisoning suffered in 1918. The Lancashire Evening Post ran coverage of his death not
as an obituary, but as an article under the headline “Accrington Man Succumbs to Effect
of Gas Poisoning.”83
Reports also suggested poison gas was dangerous by itself, without anyone’s intent to
use it as a weapon. Chemical factory explosions often made headlines. A French
chlorine gas factory exploded in 1926, killing 19.84 An explosion at a chemical factory in
Germany spread green clouds of poisonous gas into nearby towns and necessitated the
wearing of masks for relief workers. As many as 1,500 died in the explosion and
subsequent gas release, leading to some in London to issue renewed calls for chemical
disarmament.85 In 1920, a British worker handling scrap metal drums died from
exposure to the mustard gas the drums had once contained. The Ministry of Munitions,
seeking to deflect all blame, claimed all usual methods of neutralizing chemical agents
had been followed, but must not have been sufficient.86 Just a few years later large
quantities of German Blue Cross gas shells were buried in a moor near Cologne, yet fears
over continued dangers led German officials to close the moor for a period of 30 years.87
In the Times report of the incident, the paper ensured its readers understood the
implacable dangers of poison gas, explaining that even though the shells had been
neutralized, burned, buried, disinterred, and reburied in a special concrete coffin, they
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could not be rendered completely harmless.88 Such instances suggested to the public that
poison gas was so dangerous, that once in existence it could never be destroyed or made
safe.
Newspapers were not the only medium, however, that ensured citizens understood the
horror of chemical weapons. In the aftermath of WWI former soldiers from both sides
published their war experiences in the forms of diaries, memoirs, poems, and novels. In
Erich Maria Remarque’s popular novel All Quiet on the Western Front, the protagonist
finds himself in a graveyard during a gas attack, combining imagery of fear, gas, and
death in an eerie scene.89 The narrator also describes the suffering of gassed soldiers who
“cough up their burnt lungs in clots” and he is later gassed himself.90 Wilfred Owen’s
anti-war poem Dulce et Decorum Est vividly described the agonizing death of a gassed
soldier. In Goodbye to All That, British officer Robert Graves detailed his experiences at
the Battle of Loos, where the British use of gas turned out disastrously for their own men
because of a headwind.91 Correspondent Frederic Villiers illustrated his experiences on
the front with various sketches. His sketch of the first gas attack at Ypres depicts the
cloud of chlorine gas as a force strong enough to knock soldiers off their feet.92 Other
sketches included soldiers in a trench putting on their respirators, canisters leaking gas
into French trenches, and French soldiers soaking hay in hypo sulfate solution as an early
form of gas protection.93 While these published materials spoke of soldiers’ experiences,
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civilians could easily extrapolate such dangers into their own lives, particularly in light of
the war’s civilian casualties and technological advances in aviation after 1918.
Fiction also made use of the idea of poison gas. Olaf Stapleton’s 1930 novel Last and
First Men tells the story of a devastating war where bomber fleets deploy large amounts
of poison gas against the cities of Europe, ultimately leaving the continent practically
uninhabited.94 H.G. Wells speculated on the future of gas warfare in The Shape of Things
to Come, telling the reader from the perspective of a writer in the 22nd century about
“past” wars where gas was used and developments in chemical warfare, such as gases
which “[…] killed instantly and cruel and creeping poisons that implacably rotted the
brain. Some produced convulsions and a knotting up of the muscles […].”95 A Permanent
Death Gas turned a several square mile area of East Prussia into a death zone that no one
dared enter for several decades.96 Cicely Hamilton’s dystopian Theodore Savage
imagined a future aerial war that collapses British civilization. It described refugees
fleeing the war as “a horde of human rats driven out of their holes by terror, by fire and
by gas.”97 The government had failed to provide its civilians with gas masks, ultimately
dooming them to death.98 When the protagonist comes across a village filled with bodies
he finds that “These people had died suddenly, in strange contorted attitudes—here
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crouching, there outstretched with clawing fingers. Gas, he supposed—a cloud of gas
rolling down the street before the wind—and perhaps not a soul left alive!”99
Films, too, fictionalized poison gas. A reviewer at the Nottingham Journal was
disturbed at a German film that envisioned a future war with soldiers fighting in gasproof diver suits and rifles that could fire poison gas.100 The 1929 picture The Spy was an
action film about the efforts to upset organized society and included, among other
sensations, poison gas.101 A 1934 film titled The Right to Live was advertised with the
tagline “War! Poison Gas! Is there an antidote?”102 In the 1938 film Flash Gordon’s Trip
to Mars, the hero Gordon and his sidekicks confront the evil Azura who employs poison
gas to escape and orders a bombing raid on civilians.103 The 1939 Anything to Declare
was touted as an “ARP thriller” that revolved around the invention of an anti-gas formula
that made all poison gases harmless.104 A film made during the war depicted the exploits
of a British sabotage expert who goes to Czechoslovakia to blow up a Nazi poison gas
factory.105
After the end of WWI, fears over a chemical threat to civilians only increased. The
speculation regarding future wars fought entirely with chemical weapons, or featuring
increasingly sophisticated gas weapons, were extrapolated to impact the civilian
populations, as well. Britain determined that 50 tons of the latest arsenical gas, spread by
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modern, low-flying bombers, would be sufficient to wipe out all of London.106 British
experts assumed future air attacks would occur in three phases, beginning with incendiary
bombing to cause congestion through fires, high-explosive bombing, and, lastly, an attack
with gas to “stampede the civilian population.”107 U.S. Congressman Julius Kahn argued
that in a future war there would be no non-combatants because bombs dropped from
airplanes did not distinguish between soldiers and civilians. The gas fumes, he said, “will
strangle the soldier, then search out the innermost crevices of the nursery.”108 Someone
else envisioned a future archaeologist digging up the lost civilization of the British
Empire after a machine war that saw the gas menace catch unawares a population that
had no protection, was too large to be evacuated, and had not been properly drilled or
trained in what to do. The writer continued that people were driven into the streets and
even those with masks could not withstand the barrage of deadly gas which “began to
spread, rolled down the street canyons and enshrouded the houses, and death came to the
citizens, if not that day, then the next, through the simple act of breathing poisoned
air.”109
There were calls throughout the interwar period to abolish poison gas entirely. In
1925 the League of Nations drafted a charter to ban the use of all chemical weapons in
war. Known as the “Geneva Gas Protocol” the charter was signed in 1928 and ratified by
most signatories, but concerns over a possible future use of gas persisted.110 In 1928 these
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concerns were significant enough to be addressed at an international conference in
Brussels. Chemical warfare experts from fifteen nationalities met to discuss efforts to
protect civilian populations from poison gas.111 The committee concluded that in a war
of the future, no proper protection existed for civilians and that anti-gas measures were a
delusion. If a chemical war were to take place, they wrote, it was “likely to produce the
most frightful catastrophe among a country’s noncombatants.”112 Other experts agreed
that civilians living in urban centers would likely be the targets of future wars, but that
protecting civilian populations through the distribution of gas masks or the building of
bomb shelters was financially and physically unfeasible. Only through promoting peace,
they concluded, could nations protect their civilians from modern warfare.113 The AntiPoison Gas Association was still engaging in propaganda work nearly a decade after the
League of Nations charter, seeking to make all people realize the need to abolish poison
gas.114 Others argued politicians were failing to protect populations from gas and
scientists would have to do their part to promote abolishing chemical weapons.115
Britain also kept a close eye on the chemical warfare preparations of its potential
future enemies. Reports that Germany was developing a new and deadly poison gas
reached Britain as early as 1924.116 A German War Academy syllabus that trained its
students in the gas protection of civil populations suggested that Germany expected their
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civilians to become gas targets.117 A source informed British military leaders that German
chemical factories had been so organized that they could be converted to manufacturing
poison gas within 48 hours.118 Germany was also reported to have created a material that
was proof against mustard gas and were already manufacturing overalls in German fieldgray out of it.119
In the 1920s the British government began considering how to protect its civil
population from gas. The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was intended to provide
answers on a variety of subjects and its Air Raid Precautions Sub-Committee specifically
dealt with protecting the civilian populations from air raids. In 1924 the Sub-Committee
first considered how to protect the civil population from a gas attack.120 In 1931 the CID
argued that it was important to continue such preparations even after the 1925 Geneva
Gas Protocol because some signatories had added a clause making their assent to the ban
dependent on being allowed to retaliate should they suffer a gas attack.121 The Committee
considered that it might be likely that civilians would be subject to future gas attacks, the
effects of which on a population ignorant of the dangers and with no scheme of defense,
could be disastrous.122 The Committee saw the preparation of a defense scheme and the
education of the public on gas warfare as a vital necessity, arguing that this would largely
negate the terror of chemical weapons, which it saw as the worst effects of gas.123 This
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demonstrates that the Committee understood that the psychological effects of gas on the
population would be much greater than those of other types of bombs and that only
reliable information released by the government could counter the ignorance and
exaggerated notions about poison gas held by the public.124
As tensions in Europe rose, so did anxieties over the potential use of poison gas in a
future war. The Czech Crisis in 1938 especially hurried preparations for what seemed like
an inevitable war. All government departments, including those responsible for protecting
British civilians, accelerated their civil defense measures in response. During this period,
the Home Office assembled and issued approximately 38 million respirators to civilians
that had been previously stored for a future emergency.125 To those engaged in civil
defense services the Home Office issued duty respirators, protective clothing, and bleach
powder.126 The lack of ready protection for small children and babies was particularly
worrying during the crisis.127
The outbreak of war in 1939 was marked by concerns that gas would be used
against civilians. Immediately after the outbreak of war on September 1st, newspapers
across Britain informed their readers on what to do if the Germans attacked, notifying
them that rattles would signal a gas attack and asked that people keep their gas masks
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close by as they might not have much time to prepare.128 One newspaper reported that
Germany intended to break her pledge not to use chemical weapons129. The Ministry of
Home Security (MHS), its mission the protection of civilians on the homefront, had been
preparing for a possible war and within the first few months of the conflict issued
pamphlets to citizens that would teach them how to prepare for an attack. Poison gas was
an important topic. A few months before war was officially declared, the Home Office
printed and distributed through the post office millions of public information leaflets to
instruct citizens on air raid precautions in case of war.130 Public Information Leaflet No. 2
instructed readers on how their gas masks functioned, how to wear them, and how to
properly care for them.131 The pamphlet Shelter from Air Attack included a section titled
“Bombs and Gas” that informed its reader on the various bombs that might be used and
how they operated.132
The Home Office sought to publicize the gas threat throughout the war without
causing undue alarm among the population. Gas publicity became a balancing act
between engendering enough worry to get people to act, but to also provide enough
reassurance to avoid panic and disorder. A pamphlet titled How to Defend Yourself
Against Gas suggested that gas might be used to terrorize people, but that there was no
need to be frightened if one knew how to be prepared.133 This pamphlet included
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instructions on how to recognize gas, the types of gases that might be used, how to
protect oneself, and how to use the civilian respirator.134 After the start of the Blitz, Prime
Minister Winston Churchill asked the MHS to review anti-gas precautions for the public
and the resulting gas publicity campaign began with Home Secretary Sir John Anderson
broadcasting a speech to remind civilians of the gas threat.135 One official suggested that
this pamphlet and Anderson’s speech needed to be supplemented with a broadcast of
reassurance by the Minister, a full press statement of reassurance and instructions, and a
poster containing the main points of the leaflet to forestall any panic and stampeding that
might be caused if gas were used.136 After seeing a draft of a poster depicting a drawing
of a man and woman donning respirators as a gas attack occurs, an employee of the
Public Relations Department wrote to the officer in charge with a suggestion: “could you
persuade the artist to take the look of terror out of the lady’s eyes? We are anxious to
convince the Public that there is no need for apprehension if you have your gas-mask
with you […].”137 Public Information Leaflet No. 6 instructed readers on how to protect
the food in their homes from poison gas, intending to reassure the anxieties of many who
worried about losing food in a time when it was already strictly rationed.138 Another draft
pamphlet proclaimed that “Gas will be no more than a nuisance - if we are ready.”139
Gas—what you should know was a pamphlet issued by the MHS in 1941 that informed
the reader that gas might be used to “upset your daily life,” but that this could be avoided
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by following the instructions provided, which focused on using the respirator and simple
first aid.140 A film trailer dealing with anti-gas precautions was also prepared, in addition
to short BBC broadcast talks on the subject.141 The MHS and Ministry of Information
(MI) also collaborated on an anti-gas exhibition held at the Charing Cross Underground
Station and considered locations for further such exhibitions.142 The MHS also found
that it was increasingly difficult to ensure public attention to the topic when no gas attack
had transpired several months into the Blitz and suggested that publicity measures should
be spaced out carefully to provide a fresh start for the campaign every few weeks.143
Government offices responsible for educating the public also employed the press as
a tool of gas publicity. This campaign published a series of four anti-gas advertisements
in all of the Sunday newspapers, which enjoyed a large readership.144 While these
advertisements were primarily visual and provided only basic instructions, the ministries
involved in gas publicity also published “Gas Raid Quizzes” to provide more in-depth
information to readers. Over a period of several months, as many as twenty different
quizzes were published in British newspapers, each asking several questions about gas
precautions and providing a short answer. Questions included what to do with a child
unwilling to wear a respirator, whether or not a man should give up his mask for a
woman, how to wear spectacles with a respirator, what to do if one is driving while a gas
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rattle sounds, and how to deal with mustard gas splashes on the skin.145 Readers were
expected to look at the questions and determine how much they knew themselves about
gas precautions. By the end of 1941, the gas raid quizzes, which had initially been
entirely textual, were published in the form of advertisements, with a related drawing,
large text, and only one or two questions and answers.146 When the press published
reports and images covering a gas exercise in Brighton, however, the MHS and MI were
quite upset, arguing that it crossed the boundary of mere press publicity because it did not
simply provide instruction or advice.147 Officials in both ministries quickly sought to shut
down any coverage of gas exercises (and pictures thereof especially) to avoid alarming
the public.148 Similarly, it was planned to censor newspaper accounts of actual gas
attacks, should they occur, and in particular references to where gas had been dropped,
what type of gas was used, the effects of the gas, and the number of casualties.149
That the Germans would use gas against the British Isles was a recurring theme
during the war. Early in the war, a rumor suggested the Germans were trying to
impregnate dust clouds with vesicants which they could release from aircraft or let drift
across the Channel.150 It was also reported that the Germans planned to attached gas-
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filled tanks to submarines to be towed into British seaports, where their deadly contents
would be unleashed on the civilian population.151
Until mid-1940, the war had been relatively quiet for British civilians, but emerging
rumors about imminent gas attacks caused new anxieties. In July 1940 the MHS was
greatly concerned about a gas attack on Britain after reports that gas bombs had been
distributed in German aerodromes and that the German ARP department had been
instructed to test all civilian respirators.152 Intelligence also strongly suggested the
Germans planned to use gas in preparation for an invasion of the island.153 By the end of
the month an attack with gas on Britain was considered “a definite possibility.”154 New
prime minister Winston Churchill asked that further and repeated warnings be given to
the public about gas and that every gas mask ought to be tested and civilians told to carry
them everywhere.155 While the MHS wanted citizens to be prepared for a chemical
weapons attack, they worried the public would panic unduly if excessive attention was
paid to gas.156 Subsequently, a July 30th broadcast by Home Secretary John Anderson
enjoined citizens to prepare for gas in between reminding them of other air raid
precautions.157 A year later, a new report surfaced from Switzerland that Hitler intended
to employ a new gas that persisted at ground level for an attack against Russia and an
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attempt to invade Britain.158 Again, in 1943, a source claimed Hitler had told Mussolini
he intended to use gas “in the near future” against England.159 The War Office was also
concerned at reports that German troops had been made to carry full anti-gas equipment,
had increased anti-gas training, and were practicing in their masks.160
Often private citizens wrote to the Ministry of Information about gas rumors they
had heard. One man heard a tale while dining that Hitler had developed a very powerful
gas that could not be smelled and killed very suddenly about a month after inhalation.161
Another wrote that a “reliable source” had informed him that a white powder lying in the
streets after German raids was a new form of poison gas that was inert in its dry state, but
upon a rain shower a “extremely potent poison” would be released.162 A concerned
civilian even wrote in from Australia to inform the Intelligence Department that Hitler’s
secret weapon was a new type of gas.163 An anonymous letter was sent to the British
legation in German notifying them that the Germans had been storing enormous amounts
of poison gas and were intending to use it in an upcoming offensive.164
The worry over a gas attack was often more pronounced in the British colonies. An
official 1935 report considered the need for protection in Malta. It argued that the island’s
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high humidity and porous limestone made it an ideal target for gas warfare.165
Subsequently, sufficient cheap respirators were made available for the civil population of
Malta.166 At Aden, officials called for supplies of anti-gas equipment for the civil
population as early as 1936, as a result of the Italians using gas against the
Abyssinians.167 Over 4,000 respirators were sent for the protection of British civilians in
Aden.168 The Egyptian Consular Office asked for respirators for its British civilian
subjects as early as July 1938, although some worried that panic-stricken “natives” might
try to take possession of the coveted masks.169 British subjects in Egypt particularly
feared a gas attack if Italy were to enter the war, as the Italians had already employed
poison gas against Abyssinia and the Egyptians offered a similarly unprotected target.170
The British civilians in Egypt were getting “very anxious” when by 1941 the full
allotment of babies’ and children’s gas masks had still not been received.171 By 1942,
Singapore, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and Canada had requested civilian
respirators from Britain, but rubber shortages meant these requests could not be met.172
Fear of chemical warfare was also evident in rumors of Germans poisoning
civilians through everyday objects. Just after the start of the London Blitz, the police
received reports in several regions about cobwebs, a white “gossamer like” substance,
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that had supposedly been dropped from German planes during a raid and that caused
blistering of the skin when touched.173 The material was said to have floated from the sky
and, in one area, covered as much as five square miles in fine white streamers that hung
from hedges and poles.174 After testing it was determined that the purported enemy
weapon in fact comprised spiderwebs spun by a special type of spider that created its web
on the ground surface.175 This incident mimicked WWI fears of German poison dropped
from planes. Sweets found on the ground by civilians after an air raid were suspected of
being poisoned, but upon laboratory testing no traces of poison or biological agents were
found.176 Some chocolates received similar attention, although the local police did not
bother with lab tests, instead throwing the chocolates down the stairs to prove they could
not have been dropped by a plane.177 Another rumor claimed that German planes had
dropped poisoned soup packets on Calais, killing a French family. This was shocking
enough to receive attention in British newspapers, but testing again revealed no known
poisons.178 Poisoned cakes were also said to have been dropped.179 Such reports of
poisoned items dropped from planes caused enough public anxiety that one news agency
was reprimanded for its exaggerated and falsified reports.180
During the war the news media continued to ensure civilians did not forget about
the gas threat. In August 1940, one paper urged its readers to carry their gas masks as
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“the use of poison gas by the enemy is now a possibility not to be discounted.”181
Reminding British civilians of their own duties in the case of a gas attack was a common
theme in newspaper articles during the war. A member of the MHS suggested most
civilians were ill-prepared for a gas attack.182 The Coventry Evening Telegraph asked its
readers “Is Coventry Prepared Against Gas?” and suggested each citizen was responsible
for his or her own preparedness.183 By 1942, newspapers were suggesting that the more
desperate the Nazis became, the more likely they were to use poison gas.184 The
Lancashire Evening Post juxtaposed a similar article on Nazi gas plans for Britain with a
large-print call for readers to carry their gas masks, although underneath in smaller print
this was explained to be for a gas exercise to take place later.185 Reports of a new type of
German gas were repeated throughout the war. In 1942 newspapers reported the Germans
were going to use a new gas in their offensive against Russia. 186 This new gas was said to
attack the nervous system.187 A few years later the Germans were said to have a gas held
in glass phials that soldiers would smash against enemy tanks to blind their crews.188
Poison gas loomed large in the British public consciousness by the end of WWI
and, with the very real threat of civilian targeting in WWII, solidified its standing as a
significant factor in public anxiety. The basic concept of poison gas as a killer and
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something to be despised was well-understood by all members of society. Poison gas was
such a readily understood concept that it could be used in analogous reasoning to nonrelated things, such as gossip, which also had many types and could be spread unseen.189
The public had a deep enough understanding of gas warfare and its accouterments to give
meaning to images such as one printed in Britannia & Eve that showed two uniformed
members of the Legion of Frontiersmen in gas masks, one holding an unconscious
woman, while the other crouches in front of her with his hands in a bag on her chest.
Only readers familiar with gas masks and gas warfare would understand that the
Frontiersman is attempting to pull out the woman’s mask to put it on her, instead of
robbing her of her belongings.190 The actual use of chemical weapons in WWI taught
civilians and government decision-makers the very real effects such weapons had on the
human body and its condemnation as barbaric ensured that people feared poison gas
immediately. The interwar period only reinforced notions about poison gas as a weapon
to be dreaded. Contact with WWI veterans provided civilians with first-hand experiences
of what it meant to be gassed and popular media often made poison gas a tool used by
villains. Continued tensions in Europe ensured that future conflict was often on the minds
of civilians and government leaders alike and speculations concerning such a war often
included the use of poison gas. When war did break out again, Great Britain had
expended a massive effort of money, materials, and man-hours to ensure its population
was not just protected from air raids, but that it was well-protected from a possible use of
poison gas. While chemical weapons were not actually used in WWII, both government
and civilians worried throughout the war that a gas attack could happen in Britain.
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Chapter 3 - “An Unconquerable People:” Air Raid Precautions for the British Civil
Population, 1914-1945

The advent of aerial warfare and the start of German raids on Britain in WWI made
it clear to government and citizens alike that civil populations had become targets. While
WWI raids on the British population were limited in scope and the destruction these
caused, they nevertheless presented enough of a threat to worry a large part of the
citizenry. Almost immediately the government had to create some means of warning and
education for the public, a scheme that proved relatively successful in light of the
restrictive nature of WWI raids. These early raids, and the damage they wrought, did,
however, allow the government and civilians to extrapolate this threat to a possible future
war, where technological improvements in aircraft and bombs could potentially wreak
havoc on an unprotected population. In the years following WWI government decisionmakers discussed the need for a system that provided uniform education, training, and
equipment to civilians to deal with air raids and that could channel possible negative
energies into useful, or at least purposeful, actions. The idea behind civil defense was that
it would allow all civilians to protect themselves and their families from harm during
raids and to remain calm and ordered during such times to forestall morale-sapping panic.
During WWI, Britain saw several dozen attacks by German planes and airships,
primarily in coastal areas. The first raid occurred in December 1914 and was carried out
by an airplane that targeted Dover.1 By the end of 1916 thirty air or seaplane raids had
targeted Britain, usually via a single raider that never penetrated very far past the
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coastline and did little damage.2 The first zeppelin raid occurred in January 1915, when
two German airships crossed the coastline to drop bombs on prominent buildings, such as
a church and a racecourse.3 While soldiers manning anti-aircraft guns and pilots
attempting to shoot down zeppelins enjoyed some success, German air raids did enough
damage during the war to make British civilians conscious of their sudden vulnerability.
One man who lived through both world wars remembered the WWI raids as just as
frightening as those of WWII.4 From the start of raiding in Britain to the end of the war
German air raids caused over 2,000 casualties, most of whom were in London.5 The
zeppelins were seen as especially menacing, both for their unique size and shape and
their silent flight when the engines were turned off which would suddenly see an airship
emerge from behind cloud cover to drop bombs. One civilian who remembered the
zeppelin raids equated the terror that zeppelins spread as similar to that of the V-2 rockets
of WWII.6
Despite the dangers, many watched the airships as they hung in the sky. Air raids
were still a novelty and people could only guess at the actual danger they might be in
from a raiding zeppelin or plane. One child remembered that many people were more
curious of the zeppelins than afraid enough to take shelter. The child and his friends were
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sent home from school as a raid was coming, but instead went to a high bridge to watch
the zeppelin.7 One woman remembered the first zeppelin that appeared over West-Ham
Park and watched as it was shot down on “a lovely afternoon.”8 A girl who sheltered in
the basement with her family was lifted up to spot the zeppelin through the window as it
flew over London.9 A young boy remembered being allowed to watch from the basement
window if anything spectacular occurred during a raid.10 Another family went to the front
door when the anti-aircraft guns sounded to watch the zeppelin from the porch, not too
close, but quite “near enough to be unpleasant.”11 A young woman described seeing the
zeppelin as “a wonderful sight. It looked like a silver cigar […]” and when searchlights
and guns had the airship in their sights “it was something like looking at a magic
lantern.”12 Someone else remembered the zeppelin looking like a “silver fish” highlighted
in the searchlights.13 Others watched from their roof garden as a zeppelin caught in the
searchlights suddenly caught flame and came down from the sky, bending in the
middle.14 Millions of Londoners cheered when a zeppelin was brought down in
September 1916.15 Young boys often spent hours looking for shrapnel or pieces of
zeppelins to collect and trade.16 When a zeppelin was brought down at Potters Bar
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hundreds of people set out the next day to go see the wreckage and were sold souvenir
pieces of the airship, although these were swiftly confiscated by police.17
Some passive means of defense, such as lighting restrictions, existed even before
the first raids on Britain. Lighting restrictions were initially applied only to London and
Eastern and Southeastern counties, but after the penetration of zeppelins farther inland
these restrictions were extended and ultimately covered the whole of England and Wales
and a part of Scotland.18 This restriction ordered that all lights, other than those not
visible from outside of a house, must be extinguished between specified hours.19 This
included lit advertisements and shop windows, as well as street lamps, while lights inside
shops, buses, and tram cars had to be shaded.20 In 1915 the Admiralty (which was
responsible for home defense) added a requirement that the headlamps of cars be
extinguished or shaded.21 There was no legal compulsion for civilians to comply with
lighting orders, however, and after the first zeppelin raid several local authorities asked
the Home Office for compulsory powers.22 London, with its multitude of motor cars and
variety of streetlights, presented a significant light problem and required special orders
and extended police powers.23 The concern over visible lights leading the enemy to his
target was so serious that authorities questioned the use of flashlights by pedestrians, who
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needed them to walk after dark since streetlights had been extinguished, and in some
cases people were even prosecuted for striking a match in the open after dark.24
The government eventually instituted a crude warning system to allow people to
prepare for an attack. Initially reluctant to give warnings over concerns that it would
cause too much work stoppage in factories, the government eventually relented, in part
because many munition workers, female especially, refused to work at night unless they
would be warned in time of an air raid.25 Because it was impossible, especially in the first
two years of the war, to give prompt and reliable warning, there was a good chance that a
hostile raider or airship might appear unannounced, undermining the sense of security a
public warning was intended to convey.26 For the purposes of issuing a warning the
whole of England and Wales and parts of Scotland were divided into seven “Warning
Controls,” each under the leadership of a “Warning Controller.”27 The Controller received
information on the movement of hostile aircraft and, if it appeared that the aircraft were
heading towards his Control he would inform the telephone exchange manager, who
would then send on the warning to the various telephone exchanges.28 Only those who
had subscribed to the warning lists would receive the telephone warning and this included
those who needed to make preparatory arrangements, such as factories, businesses, and
government offices.29 This WWI warning system suffered seriously from the limitations
of communication. In February 1916 nine German airships penetrated British defenses in
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what is often known as ‘The Silent Raid’ because no air raid warnings were given in most
of the locales bombed. The zeppelins penetrated as far inland as Derbyshire and many
towns that were attacked did not fall under the lighting order. Clogged telephone lines
and inadequate arrangements to transmit warnings from region to region led to the lack of
a public warning.30 Confusion also arose over the type of warning sound various
localities employed. Birmingham, for instance, discontinued the use of warning sirens in
the city, but the adjoining borough of Smethwick continued to use theirs, which were
easily audible in Birmingham, leading to significant confusion in the case of a raid.31
Civilians were also warned before an attack. Such warnings in WWI served
primarily to allow people to extinguish any visible light and urge those outdoors to find
cover.32 Initially, a number of means of warning the public were considered, including the
ringing of telephone bells, the turning on of street lamps, the ringing of tramcar bells, and
the firing of blank charges by the anti-aircraft guns, but all these were considered to take
too long or be ineffective.33 By the middle of 1916 over 500 places of public
entertainment in London, such as cinemas, theaters, and music halls, were included on
the official warning list.34 When there was an imminent threat policemen were sent out on
bicycles or foot carrying placards that read “Air Raid Take Shelter.”35 Sometimes these
signs were printed front and back marked ‘Take Cover’ and then “All Clear’ for after the
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raid.36 The policemen would blow whistles or a bugle would sound for the “all clear.”37
In other areas Boy Scouts blew whistles to indicate the “all clear.”38 There was no
consistency between regions, however, and in some locales constables and the fire
brigade would call out a warning when an attack was possible, but there was no specific
warning when an attack was imminent.39 Eventually maroons were used to warn the
population before a raid, but these exploded with “a shattering bang and scarlet flare”
loud enough to be mistaken by many for the raid itself and thus may often have caused
more panic than they prevented.40 These maroons, sound bombs usually used as a distress
signal at sea, rose to a height of 1000 feet before exploding and could be effectively
heard over an area of a square mile.41 Because of the slow speeds of planes and airships
at the time, warnings were given as much as twenty minutes in advance of a raid, a stark
contrast from WWII.42 For many civilians the air raid warnings caused indignation and
often aroused curiosity rather than impelling people to seek shelter.43 At night, most local
authorities were reluctant to employ sound warnings and only policemen with placards
and whistles or bells were used to clear the streets, although some members of the public
complained that such warnings did not reach those indoors who wanted to seek shelter.44
By 1917, the public were increasingly demanding something more emphatic than
36
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placards at night and in February 1918 the decision was made to fire maroons at any time
during the day.45 Hull’s Chief Constable admitted he would not have used sound signals
had he known what the effect would be, especially in light of the complaints of the upper
classes, who preferred to stay at home during a raid, and opposed the noisy warnings.46
Civilians were quickly instructed on ways to protect themselves from air raids. It
was important that civilians came to appreciate the risks to which they might be exposed
during an attack and how to take steps to protect themselves. 47 There was, however, no
definite or prescribed course of action the government or local authorities could point to,
and thus only general principles of protection were issued to the public. Early in 1915, a
poster illustrating the shapes and types of German and British aircraft was widely
distributed and achieved significant popularity.48 The British Fire Prevention Committee,
consulting with the Home Office, issued a series of leaflets on fire prevention.49
Instructions were issued to towns in the East in 1915 and printed in local newspapers.
These instructions were minimal, telling people to disperse, seek shelter, go into cellars
or lower rooms if possible, and not to touch unexploded ordinance.50
In Hull, middle and lower class people would trek into the countryside with their families
upon the sounding of the public warning, which on some nights may have affected up to
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as many as 40,000 people.51 Civilians were generally instructed to remain indoors upon a
warning, but experience showed only the “educated and responsible” section of society
complied, while the “masses” living in the East End were quick to leave their homes for
what they saw as better shelter at the slightest sign of a raid.52
Civil defense services, however, were generally unsophisticated, disorganized, and
often unofficial. In some areas there was a voluntary night patrol, a precursor to the
Wardens' Service in the next war. At the Holy Trinity Church in Islington, London,
civilian volunteers patrolled the church grounds every night during the war in teams of
two men for two-hour shifts that began at 10PM and ended at 4AM.53 If an air raid
warning sounded the patrolmen would turn off all the lights, open all doors, set out guide
lamps, and control the crowds who sought shelter in the church.54 Without a
comprehensive medical system to deal with air raid casualties, treatment for victims was
sometimes delayed. One doctor suggested that Special Constables should receive a short
first-aid course to treat serious casualties on the spot and potentially save lives.55 In
London, by 1917, there existed about sixty air raid depots with fleets of ambulances
operated by voluntary organizations and coordinated by the police to ensure air raid
victims could be dispatched to hospitals more quickly.56 Local groups and charities often
held first-aid courses for civilians to allow them to render assistance during a raid, but
there was no official system of training or training requirements for those engaged in air
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raid precautions.57 A national relief fund and charities, such as the Mansion House Fund,
offered financial assistance to the victims of air raids.58
After the raids of WWI, it was clear that a better system of air raid precautions was
needed in case of a future war. In 1924 the Sub-Committee on Air Raid Precautions was
added to the CID with Sir John Anderson, future Home Secretary, as its chairman. The
sub-committee was established to consider the question of air raid precautions in light of
“the exposed situation of the Capital and seat of Government and other parts of southern
England to air raid attack.”59 The members of the Sub-Committee were alarmed by an Air
Staff report of the danger to which Britain was exposed, which estimated that the nearest
enemy could drop a higher tonnage of bombs on Britain in the first 48 hours of a future
war than had been dropped in all of WWI.60 The Committee also suggested that for
precautionary measures to be taken seriously the public had to be receptive and
understand the danger of air attack. They did not, however, wish to institute the
immediate and wide distribution of information on the topic, instead arguing that
education on air raids should be “slow and gradual” to avoid creating “undue alarm” in
the population.61 A 1925 report by the CID considered necessary aspects of an air raid
precautions system, such as a warning system, damage prevention, vital services after a
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raid, and anti-gas measures.62 The Sub-Committee saw the education and morale of the
public as cornerstone of national defense, assuming that in a future war “that nation,
whose people can endure aerial bombardment the longer and with greater stoicism, will
ultimately prove victorious.”63
The Committee drew conclusions based on air raid experiences in WWI. They
thought an ad hoc warning system would only aid the enemy in disrupting normal life,
but considered a fully worked out warning system to be necessary, partially in light of the
refusal by munition workers to continue their work during a raid.64 Additionally, they
recommended the use of the wireless broadcasting service as an important alternative or
supplement to the warning system, especially if telephone lines became congested or
interrupted.65 The Committee recommended that, in the future, lighting restrictions be
vested entirely in the Home Office, to avoid the confusion and conflicting guidelines
from WWI.66 They realized the necessity for a well-staffed and organized medical system
and ambulance service to care for the many casualties to be expected in massive air
raids.67 While British civilians did not suffer from a gas attack in WWI, a future attack
with chemical weapons seemed likely. To combat the gas menace the Committee
suggested the creation of a decontamination service, the gas-proofing of buildings,
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training the police in anti-gas measures, and educating the public on how to protect
themselves.68
Even prior to the outbreak of WWII, the Home Office put into force many of the
recommendations of the CID. The Home Office implemented a whole system of civil
defense to educate, protect, and organize the civilian population of Britain in case of
another war. Unlike WWI, the government departments responsible for air raid
precautions and the various local authorities had had time to make detailed plans and had
the benefit of prior experiences on which to improve upon. The 1937 Air Raid
Precautions Act was based on Home Office instructions to local authorities on the
provision of civil defense measures and services, such as warning systems, lighting
restrictions, and rescue services, and detailed who should bear the financial burden of
civil defense preparations.69 While the 1937 act made provision for basic air raid
precautions, the international crisis in 1938 showed that it needed strengthening. The
Civil Defence Act of 1939 was drafted to further enable the protection of life and
property through such services as evacuation, civil defense training for staffs, the
treatment of casualties, and the provision of improved shelters.70 These two acts
combined allowed local authorities to take civil defense measures in their regions and
receive financial aid from the government, such as building or designating air raid
shelters, which ranked for grant-aid up to 70% of expenditure.71 The acts ensured not
only financial support, but also uniformity in civil defense across Britain. The Home
68
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Office now could set standards and requirements for local authorities to implement,
avoiding the often disorganized and sometimes contradictory nature of WWI air raid
precautions in the event of a future war.
Unlike the case of WWI, in the 1930s anticipation was high that civilians would
become deliberate targets of enemy air attack. While there had been some means of
protection for civilians during the previous war, and the state had provided some
information on ARP, future attacks were expected to occur on a much wider scale,
necessitating a much more comprehensive system of civil defense. Civilian response to
enemy air raids in WWI had often been lackluster and evidenced more curiosity than fear
and government officials knew they needed a well-educated and well-prepared public to
withstand a future attack when faced with ever-improving technology. As a result, prior to
the outbreak of war, the state engaged in ARP publicity and education campaigns to
ensure every civilian would know what to do if war came again. Civil Defense was the
term preferred by London County Council (LCC) Leader Herbert Morrison to describe
air raid precautions, as it “implie[d] a co-operation of citizens in the defence of their
homes and their very existence which [was] in harmony with democratic traditions.72”
An effective ARP measure adopted from the experience of WWI was the restriction
of lighting. The purpose of this was to prevent hostile aircraft being guided to their target
on the ground by visible lights.73 In WWI the warning time had been sufficient to allow
localities to station men in sectors ready to extinguish street lamps when necessary, but
the shorter warning time resulting from increased air speed meant that lights could not be
put out in time. Some advocated for a system to allow a central controller to immediately
72
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extinguish all street lights in an emergency.74 Some officials worried that the sudden
darkness, should all lights be extinguished simultaneously, was apt to cause panic.75
Lighting exercises suggested that the speed with which visible lights were extinguished
upon the receipt of a warning was too slow and the Home Office reached the conclusion
that a general condition of darkening for the entire period of the war would be the best
solution.76 In areas of the country where the warning period would be very short,
permanent darkness was necessary, while in other areas some screened streetlights were
permitted.77 All householders were required to mask their windows, skylights, and doors
to allow no inside light to be visible.78 This could be accomplished with dark curtains,
blinds, stout cardboard, screens of wood, or black paint.79 Illuminated advertising signs
were prohibited and factories had to mask their windows through dark blinds or black
paint.80 Theaters, cinemas, and other places of entertainment were prohibited from using
illuminated displays or advertisements throughout the war, day or night.81 Local
newspapers published the blackout start and end times.82
Noncompliance with lighting restrictions could lead to a heavy fine or even
imprisonment. Police had the legal power to enter civilian premises and order lights be
74
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extinguished.83 Without proper street lighting, pedestrians resorted to using flashlights to
guide their way, but these also had to be screened to no more than an inch diameter, or
dimmed by inserting a newspaper, and were required to be pointed down at all times.84
The Ministry of Transport also installed aids to movement on roads, including white paint
to mark the middle of roads, curbs, junctions, and pedestrian crossings, and illuminating
street signs, route numbers, street names, and obstructions.85 Motorists were asked to
screen the headlamps of their cars with a special ARP-approved mask if driving at night
and to proceed with great care and at low speed.86
The lighting restrictions often made being out after dark both dangerous and
unappealing to most citizens. Just two months into the war, the rate of road accidents had
risen to an alarming degree and when reported to the House they were received with a
“gasp of dismay.”87 In the first month of the war, and the first month of the
implementation of lighting restrictions, road deaths had doubled in comparison to the
same period in the previous year.88 By October 1939, however, vehicular accident
numbers had actually dropped below average, because of petrol restrictions and a
reduction in the number of vehicles on the road, but pedestrian road casualty figures
remained unchanged.89 Pedestrians were encouraged to carry a white object with them or
wear a white piece of clothing if out at night to make them more visible to drivers.90 The
83
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Pedestrians’ Association was especially incensed at road accident numbers, reporting that,
in three months of war, more people had died on British roads than soldiers and sailors on
active war service.91 They emphasized this point with a cartoon of British soldiers
huddled together in a trench over a newspaper article on blackout road deaths, with the
caption “It must be dangerous over there.”92 One Chief Constable blamed poor
attendance at ARP lectures on the blackout.93 Some believed lack of lighting had a
negative effect on the mental state of citizens.94 While some argued that darkened streets
lowered morale, others countered that lighting restrictions actually increased morale
because it made civilians feel that the government cared about their security and was
doing something to protect them.95
Entertainment opportunities were either curtailed during the war or restricted
entirely to prevent the massing of people. While such measures directly aimed to limit the
loss of life in case of air raids, the reasoning behind this was to avoid mass casualty
events that would negatively affect morale.96 The continuation of entertainment also
depended on the capability of the venue to protect its customers. Traveling circuses,
performing under canvas tents, were shut down.97 Prior to the outbreak of war the Home
Office considered what venues would likely need to be closed in the case of war,
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considering cinemas and theaters, in particular. Theaters, cinemas, and most other public
places of entertainment lacked adequate overhead cover to protect audiences from bomb
explosions.98 Short periods of warning were a concern and officials also suggested that
the capacity of all venues ought to be restricted to 50-75% of normal.99 Others suggested
restricting business hours primarily to daytime and prohibiting queues in the open.100
Officials, however, also recognized the importance of entertainment to civilian morale.
Most cinemas and theaters remained open and stationed a staff member where he could
hear the public warning siren. Upon hearing an air raid warning, the manager would
inform the audience and suggest that they remain in their seats, although anyone wishing
to do so was free to leave.101 The Association of County Councils in Scotland, however,
considered the danger of panic so high that they recommended closing all places of
entertainment for the duration of a war.102
Football games especially caused logistical and safety concerns during the war.
Football grounds, many holding 40,000 or more spectators, would lead to the type of
large concentrations of people that the government wanted to avoid.103 In addition to the
concern over population concentration, such large gatherings also meant crowds making
use of public transport and public roads, possibly at a moment of attack.104 The
competitive and financial nature of league matches, in particular, were seen as
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inappropriate during a time of war and only friendly matches were to be played.105 The
Football Association (FA) was instructed to limit attendance at matches to 8,000
spectators in evacuation areas, or half the capacity of the stadium, whichever was less.106
Some in the Home Office also wanted to require all spectators to book tickets in advance,
but the London Clubs, reluctant to go to this expense, argued that if the press did not
“ballyhoo football” and considering the “second-rate nature of the games that will be
provided” the likelihood that large crowds would try to come to the matches was slim.107
The FA was also quick to ask that the Scottish Football Association and greyhound
racing, often held on football grounds, be similarly restricted.108 Crowds that did attend
matches were to be distributed across the stadium, and stands, built out of concrete, were
thought to offer some shelter.109 The first returns of attendance numbers after the
outbreak of war were positive. In Scotland, attendance was “very poor” due to the noncompetitive nature of the matches.110 In the Midland Region, attendance numbers were in
some places less than a sixth of peacetime numbers, often influenced by lack of traveling
facilities.111 With the younger men away in the Forces or doing National Service, many
potential spectators also stayed away from matches because the men now playing in them
were “too old.”112 Fear of being caught in the open during an air raid, the discomfort of
carrying gas masks in the press of a crowd, the lack of popular players, and the absence
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of football pools also discouraged attendance.113 When air raid warnings did occur during
a match, however, instructions given to spectators differed by locality, with police in
some places stopping matches while allowing them to continue elsewhere.114 The Home
Office subsequently issued a circular instructing that spectators out in the open should
take cover at once, preferably under the stands or other available shelter, but to avoid
flocking into the streets and overwhelming public shelters.115 While the match was to be
suspended upon the air raid warning, it needed only be abandoned if it was close to the
end or there was no adequate cover for spectators.116
The Home Office sought to educate the public on ARP primarily through pamphlets
and posters. In some instances, when information needed to be disseminated quickly,
Head Wardens would instruct teachers, who would inform the children and, through the
children, who, in turn, would tell their parents.117 One ARP pamphlet was issued based on
location, listing shelters, first aid posts, and warden posts in the local area, as well as
reminding the reader of the major points of civil defense such as the use of respirators
and the air raid warning signals.118 The MHS’ most popular pamphlet, Air Raids What
You Must Know What You Must Do, included 60 pages of instructions on various ARP
topics, such as types of bombs, war gases, first aid, shelters, and lighting restrictions, and
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sold for three pence.119 The pamphlet How You Can Help, issued after the outbreak of
war, sought to explain the part every British civilian could play in the struggle and
brought together the various instructions issued by different government departments on
ARP.120 Public lectures were also an effective way of teaching the public about ARP,
often employing lantern slides for added effect and demonstration.121 Ten posters were
printed, but held back until an air raid emergency, informing the public to carry their gas
masks, to seek shelter quietly in case of a raid, to allow passersby to seek shelter in one’s
home, to take cover at once upon a warning, and for motorists to turn off their headlamps
at night.122 Over 50,000 of these posters were printed.123 In 1940, the Chief Medical
Officer of Scotland was appalled that the government seemed to think pamphlets it had
issued to the public once only in 1939 were sufficient to ensure continued education
simply because civilians had been instructed not to throw it away.124
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He argued that these pamphlets were “dead as the Dodo” and that it was necessary to
communicate “again and again, always from a fresh angle” the information necessary to
save civilian lives.125 The Treasury took a more positive view, arguing that if heavy raids
began, the public would adopt precautions of their own volition, because the Office
balked at having to pay for more instructional posters.126
Other media were also employed to teach ARP. Short films on ARP subjects could
be shown in cinemas before the main feature and reach large parts of the population in an
easy-to-understand format. The film If War Should Come was produced prior to the
outbreak of war, although before it could be shown the war had already started and the
title was hastily changed to Do It Now.127 This ten-minute film instructed civilians on fire
precautions, storing food, building shelters, carrying gas masks, keeping the phone lines
open, carrying an identity label, evacuation, lighting restrictions, air raid sirens, and on
what to do in a gas attack.128 Another short cinema filler film taught viewers how to put
on and use the gas mask, instructing them to fit the mask and breathe out forcefully
“never mind the noise it makes.”129 In the 1940 film London Can Take It, the strong
resilience of Londoners in the face of the Blitz was mythologized, particularly for
viewers overseas. “Today the morale of the people is higher than ever before,” claims the
narrator over scenes of Londoners carrying on the morning after a raid, adding that there
was “no panic, no fear, no despair in Londontown.”130 With permission from the Home
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Office, one record company made two gramophone records for ARP purposes, one for
local authorities to use at ARP exhibits, and the other for the public to learn the sounds
and meanings of official air raid signals.131 The record included the sounds of “action
warnings” with wailing sirens, intermittent sirens, and wardens’ whistles, as well as the
gas warning, “raiders passed” signal, and the gas all-clear signal, with commentary and
explanations included on the record intended for the general public.132
A major aspect of civilian ARP was preparing one’s home for air raids. One
pamphlet urged civilians to be prepared, stating that “A.R.P. begins in the home.”133
Education campaigns and pamphlets specifically focused on preparing the home for
attack, ensuring the home was darkened, and that everyone in the home knew what to do
in the case of a raid.134 Early instructions suggested selecting a ground floor room,
preferably near a bathroom, covering the windows with wood to prevent splinters raining
in, storing alongside gas masks, first aid kit, and non-perishable foods, and readying
buckets with sand and water in case of fire.135 A family might need to spend several hours
in their Refuge Room and instructions therefore focused particularly on ensuring access
to food, water, and sanitary arrangements.136 In 1940 the Home Office issued a pamphlet,
titled Your Home As An Air Raid Shelter, specifically to instruct civilians in the
preparation of their homes, offering advice on selecting refuge rooms, sheltering,
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protecting windows and doors, and fire precautions.137 A large aspect of preparing a home
for air raids was fire prevention. Civilians were instructed to keep at hand buckets of
water and sand, to turn off gas and electricity when leaving, to train the entire family, and
to clear all attic and roof spaces of clutter and everything flammable.138
Civilians were also instructed on what to do in the case of a gas attack. Detailed
instructions taught civilians the differences between persistent and non-persistent gases
and the different types of war gases that might be used by the enemy.139 In a gas attack,
the safest rooms would be those upstairs, and civilians were urged to ensure all windows
and doors were closed and sealed, if possible.140 Householders could prepare a gas-proof
room in their house, by blocking cracks and seals with newspapers, felt, or mush made
from soaking newspapers, although this meant the room could not be used for other
purposes as it was not properly ventilated.141 The primary protection for civilians,
however, was the civilian gas mask, and no ARP instruction on gas attacks failed to
mention the respirator and its vital importance (See Chapter 5 for an in-depth discussion
of gas masks).142 Some instructions focused only on mustard gas, suggesting civilians
avoid gassed areas.143 If one were splashed, however, he or she was to “forget decency”
and remove all clothing, before taking a warm bath and scrubbing well with soap,
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followed by donning clean clothes and lying near an open window.144 One leaflet
suggested that if “Hitler uses blister gas, Soap and Water will help to beat him.”145
The protection of special populations that were incapable of properly protecting
themselves were a major concern. What to do with young children was a consistent
problem throughout the war. While some suggested children should be sent home to seek
shelter upon an air raid warning, others pointed out that the reduced warning time meant
most children would be caught out in the street.146 The government’s best solution for
protecting children from air raids, and the one that was at least partially adopted, was to
evacuate all school-aged children from areas where heavy raids were thought the most
likely (see Chapter 7 for more on evacuation). Well before the outbreak of war there were
concerns about how to deal with ARP in mental hospitals. Ministry of Health officials
were frustrated that the ARP Department could not give a satisfactory answer on whether
it was best to disperse or collect mental patients in case of an air raid.147 Five big mental
health hospitals had their patients evacuated entirely to other hospitals, although this was
less a precaution to protect patients than a need for more hospitals that could accept air
raid casualties.148 Mental hospitals were also encouraged to make their own firefighting
arrangements in regards to staff, equipment, and water supplies, because they would not
be able to rely on assistance from the Fire Brigade in the event of a serious outbreak of
fire.149 The reasoning behind this lay in the location of most mental hospitals distant from
144
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town centers, and that local fire brigades would have too much to do in the event of an
attack to reach the hospitals in time.150
People were not the only ones needing protection and animal ARP was a serious
concern both before and during the war. The Home Office formed a National ARP for
Animals Committee (NARPAC) made up of representatives of animal welfare societies
and veterinarians, with the objectives of preventing and alleviating animal suffering,
protecting human beings from panic-stricken or contaminated animals, the conservation
of animals of economic value, the provision and protection of food supplies for essential
animals, and giving general information and advice to animal owners.151 NARPAC
arranged for the establishment of first aid posts to facilitate speedy treatment of animals
injured in air raids.152 Animal Guards registered all animals by visiting every animal
owner in their street, recording the animals’ information, and issuing a free numbered
identity disc to be attached to the animal in case it became lost.153 While the job of an
Animal Guard was in some ways similar to that of an Air Raid Warden, the guards were
not expected to be out during an air raid or actually deal with injured animals.154
NARPAC also urged owners not to have their pets destroyed, as animals were in no
greater danger from air raids than humans, but many did not take up this advice.155 A
considerable concern was how to protect animals from gas warfare as no real protective
devices existed, and NARPAC offered a chart of war gases and their effects on various

150

TNA: MH 76/188, Letter to Miss E.A. Sharp, January 1939, 1.

151

National ARP Animals Committee, Wartime Aids for All Animal Owners (Croydon: H.R. Grubb, 1941).

152

ibid, 2.

153

ibid, 2-3.

154

ibid, 3.

155

ibid, 5.

86

animals, such as horses, birds, and dogs, as well as first aid measures and possible
protections.156 The MHS also included instructions for pet owners in some of their ARP
educational material. Ideally civilians would send their pets to the countryside for safety,
as public shelters did not allow them, but this was not an option for the majority of the
public.157 Pet owners were urged to walk their dogs close to their homes so they could get
back quickly if an air raid occurred.158 For dogs frightened by noise, the MHS offered the
remedy of tying cottonwool under the dog’s earflaps with strips of cloth.159 For nervous
dogs it was suggested that they be dosed with bromide tablets obtained from the
pharmacist, or aspirin if bromide was unavailable.160 Commercial options included a
powder given before a raid that would put the pet “into a quiet and sleepy state.”161 To
protect dogs’ paws from broken glass caused by air raids, the Dumb Friends’ League
made special dog shoes available for pet owners.162 One veterinarian, however, argued
that dogs showed little fear during raids and often showed better common sense than
human beings in leading the way to shelter upon the sound of the sirens.163
Special air raid protections were also required for various government institutions
and buildings. Westminster Abbey was a particular concern because of its large stained
glass windows that were impossible to screen and officials considered closing the Abbey
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after dark.164 The Dean of Westminster, however, argued that closing the Abbey would
severely affect civilian morale, and the Abbey remained open.165 Windsor Castle was
treated as its own civil defense precinct, with its own fire brigade, first aid post, stretcher
parties, and rescue service.166 Additionally, gas proof rooms were selected at Windsor and
the entire staff and all occupants trained in anti-gas measures.167 At Marlborough House,
the sitting room was turned into a first aid station and all doors, windows, vents, and
fireplaces were treated, caulked, and shuttered to prevent the entry of gas.168 The Royal
Mews had their own ARP Party that included stretcher bearers.169 For museums, art
galleries, and libraries a special booklet was printed with ARP instructions that included
information on normal precautions and the civil defense services, as well as specific
measures of protecting, storing, and evacuating sculptures, books, documents, and other
such items.170
It was difficult to maintain people’s interest in ARP, particularly when there was
little or no enemy activity. While immediately after the outbreak of war in September
1939, civil defense measures had been fervently adopted across the country, by mid1940, with no enemy air raids having occurred, apathy and boredom had set in. In March
1940 the Home Office held a special meeting to address how to revive public interest in
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ARP.171 Their main objectives were twofold: to reeducate the public by repeating and
amplifying the information provided the prior year, and to devise and ready for use
publicity material for when intensive bombing began.172 The members of the meeting
argued that this new publicity campaign should forego house-to-house distribution of
materials and instead focus on posters, broadcasting, and newsreels.173 Some Boroughs
reissued ARP leaflets. The Reigate Borough leaflet reminded readers of the major points
of ARP because “Five months of War with no Air Raids has, no doubt, lulled many of us
into a false sense of security.”174 Apathy extended also to public education events. One
Chief Constable had anticipated that a public ARP lecture with lantern slides on a
Saturday evening would be well-patronized, but was disappointed to find no more than
250 people present.175
A mainstay of the purpose of civil defense was the upkeep of civilian morale. Air
raids were specifically seen as aiming to demoralize civilians and break down the “spirit
of resistance to injustice which is necessary to knit a people together for a continuous war
effort.”176 It was thus necessary to ensure the spirit or morale of the people did not break.
Queen Mary planned early on to remain in London partially because she believed this
would have a beneficial moral effect upon the population who could not leave.177
Civilians were consistently told the importance of their own psychology in the war, and
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that the war would be won if only the home front remained strong.178 “Come what may,”
instructed one pamphlet, “we must show the enemy that our resistance cannot be
broken.”179 While ARP measures were intended to protect and save lives, the nature of
education programs and ARP preparations also sought to ensure civilians avoided panic
and stayed morally strong during a war. The Yorkshire Post suggested that ARP training
must also be concerned with measures “for guarding against panic and disorder among
the civil population.”180 A Ministry of Information memo, specifically intended to aid
civil defense regions in allaying air raid panic, defined the importance of ARP measures
in preventing fear: “The public must be prepared beforehand to act in definite ways at
given cues so that while performing certain pre-arranged actions more or less
automatically they will have time to recover their mental poise and courage.”181 A
pamphlet told civilians that they could defeat the Nazis by “keeping calm, by carrying on
quietly with your work, by finding out how best you can help, and by helping with all
your might.”182 The noise of air raids could also impact morale. The terrifying sound of
the anti-aircraft guns and dropping bombs strained the nervous systems of civilians.183
The air raid sirens themselves often had a depressing and demoralizing effect on the
populace. One bishop suggested that instead of the common wail of the siren, it should
instead play a “cock-a-doodle-doo” note to sustain the civilian spirit.184 Winston

178

TNA: HO 186/315, How You Can Help in Air Raids, At Home-At Work in National Service, n.d., 8.

179

ibid, 9.

180

“Air Raid Nerves,” Yorkshire Post and Leeds Mercury, December 8, 1939.

181

TNA: HO 199/434, Ministry of Information, Regional Circular No. 12, Hints for preventing or allaying
panic in air-raids, September 20, 1939, 4.

182

TNA: HO 186/315, How You Can Help in Air Raids, At Home-At Work in National Service, n.d., 3.

183

“Sound and Fury,” The Scotsman, September 21, 1940.

184

ibid.

90

Churchill was impressed by the resilience of the civilian population as he saw their
devotion to the cause despite the damage done by the enemy after months of heavy raids,
seeing in them “the spirit of an unconquerable people.”185
To preserve the civilian “spirit” it was necessary to restrict demoralizing news and
contain rumors. How and when to report on air raid casualties was a question that was
addressed several times throughout the war. Up to mid-1940, the casualty numbers had
been released in a monthly return, but, knowing the next report would show high
casualties, the War Cabinet considered issuing weekly returns instead.186 It was decided,
however, to continue with monthly returns and simply express the casualty rate as a
percentage of the normal death rate or peace-time road casualty rate, in which case air
raid numbers “were not high.”187 The government wanted to refrain from publishing
exact casualty figures, because it was assumed the Germans could use such numbers to
determine the effect and efficiency of their raids.188 The release of casualty numbers and
other particular information was often published solely to combat rumors. Regional
Information Officers were allowed to distribute discrete particulars on bombings (such as
the types of bombs used and material damage caused) to local Information Committees
specifically so they could counter “noxious rumours.”189 After bombings in Derby,
Leicester, and Croydon, casualty figures were highly exaggerated and after a heavy raid
in Coventry rumors abounded that many public shelters containing dead had simply been
sealed never to be reopened. All such rumors were considered “harmful to public
185
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sentiment.”190 The MHS also wanted to particularly avoid information passed verbally,
where such reports could easily be distorted and exaggerated.191 Casualty lists were
generally posted at local Town Halls for everyone to view, but names were added as they
became known and one official worried that no one took the time to add the numbers
together before spreading exaggerated rumors of casualties. 192 In most cases of air raids,
exact casualty numbers were not authorized for publication and vague official references,
such as “a very large number [of casualties],” only exacerbated the problem of rumors.193
The MHS eventually reversed the policy of publishing casualty figures only in general
terms, realizing that it encouraged the spread of rumors and had a depressing effect on
morale.194 Figures were now to be given when “the moral effect seems likely to be
good.”195 A committee organized to discuss the preservation of civilian morale during a
war argued that people must be told the truth, but continued “But what is the truth? We
must adopt a pragmatic definition. It is what is believed to be the truth. A lie that is put
across becomes the truth, and may, therefore, be justified.”196 One pamphlet specifically
instructed readers to ignore all rumors, especially those spread by the enemy about
horrible new weapons “in order to shake [British] morale.”197
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Concerns over morale also determined the response to the advent of the German V
weapons in 1944. The government had intelligence on both the V1 pilotless aircraft and
the V2 long-range rocket months before the first use of these by the Germans, but,
despite newspaper reports on a secret new German weapon, made no statement on the
existence of these bombs.198 The first V1s, also known as “buzz bomb” or “flying bomb,”
fell on June 13, 1944 within minutes of one another, causing a few casualties and
damaging several homes.199 Within a week over 670 flying bombs had made landfall,
causing over 5,000 casualties in London, of which at least 500 proved fatal.200 Home
Secretary Herbert Morrison, however, in a speech to Parliament downplayed the effects
of the flying bomb on the civil population, saying that “[t]he morale of the British takes a
lot of upsetting.”201 Newspapers, however, took quickly to the new weapon, referring to
the flying bombs as the “robot menace202.” They criticized the government’s secrecy
surrounding the flying bombs, arguing that this led to exaggerated rumors and
indignation among the population.203 The blind and indiscriminate way of the flying
bomb, capable of attacking at all hours of the day, was “robot terrorism,” claimed the
Dundee Courier, and imposed a special kind of strain on morale.204 It was also argued
that a bomber that had no control over its target, was intended solely to break civilian
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morale, but the writer was quick to add that this would be a lost hope for the Germans.205
The unique sound of the flying bombs could be mimicked by training aircraft throttling
their engines as they flew over London, leading to significant anxiety among the
population and the Air Ministry subsequently prohibited its bombers from flying over the
city.206 Londoners’ morale was not only affected by the buzz bombs themselves, but also
by how non-Londoners perceived their plight. Civilians and government officials alike
believed that other regions were not moved about the bombing and that some regions
were particularly apathetic to London’s suffering.207 A film about the flying bombs was
prepared, but the censorship office refused to let it be shown.208
The first V2 rocket likely fell on September 8th, 1944 in Chiswick with a noise so
that terrific windows rattled in adjoining boroughs and people in London’s city center
were disturbed.209 While the government refused to make an official statement about the
arrival of the V2 rocket, rumors and anxiety abounded amongst the civilian population.
After over four years of war and bombing the potential arrival of another new and deadly
weapon increased anxiety, with many civilians saying they could not “stand anything
more at this stage of the war.”210 A majority of Londoners assumed this new bomb was
the successor to the V1, even without a government statement on the topic, and many felt
anxious and defenseless because there were now no warnings of attack and no barrage
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balloons or anti-aircraft guns to stop them.211 One rumor suggested that a rocket
explosion instead had been caused by sabotage at a factory, while another claimed that
the British government was exploding rockets to deter evacuees from returning to
London.212 Outside of the capital rumors began to circulate warning that “something
dreadful” was happening in London.213 Without official information, rumors claimed that
rocket bombs had caused terrible damage in London.214 A majority of people wanted the
government to make an official statement, as the lack of information was worrying them,
although some civilians expressed concern that a statement would make the bombing
worse and provide information to the enemy.215 The use of the V2 was seen as another
futile attempt against British morale, as well as an effort to boost lagging German morale
in the face of certain defeat.216
The limited air raid experiences of WWI had taught the British government the
importance of protecting its civilians and prior to the outbreak of another war means were
put into place to ensure this. WWI air raids on the British Isles had come as a surprise,
with the government relatively unprepared to instruct, protect, and reassure its civilians.
ARP measures, thrown together hastily, were sometimes disorganized and instructions
often ignored by the civilians they were meant to protect. The Home Office, which came
to be in charge of ARP prior to WWII, realized the importance of not only providing
211

ibid.

212

ibid.

213

ibid.

214

ibid.

215

ibid.

215

“Hitler’s 2s Land in England,” Hull Daily Mail, November 10, 1944; “Gestapo V2 Gallup Poll to
Bolster Morale,” Derby Daily Telegraph, November 11, 1944.

216

“Hitler’s 2s Land in England,” Hull Daily Mail, November 10, 1944; “Gestapo V2 Gallup Poll to
Bolster Morale,” Derby Daily Telegraph, November 11, 1944.

95

protection and education, but that for civilians to undertake ARP in a time of crisis the
instruction had to be consistent, repetitive, and accessible. While many WWII ARP
measures were directly responsible for the protection of life, limb, and property, many
elements of ARP were also specifically intended to safeguard British morale. It was clear
to government officials that civilian lives would be lost in heavy air raids, but that the
nation could withstand tragedy as long as people believed they were still in the fight and
that their government was doing everything possible to protect them. ARP was thus not
only concerned with actual protection from air raids, but also a reassurance that such
protection, and therefore survival, was possible.
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Chapter 4 - The People’s Army: The Civil Defense Services in World War II

As it was vital that the general public were well-informed about ARP and could
protect themselves when air raids transpired, there was a need for a well-organized
system of services to assist and inform civilians if war came. Civil defense would provide
a system of services that not only offered aid and protection during raids, but also ensured
compliance with civil defense instructions. Despite facing some issues over recruitment,
supply, compliance, and organization, the British civil defense system in WWII was
relatively successful. Prior to the actual outbreak of war in 1939, the British government
had put in place a system of civil defense that would provide various services before,
during, and after an air raid. These services and the volunteers that manned them would
help with protection before and during raids, offer vital information, provide medical aid,
and, most important of all, ensure the preservation of civilian morale and good behavior.
The services most vital to a successful civil defense program and the protection of morale
were the Warden’s Service, the Auxiliary Fire Service (AFS), the First Aid Posts (FAP)
and Ambulance Service, the Rescue and Demolition Service, and the Women’s Voluntary
Services (WVS). All of these entities had set roles and functions prior to the start of war,
but during the course of WWII, and after the experiences of air raids, most of the civil
defense services were altered in scope and function.
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The British civil defense services ensured that civilians were prepared to deal with air
raids, knew how to protect themselves, would be rescued if trapped, treated in a timely
manner if injured, rehoused if bombs had made them homeless, and fed. In a speech
delivered in October 1940 Winston Churchill described the civil defense services as
“forces [that] will descend upon the scene in power and mercy to conquer the flames, to
rescue the sufferers, to provide them with food and shelter, to whisk them away to places
of rest and refuge […].”1
The government presented civil defense work as being vital to the good of the
nation. Prior to the outbreak of war, Herbert Morrison, at the time the Leader of the LCC,
urged Londoners to join the civil defense services so that “if, in the uneasy state of the
world to-day, the need should arise, the life of the country could be carried on.”2 One
pamphlet urged readers to participate in national service because the nation’s “strength
depends on the will of millions of free men and women to make voluntary efforts for the
ideals we all stand for.”3 Recruitment adverts often called on a citizen’s patriotism and
referred to the need to help others. One such advert told its readers that both the
ambulance service and stretcher parties were services “for the relief of suffering. Both are
of national importance.”4 A recruiting leaflet suggested that those serving as stretcher
bearers or in the first aid parties would be engaged in “the noblest service of all—the
saving of human life.”5 An Ambulance Service poster called for “eighteen thousand
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fearless women” to prove their mettle and bravery and “rise to the occasion.”6 The
importance of civilian morale was reflected throughout the civil defense services, with
one training manual specifically stating that the behavior and competence of the civil
defense volunteers would greatly influence the ability of the civilian population to resist.7
Some recruitment initiatives played on ideas of masculinity to draw male
volunteers. Civil defense service was intended for men over military age, thus offering
them a chance to prove their patriotism and masculinity through national service without
fighting overseas. A recruitment advert for the Stretcher Parties and first aid parties
suggested it was a job that required “courage and strength and endurance. It is a real
man’s job.”8 Another advertisement agreed that the courage, resolution, and endurance
required by Stretcher Parties made it “a real man’s job for those between 25 and 50.”9 A
first aid party recruitment poster reminded viewers that it was a “man’s job” three times,
adding that volunteering with the service was a “vital, front-line” job.10
Civil defense publicity also drew on ideas of personal responsibility. One poster
urged people not to rely on a mysterious “they” that would prevent war, put out fires, or
provide aid in case of injury, arguing instead that “There is only ‘you’. On ‘you’, rests the
safety of yourself and your family.”11 Another questioned what the reader had done for
national service after weeks of reading civil defense advertisements, reminding him or
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her how important it was for everyone to be trained in ARP.12 One ARP pamphlet
reminded civilians that they were “responsible citizen[s]. Don’t wait to be told what to
do. Think things out for yourself—DO things yourself!”13 When considering how to
recruit women for the Ambulance Service, one official pointed out that the type of
women needed, middle-class women in comfortable circumstances without domestic ties,
simply had not yet realized how great the need was for their help and should be
encouraged to serve instead of moving out of dangerous areas.14
Recruitment for civil defense enjoyed varying degrees of success prior to, and after,
the outbreak of war. Low recruitment numbers across the civil defense services before to
the war made the Home Office consider some type of compulsory training for everyone,
although the wide age range of 25 to 50 for males made such training too difficult to
implement.15 Had such a system already existed, it was argued, it could have provided the
basis for filling the civil defense services.16 During 1938, recruitment was relatively
steady, with a sharp increase immediately after Germany’s annexation of Austria. By the
middle of the year London alone had over 24,000 volunteers enrolled in the various civil
defense services, a third of them women.17 Across the country, 385,000 had joined one of
the civil defense services in their region by the same time.18 One bureaucrat suggested
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another international crisis could rapidly swell recruitment numbers.19 His words proved
true when, by October 1938, enrollment for all services had ballooned to over one million
volunteers.20 Local authorities found, however, that volunteers they had enrolled
immediately after the September crisis were no longer interested once tensions had
eased.21 The London Ambulance Service, for instance, enrolled 550 recruits in the tenday period prior to the signing of the Munich Agreement, but by the middle of October
recruits averaged only twenty per day, eventually down to only five per day in
December.22 Official war establishments for the civil defense services were established in
early 1939 and authorized 1,131,900 whole and part-time volunteers for the ARP
services, with an additional 300,000 for the AFS, specifically.23 In the same year the
Home Office suggested distributing civil defense recruitment leaflets with gas and
electricity accounts to reach households.24 One recruitment leaflet was distributed
alongside telephone accounts in London and the provinces and reached as many as
637,000 homes.25
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The Home Office also asked employers to help in recruitment, urging them to display
posters in their shops or factories and to issue recruitment leaflets to their employees.26 A
National Service Rally in London’s Hyde Park in mid-1939 sought to interest potential
recruits through exhibitions and a parade of AFS members marching past the King.27
While initially the outbreak of war had driven people to volunteer for civil defense,
by early 1940 interest was again flagging. Renewed concerns over recruitment led the
Home Office to consider lowering physical and age standards for enrollment in civil
defense. By mid-1940 the loss of a limb or a hernia was no longer a bar to serving,
provided the enrollee could perform the necessary actions, such as putting out an
incendiary bomb.28 To attend the Air Raid Precautions School, a requirement for almost
all the civil defense services, the maximum age for male attendees was raised from 55 to
60 in 1940.29 In June 1940 over 1.3 million volunteers were enrolled in the various civil
defense services, with nearly 230,000 full-time, paid personnel.30 Particularly concerning
was the loss of civil defense personnel to industrial jobs with attractive wages, and a
Defence Regulation in July 1940 forced members of the Rescue Service, First Aid
Parties, and AFS to remain in service until released.31 Civil defense enrollment numbers
were precarious enough that full-time volunteers were barred from joining the Home
Guard and unpaid, part-time civil defense volunteers required the written permission of
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their superiors to so sign up.32 Officials did fear, however, that a bar to Home Guard
service might lead many civil defense part-time volunteers to resign, and urged discretion
on civil defense leaders to ensure no loss of strength among the civil defense services.33
By mid-1944, 1,250,000 men and 350,000 women were engaged in part-time civil
defense work throughout Great Britain.34
The majority of the many who participated in civil defense were part-time
volunteers. Part-time service required a minimum commitment of 48 hours over a four
week period.35 Unlike members of the Home Guard or armed forces, who received
money for meals, part-time civil defense volunteers did not enjoy the same benefit,
receiving “light refreshment” at the value of six pence for four hours of duty, or a meal
valued at one shilling for twelve hours continuous duty.36 In some areas, usually those
more densely populated, a small number of personnel were engaged in full-time paid civil
defense work. In Scotland, this number of paid civil defense workers never exceeded
10,000, a tenth of the total strength of Scottish civil defense.37 The AFS, particularly,
required full-time volunteers, although part-time workers were nonetheless accepted. In
1939, full-time civil defense workers received pay at the rate of £3 per week for men and
£2 per week for women.38 Youths engaged in full-time work were eligible as well: 20
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shillings a week for those aged 16-17, and 25 shillings per week for age 17-18.39 No pay
was provided for those under 16 because the Home Office considered it undesirable that
children of that age be enrolled in civil defense.40 In 1942, the pay of civil defense
workers was increased to £3 14s. for men and £2 12s. for women.41 The increase in pay
also sought to increase women’s hours of duty from 48 per week to 60, an increase that
caused considerable consternation. Opponents of this increased duty burden argued that
women were required to carry out domestic duties as well as civil defense duties and the
increase in pay could not allow female volunteers to complete their own responsibilities
of shopping, washing, and feeding their families.42 Full-time paid volunteers also
qualified for annual paid leave on the basis of one day for each completed month of fulltime service, up to a maximum of twelve days per year.43 The hours of civil defense
workers, both part-time and full-time, were not fixed and the Home Office specifically
pointed out that for paid workers there could be no question of overtime pay because duty
hours depended on when workers were needed.44 Some decried the paying of civil
defense volunteers as a waste of money, but Herbert Morrison argued that a full-time civil
defense worker ready at his or her post was as entitled to receiving a wage as troops
manning the Maginot Line.45 Without the unpaid labor of part-time volunteers local
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authorities could not have had functioning systems of civil defense, but the reliance on
workers who might be engaged in other duties at a time of emergency was also an issue.
Part-time volunteers who were at their regular place of employment during an air raid
alert were not required to report to their civil defense duty stations. The Home Office
urged local authorities to work out manpower needs and determine which part-time
volunteers would be needed during a raid and for the part-time volunteers to get the
consent of their employers to leave when necessary.46 Local authorities were authorized
to compensate volunteers for lost wages up to a maximum of 10s. per day for men and 7s.
for women.47
Training such a large volunteer force for civil defense was achieved through a
“snowball” system. A small number of volunteers attended one of the Home Office’s ARP
Schools, where they could qualify as instructors. These instructors then trained select
local personnel as local instructors, who in turn trained members of their local civil
defense services and civilians.48 There were two civilian ARP schools in the nation, one
at Easingwold and another at Falfield.49 Initially known as Civilian Anti-Gas Schools, by
early 1939 the curriculum was extended to cover other aspects of civil defense and the
course increased from twelve to seventeen days.50 Graduates of the schools were awarded
certificates divided into three categories: special, first-class, and second-class,
differentiated respectively by being allowed to train civil defense personnel and
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instructors in all subjects, personnel in all subjects and instructors in some, and personnel
only in the last category.51 Uniformity in the training provided by these graduates locally
was desirable and the Home Office issued a manual for the local officers responsible for
ARP training to lay out specific training plans.52 The first stage of ARP training involved
basic individual training of every ARP volunteer, covering topics in ARP organization,
incendiary bomb control, protection against High Explosive (HE) bombs, anti-gas, and
first aid.53 The first stage training lasted about four and a half hours, with full-time
volunteers training while on duty and part-time workers making time as they could.54
Second stage individual training intended to raise the standard of knowledge acquired in
the first stage and provide technical experience specific to the civil defense job the
volunteer had enrolled in.55 Some second stage topics were covered in short or long
courses, depending on the type of civil defense service. For instance, the short first aid
course took six hours to complete, while the full first aid course lasted 18 hours.56 While
all civil defense volunteers received basic training in the major aspects of ARP, second
stage training was focused specifically on the needs of the particular job the trainee was
enrolling for. Trainees also practiced as teams in their respective jobs, as well as
participating in combined exercises that provided practical knowledge in how the various
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civil defense services worked together.57 Some civil defense workers also attended
specialty schools for more advanced technical training, particularly in first aid and rescue
work.58 In 1942 a residential Civil Defence Staff College opened in Surrey to offer
general instruction in all matters concerning the organization, administration, and
operational control of civil defense to senior officials.59 The Home Office also regularly
issued ARP training bulletins that covered or updated topics such as crushing injuries,
methods of resuscitation, first aid for eye injuries, and incendiary bombs.60 After 1944
such bulletins also instructed civil defense personnel on how to recognize, safely
approach, and deal with casualties of flying bomb attacks.61
All members of the civil defense services received anti-gas training. Individual
Training First Stage, completed by all civil defense volunteers, included two 45-minute
lessons on gas: one taught the nature of war gases and the other covered personal
protection against gas.62 There were four different anti-gas courses, with the specifics of
instruction dependent on the trainee’s particular civil defense job. The short anti-gas
course consisted of over three hours of instruction in the inspection of respirators,
respirator drill, fit testing respirators in a gas chamber, and the gas protection of rooms.63
The full anti-gas course, about nine hours in length, taught trainees the fitting and
disinfecting of respirators, the recognition of war gases, how to avoid becoming a
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casualty, protection of the eyes and lungs, protection of the body, preventive cleansing,
the gas protection of buildings, and how to perform routine duties while wearing a
respirator.64 The Anti-Gas Decontamination Course added four hours of instruction to the
full anti-gas course on the general principles of decontamination, methods and materials,
the decontamination of roads and open spaces, decontaminating buildings and their
contents, and the decontamination of vehicles.65 The Anti-Gas and Voluntary Aid Course
took over eleven hours to complete and added onto the full anti-gas course information
on the treatment of gas casualties.66 Trainees were taught how to recognize contaminated
casualties, how to handle them, how to determine the types of gas used, and what
treatment to use for each.67 Anti-gas training for ARP volunteers also included the
wearing of a respirator in tear gas, to confirm fit and provide confidence in the mask,
using either gas vans or gas chambers.68 The Home Office also trained sixteen medical
professionals specifically to instruct medical, dental, veterinary, and nursing professionals
in anti-gas measures across the nation, both to ensure proper treatment of potential gas
casualties and for its moral effect in enabling the civilian population to regard its medical
advisers as qualified to assist at a time of need.69
First aid training was also a vital component of the skills of all civil defense
volunteers. Volunteers received first aid instruction based on how likely they were to deal
with casualties, but all the services received at the very least elementary instruction in
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first aid procedures. Individual Training First Stage, taken by all civil defense volunteers,
included a 45 minute lesson on basic first aid, covering topics such as shock, hemorrhage,
fractures, burns, and dislocations.70 The short first aid course offered lectures on the
structure of the body, fractures, shock, the circulatory system, hemorrhage, wound
treatment, burns, concussions, asphyxiation, artificial respiration, and hysterical attacks.71
Practical lessons taught volunteers how to splint fractures, bandage wounds, apply a
tourniquet, carry casualties, artificial respiration, and treating burns.72
All civil defense volunteers were issued uniforms and equipment. Initially uniforms
consisted of cotton bluette combination suits for men and bluette coats for women, with
weather protection, such as oilskin jackets, supplied locally.73 Early in 1941 it was
decided that rescue and first aid parties required a more durable uniform and boots and
were issued with serge battledress, which was extended, after much discussion, to all civil
defense services by the middle of that year.74 Male volunteers received a battledress
uniform of blue serge cloth, consisting of blouse, trousers, and greatcoat, while female
volunteers’ new uniform consisted of jacket, skirt or slacks, and greatcoat.75 Women in
the First Aid Post wore blue-grey flecked gabardine coats.76 A gold civil defense badge
was worn on the uniform, replacing the old red badges.77 In most services both males and
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females wore a navy blue wool beret, although women could also opt for the felt hat.78
Female drivers wore a peaked cap and nurses a white nursing cap.79 Full-time workers
were also issued with leather boots or shoes.80 Each volunteer wore shoulder titles on his
or her uniform to indicate to which service the volunteer belonged.81 A few months after
the introduction of the rationing system for clothing, civil defense was not immune and
full-time volunteers were required to turn in as many as 18 clothing coupons for their
uniforms.82 Part-time volunteers did not need to surrender coupons, but were authorized
to wear their uniform only when on duty.83 All civil defense volunteers were authorized
to wear war service chevrons and wound stripes on their uniforms.84 Eligibility for such
chevrons could arise from current or previous service the volunteer may have given, and
was indicated through one chevron per twelve months of service.85 Gold wound stripes,
one for each wound, were authorized for wounds received during the current war, while a
red wound stripe indicated injuries received in a previous war.86
Members of civil defense were provided with activities and entertainment similar to
those enjoyed by members of the military. Civil defense duty often meant long periods of
inactivity at a post waiting for incidents and both civilians and government officials
quickly saw the need for offering some forms of entertainment. The LCC considered that
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in light of the nature of civil defense work, every reasonable endeavor ought to be made
to make working conditions comfortable.87 Officials were especially worried that
boredom among civil defense workers would adversely affect morale.88 One private
citizen offered to organize concerts for civil defense workers, with the entertainment
including singers, comedians, a conjurer, and an accompanist. The funds to pay the artists
were raised through private collection and no financial burden, other than providing the
premises, lighting, and heating, fell on the LCC.89 Four concerts a week were to be held
in the County of London.90 One proposal suggested a series of short lecture courses for
the services, adding that this was likely to be successful as the level of intelligence among
civil defense volunteers was “comparatively high.”91 Topics for such lectures included
“democracy and dictatorship,” “international affairs,” “the political structure and
economic problems of the British Commonwealth,” and “foreign policy and economic
organisation of Nazi Germany.”92 The British Social Hygiene Council offered to give
lectures to civil defense volunteers on venereal disease and while the LCC welcomed the
offer there was some concern over offending the sensibilities of the young women
making up the majority of the ambulance service.93 One visitor to local civil defense
posts noted the lack of reading material and suggested each volunteer be issued a ticket to
the nearest library branch to enable them to check out material near their duty station.94
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The publisher of the Oxford University Press offered a donation of books drawn from the
World’s Classic series to be distributed to various posts of the London AFS.95 Films also
proved very popular with civil defense volunteers, but this required a duty post to have a
projector and the estimate to supply just the AFS station in London was just under
£10,000.96 In London, civil defense volunteers were also invited free of charge to a
preview of a film “of interest to ‘people engaged on the home front’.”97 Competitions
were sometimes put on for entertainment purposes. The London Civil Defence Region
held a Fire Guard trailer pump competition where each local authority selected three
crews, two male and one female, to compete in the standard operation of the pumps.98
Teams also competed in a Rescue Service competition in the London region, with the
winners receiving badges and trophies.99 Civil defense volunteers also put their free time
to good use by fabricating toys for children in war-time nurseries.100
Physical training programs were a useful way to keep volunteers entertained and fit
for duty. Local authorities were asked to provide physical training, games, and recreation
for their civil defense volunteers. The wide range of age and physical abilities among
volunteers, however, meant that physical training could not be compulsory and needed to
be carefully adapted to avoid injury and illness to participants.101 One volunteer for
every 250 civil defense workers was to take a class to qualify them to lead physical
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training for other members of civil defense.102 While participation in physical fitness
training was purely voluntary, particularly in the services tasked with heavy work, such
as the rescue and demolition crews, it was strongly suggested that the men be informed of
the need for physical training to properly carry out their duties.103 In 1941 the Home
Office issued a pamphlet titled Physical Recreation for Civil Defence Workers to provide
clear instructions to all civil defense regions on how to facilitate such activities.104 It
suggested that physical training ought to form an integral part of the training of all civil
defense workers and that it was essential for the upkeep of morale.105 It further provided
instructions on various types of activities that could be done at civil defense depots, such
as keep-fit classes, indoor games like cards or chess, badminton, cricket, basketball, and
table tennis.106 For male civil defense workers there were also football, baseball, or
rugby, while female workers could enjoy netball, rounders, or stoolball.107 Competitions
were also encouraged to stimulate interest, but the pamphlet cautioned organizers to not
unduly overemphasize competition if physical training was the primary intent.108
With multiple services and hundreds of thousands of volunteers, discipline was a
necessary element of civil defense. In one AFS brigade the men objected to the penalties
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of a deduction of wages and extra duty for offenses against discipline.109 In London there
were reports that some men of the Rescue Service were receiving money from members
of the public as a reward or an incentive to salvage property. The LCC swiftly attempted
to put a stop to this practice, informing volunteers that it was illegal to accept gifts and
that any future occurrence should be brought to the attention of the officers in charge and
the money returned.110 The acceptance of gratuities was forbidden for all members of
civil defense and volunteers were instructed to suggest to grateful civilians to donate such
gifts instead to the Widows’ and Orphans’ Fund.111 A General Order by the London Fire
Brigade also suggests looting may have been a problem. The Order reminded volunteers
that taking even the smallest article of property, even as a joke or souvenir, was looting
by law and would be punished severely.112 Officers were instructed to keep strict
supervision over their men, particularly when attending calls and when going through
houses after fires.113
The members of the civil defense services performed their jobs under dangerous
and trying conditions. Many civil defense volunteers braved considerable danger in the
performance of their jobs and the mortality rate for ARP workers may have been three
times as high as that of the general population.114 The drivers of ambulances, WVS vans,
and despatch riders faced particular dangers driving at night during air raids,
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maneuvering around bomb craters, debris, firemen’s hoses, and trailing wires. One WVS
driver had her sons lie across the bonnet of her canteen van to call out directions to her as
she slowly nosed forward in the poor conditions.115 First aid parties, with roads blocked
by debris, would walk with their medical kits to their destinations as bombs and antiaircraft fire raged around them.116 Ambulance drivers left their broken down vehicles to
carry patients through the streets to hospitals.117 Other drivers refused to return to post
and continued to ferry casualties to hospitals as bombs and debris fell around them.118
Some ambulances were machine-gunned by enemy raiders as they made their way
through the streets.119 Wardens were usually first on the scene and thus actively engaged
in rescue activities, digging through rubble as fires raged, protecting casualties from
falling debris with their own bodies, or working to reach trapped civilians near broken
gas mains.120 Many wardens were casualties of bombs themselves, but carried on their
duties to report incidents and rescue others who had become trapped.121 Rescue workers
tunneled into the remains of broken homes liable to collapse on top of them at any time,
working next to tottering walls, broken gas mains, and fires.122 Despite the dangers,
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rescue workers continued to dig through debris as bombs fell around them.123 WVS
workers often arrived at incidents with their mobile canteens pitted with holes from bomb
shrapnel and machine-gun bullets and these canteens continued to operate, serving tea to
firefighters during the worst of the raids.124
The service and sacrifice of civil defense volunteers regularly received attention
from both the state and the public. The film London Can Take It praised the work of the
civil defense services, saying “they are the ones really fighting this war” and showcasing
their dangerous and difficult nightly work as “the people’s army.”125 Winston Churchill
wanted it widely known that acts of gallantry by civil defense workers would be
recognized.126 The MHS was eager to publicize examples of “heroism and devotion to
duty,” as well as mention in the press “other deeds” that did not merit an award for
gallantry, not only as a reward for the individuals concerned, but also to “fortify and
encourage others.”127 Immediately after the start of the Blitz the MHS urged the heads of
the civil defense services and local civil defense leaders to report acts of gallantry by
their members, having only received twenty nominations to date when the prime minister
had asked for one hundred.128 King George VI specifically created two medals, the
George Cross and the George Medal, to recognize “deeds of gallantry done by men and
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women in all walks of civilian life.”129 The George Cross was awarded for deeds of
“great valour” and ranked immediately after the Victoria Cross and was to be worn before
all other orders or decorations.130 The first George Medal was awarded to an Air Raid
Warden who rescued a blind woman trapped in the rubble of her house.131
The civil defense services stood by 24 hours a day, seven days a week during the
whole of the war. Some stood by at a post or center while others were on call, and many
volunteers remained ready to spring into action while at work, at the factory, or taking
care of their household. As soon as the warning signal of approaching enemy aircraft
reached the Control Room, the nerve center of civil defense, the whole organization stood
alert. Wardens went on patrol while Rescue, First Aid, and Ambulance workers waited at
their depots to be despatched to the next emergency. In heavy raids on densely populated
areas, incidents often occurred in rapid succession, requiring efficient organization and
tactical leadership to ensure resources were employed in the most efficient manner.
Immediately after the raid, civil defense volunteers focused on recovery efforts, offering
relief, shelter, and food to the affected civilian population.

The Cinderella of Civil Defense
The most visible arm of British civil defense was arguably the Wardens’ Service.
The Air Raid Warden was generally a part-time male volunteer over military age who
was a well-known and respected member of his community and neighborhood. There
were exceptions to this, however, and the Wardens’ Service ultimately was made up of
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men and women, young and old, part-time and full-time, and paid and unpaid volunteers.
The warden was the civil defense worker most likely to interact with civilians on an
everyday basis in the pursuit of his duties. While civilians encountered most of the other
civil defense services only after having become the victim of a raid, their local warden
was intended to be a constant source of information, reassurance, and control. The job of
an air raid warden was difficult to define, but in essence the Wardens’ Service was “the
lever which brings into action the work of the other Services.132” The warden’s job as the
frontline of civil defense and a source of reassurance and information for the public was
vital to the nation and the official history of the Blitz cited the Wardens’ Service as “a
principal reason for the success of the civil defense services.”133
The Wardens’ Service was created before the outbreak of war. The Air Raid
Precautions Memorandum No. 4, issued by the Home Office in 1938, explained the need
for “an organization of citizen volunteers” who would perform important duties in time
of an air attack and thereby augment and relieve the resources of the regular civil
authorities for safeguarding the public.134 With functions allied to those of the police, the
Home Office intended wardens to be looked upon by the public for help and guidance as
they did with the police.135 For this reason the Wardens’ Service was often organized
under the control of the Chief Constable or directly under the Chief Officer of Police,
although each local authority could implement its own organizational scheme that best
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fitted their existing police and governmental organizational structure.136 Each area was to
have a Chief Warden, who would be responsible for the recruitment and training of
wardens, often with assistance from the police.137 The local organization of the Wardens’
Service depended on population size. A town of 250,000 inhabitants, under the purview
of a Chief Warden, would be divided into Divisions each with a Divisional Warden. Each
Division contained ten Groups, each led by a Head Warden and each Group was made up
of four to five wardens’ posts, with a Senior Warden in charge at each.138 An important
aspect of the organization of every wardens service was the distribution of wardens’ posts
in the local area. In residential areas the Home Office suggested one post per 500
residents, while in industrial or business areas the location would be determined by
distance, about one post every quarter of a mile.139 A warden’s post needed to be in a
prominent location, both to provide good observation to the warden and to allow the
public to easily find it.140 Ideally, such a post would also be connected to the telephone
network, but if this was not possible the post needed to be in close proximity to a public
call box or a police box to allow the wardens to make their reports quickly and easily.141
The post also needed to be large enough to provide storage for the protective gear issued
to wardens and offer protection for wardens against blast and splinters of HE bombs.142
The number of wardens in an area was determined by population density. In important
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urban areas the ratio was six wardens per 500 population, twice the ratio of other areas.143
Wardens were also sometimes appointed to specific buildings or non-residential areas.
The staff of Westminster Abbey, some 40 or 50 men, all underwent warden training to
ensure proper air raid precautions were in place.144
The recruitment of volunteers to fill the Wardens' Service enjoyed varying degrees
of success. Because of a warden’s prominent place in public it was vital that a volunteer
be “of good character, level-headed, and free from obvious physical or temperamental
disability.”145 The Home office specifically suggested that wardens be older men who had
a good sense of responsibility and inspired confidence among their neighbors.146 While in
the initial organization of the Wardens' Service only men were qualified to volunteer, by
1939 women were also allowed to become air raid wardens.147 Through 1941 at least one
in six wardens was a woman.148 By mid-year 1938 some boroughs had only enrolled 25%
of their needed wardens, while other boroughs had yet to take any civil defense
measures. 149 The Munich Crisis swelled recruitment numbers and by the end of October
almost 470,000 wardens had been enrolled out of the needed 520,000.150 London was a
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particularly difficult case, because although out of the required 49,805 wardens over
36,000 had been enrolled by the end of 1938 some boroughs, such as Chelsea, had twice
as many wardens as required while other boroughs, such as Bethnal Green, could not
even fill 50% of their quota.151
Wardens received training specific to their jobs, which incorporated parts of the
training of almost all the other civil defense services. The basic knowledge needed by an
air raid warden was, particularly, how to provide aid during an air raid and proper
reporting techniques, as well as the organization of the civil defense services, and details
on the respirator distribution scheme and respirators themselves.152 It was important that
wardens were fully conversant of Home Office guidance notes issued to the public to
allow them to properly advice civilians in their sectors.153 Warden training was conducted
in two phases—individual and collective. Individual second stage training included local
information, relations with police and public, fitting respirators, principles of the air raid
warning system, message writing and reporting, map usage, protection against HE
bombs, dealing with incendiary bombs, organization of the AFS, elementary first aid,
damage to water or sewer mains, and the equipment of wardens’ posts.154 Wardens were
also required to complete the short First Aid Course and a basic course on incendiary
bomb control.155 The basic training of a warden, not including the locally arranged course
151
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on a warden’s special duties or team training, took over 27 hours to complete, a
significant investment in time particularly for part-time volunteers.156 While the course
on a warden’s duties was locally arranged, the Home Office nevertheless suggested
keeping periods of instruction short and classes relatively small.157 Collective training
would be completed with other wardens, preferably at the warden’s duty location, and
include exercises on the distribution of respirators, manning a post, patrolling, and
actions to be taken upon hearing an air raid warning.158 Wardens in training also practiced
effective message writing on authorized message pads, the use of telephones,
communications when normal channels failed, dealing with casualties, guiding other
services to incidents, and what to do in case of panic.159 By 1940, the government had
issued a training manual intended to cover Individual Training, Stage I for all civil
defense workers, which included instructions on first aid, anti-gas measures, incendiary
bomb control, protection against HE bombs, and the organization of civil defense.160 The
warden training syllabus included a variety of subjects and thus it was often time
consuming and it was not always possible to provide lecturers on every subject, resulting
in some topics being covered through issue of printed materials only.161 Some suggested
that wardens also receive special training in psychology to better handle cases of “air raid
nerves” and shock among the civil population.162 Some localities, such as Leeds,
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arranged lectures on psychology for their wardens.163 Anti-gas training was also vital to
the job of the warden. Wardens took the full anti-gas course, which lasted about nine
hours.164
Most of a warden’s duties, however, did not revolve around actual air raids. The
chief duty of an air raid warden was to advise fellow citizens on official air raid
precautions, to assist in cases of trouble arising from air raid damage and to know how
and where to find relief measures—to generally “act the part of a good neighbor.”165 It
was a vital requirement of the job to establish good relations with the civilians in a
warden’s sector to ensure compliance and avoid conflict.166 A warden, patrolling his or
her sector nightly, was also the perfect person to ensure compliance with lighting
restrictions. Wardens, however, had no legal power to compel compliance and could only
attempt to persuade civilians through appeals to patriotism or advisements of danger.167
The Home Office considered early on that the fitting and distribution of respirators to the
civilian population would require a considerable number of trained personnel who knew
the local area. Wardens were the perfect solution, as their organization revolved around
communities, their training included information necessary to fit and distribute gas
masks, and their duties would not fully start until the outbreak of war.168 After war had
broken out and respirators had been issued to the civil population, much of a warden’s
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time was often taken up with the inspection of respirators. Wardens were required to
make house-to-house inspections in their duty section of all occupants’ gas masks and to
mark the mask’s condition on household record cards. Depending on the region, this
inspection was carried out anywhere between every month to every six months.169 It was
also the duty of a warden to distribute and ensure the correct completion of the
Householder’s Card, a card issued to every household that included a permanent
reminder of air raid precautions and vital local information, such as the location of the
closest wardens’ post, the nearest First Aid Post, the closest local warden and Senior
Warden, and where to obtain help in the case of a fire.170 During public gas exercises
wardens were encouraged to use the opportunity to check the fitting and efficiency of the
respirators worn by civilians observing the exercise. Additionally, it was the wardens’ job
to ensure that civilians who wandered into a gas exercise donned their respirators swiftly
and in the proper manner.171 While a warden did not have the legal power of a policeman,
common law allowed for wardens to make a citizen’s arrest when witnessing a felony.
Wardens were instructed that they might witness felonies such as stealing, housebreaking,
burglary, or malicious damage and be required to respond, but they were also advised to
use great caution when making an arrest to avoid doing so wrongfully.172
During an air raid a warden had a specific set of duties to fulfill. Most wardens
operated out of fixed duty posts, manned by as many as three wardens during a raid, with
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a defined sector under their purview.173 In rural areas some wardens operated out of their
own homes.174 Upon the sounding of an air raid warning each warden would assemble at
his or her wardens’ post.175 It was vital that the wardens’ post be continuously manned to
facilitate the reporting and relaying of messages.176 One of a warden’s primary duties was
to report the falling of bombs and damage caused in their duty section, allowing ARP
Headquarters, the fire brigade, and police to immediately direct their services to the
proper location.177 During his patrol the warden was not only in a good position to report
bomb damage, but would also be the first to determine that a gas attack had occurred.178
Thus a warden during an air raid was a first responder who could direct the proper
services as needed to the right location. Being the first on the scene of an incident could
also mean that wardens had to perform jobs such as rescue and first aid before the arrival
of the appropriate parties.179 One job that was specifically outside the purview of a
warden’s responsibilities was the fighting of fires, as the requirements to man posts, make
reports, and give advice to the public would preclude them from managing both.180
Nevertheless, wardens were instructed to help householders fight incipient fires before
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the arrival of the fire brigade to prevent the spread of flames to other buildings.181 As a
well-respected member of his or her community, the warden was also responsible for
shepherding members of the public to the nearest shelter and to administer first aid
measures to any casualties until more-skilled help could arrive.182 Most important,
however, was the mere presence of the warden in a community during a raid to set an
example of “coolness and steadiness” in the face of danger, ensuring good morale and a
mitigation of panic among the population.183 Additionally, immediately after a raid the
warden was to become a barrier against rumors by displaying “hearty skepticism” in the
face of exaggerated reports and through quoting fantastic examples that had proven
untrue previously.184 Because of the warden’s importance in reassuring civilians, a
committee on preserving civilian morale suggested that “[e]xcitable air-raid wardens
should be combed out.”185
In the event of a gas attack an air raid warden would have performed a specific set
of actions. If a gas bomb exploded in his vicinity, the warden would don his own gas
mask, give the gas warning by sounding his rattle, and reconnoitre the gassed area.186 The
rattle was intended to be operated with a steady swing instead of isolated jerks and
wardens were specifically instructed “not [to] be afraid of making a noise with them.”187
It was the warden’s responsibility to ensure all civilians near a gassed area put on their
181
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respirators and to direct them away from the danger area to the nearest cover.188 The
warden would also need to render first aid and direct casualties to Public Gas Cleansing
Centers if the victim had become contaminated.189 It was vital that wardens knew how to
test for the presence of gas and determine its type, to allow them to determine when to
don protective clothing and to assist the Gas Identification Officer (GIO).
Not everyone welcomed the sometimes intrusive presence of an air raid warden. In
the months prior to the Blitz, when bombs began falling on civilian targets, wardens
seeking to usher people to shelter were often treated disrespectfully.190 After initial issues
with the recognition of a warden’s authority, by 1939 all wardens were issued with a card
of appointment as evidence of their authority in dealing with householders.191 This also
helped to prevent false representation, such as in a case in Dumbartonshire where a man
received a warning from the court for posing as an air raid warden to admonish his
neighbor about visible light coming from his house.192 In Kent, wardens going door-todoor to inspect respirators were often “rudely received” and had doors slammed in their
faces, making many disinclined to carry out further inspections.193 One Group Warden
complained that his wardens were “roundly abused” while on patrol and were treated
“more like ‘Gestapo’ than neighbours.”194 While some wanted to fine noncompliant
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householders under Section 79 of the Civil Defence Act, others cautioned against such a
stretch of powers and suggested instead that if wardens commanded proper respect in
their community there would be no issue.195 One official worried that if wardens were
tasked with reprimanding civilians out in public without their respirators that it could
“prejudice their relations with their flock” and warned against asking wardens to do
this.196
Many wardens felt under-appreciated compared to the other civil defense services.
In London, wardens grew increasingly discontent early in the war because they did not
qualify for pay for rank, did not have proper uniforms, and did not receive a free issue of
army boots.197 A letter to Herbert Morrison, Minister of Home Security in 1941, accused
the MHS of “consistently [making] less favourable provision for the Wardens'’ Service
than for other Civil Defence and the Auxiliary Fire Services.”198 Among the many
instances of “discrimination” against the wardens, the writer listed the lack of greatcoats,
mackintoshes, and boots for wardens, not qualifying for pay for rank or meal allowances,
service as a warden not being considered an alternative to military service while other
civil defense work was so regarded, and receiving uniforms of inferior quality when
services with less strenuous jobs were issued with two good uniforms.199 The writer
further argued that such treatment would adversely affect the morale and efficiency of the
London Wardens’ Service.200 One official worried that several issues in London had
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caused discontent among the wardens. Wardens were the sole service not directly under
the purview of the county boroughs and thus when favors were available to be dispensed
they went to the other services under county borough control.201 Additionally, wardens,
unlike the other services, had no representatives on the Borough Council to advocate for
their interests.202 The official described the wardens as “looking for insults for a long time
past” and urged that wardens be included in the new uniform issue to prevent
discontent.203 A survey of other civil defense regions, however, found that London
wardens were not alone in their grievances. Nottingham civil defense officials were
“gravely apprehensive” of the consequences if wardens were not given the new
uniforms.204 In Bristol wardens complained that even though their job required them to
continuously man their posts and patrol, and other services were only on duty during an
alert, wardens were still treated less favorably.205 One female warden complained about
the perception of full-time paid wardens as “taking the job for pin money,” arguing that
many volunteers, like her, needed to supplement family income with husbands at war or
businesses negatively affected.206 Other wardens agreed that they were looked down upon
for receiving pay, one saying that despite the long hours worked he was made to feel like
“a slacking thief.”207 Such incidents led the Wardens’ Service to consistently believe it
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was being treated as the “Cinderella of Civil Defence.”208 One official facetiously
commented that the wardens-as-cinderella comparison was made in the hope that they
would receive “the traditional reward and be raised to royal rank!”209
Under purview of the Wardens’ Service were also the Fire Guards, who played a
vital role in the protection of the nation. The duty of a Fire Guard involved watching for
the fall of incendiary bombs and alerting the neighborhood when and where such bombs
fell.210 Fire Guards were also asked to aid householders in extinguishing fires caused by
incendiary bombs to prevent larger conflagrations that would require the fire brigade.211
Fire Guards operated in stirrup pump teams, usually consisting of three people, with one
stirrup pump team for approximately every 150 yards or every 30 houses.212 Businesses
and factories were required to maintain their own Fire Guard organizations.213 To avoid
significant interference with nightly rest, Fire Guards only patrolled during an air raid
alert and the Guard on watch duty could remain indoors while the other team members
slept until their turn for watch duties.214 The recognized signal for the fall of fire bombs
in a neighborhood was a series of short blasts of a whistle, given either by police, warden,
or fire guard, to alert the stirrup pump duty teams into action.215 Fire Guards not on duty
when the whistle sounded were still required to dress and to turn out to assist the duty
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team.216 The training of Fire Guards was done in three stages, starting with basic
instructions on operating stirrup pumps, putting out incendiary bombs, and how to
operate in teams of three, followed by practical training with practice incendiary bombs
and lastly tactical training, sometimes involving local exercises. 217 By 1944, the call on
men for the armed forces had in some areas so reduced the availability of civil defense
volunteers that women were taking on more and more fire guard duties.218 Women
operated as fire guards in street parties, as business and factory fire guards, as well as at
government premises.219

The Auxiliary Fire Service
The MHS was aware well before the start of war that perhaps the biggest danger
from enemy air raids would be fire. While existing fire brigades would be capable of
fighting fires started by regular or incendiary bombs, especially in concentrated urban
areas under heavy attack the existing fire service was not large enough to deal with every
fire that might be started. A large component of civilian ARP education consisted of
dealing with incendiary bombs to avoid the fire brigade from being overtaxed. The AFS
was formed as a support to and supplement of existing fire brigades across the civil
defense regions. A job that often took its volunteers into dangerous situations, service in
the AFS was the most recognized and respected of the various civil defense jobs.
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The duties of AFS volunteers were quite similar to those of the regular fire brigade.
The majority of AFS volunteers were needed to fight fires. Members of an AFS brigade
would go with their pumps to the scene of a fire, often working in cooperation with the
regular fire brigade for serious outbreaks, but were asked to handle smaller fires without
the aid of professionals.220 Some volunteers would work in emergency water units,
tasked with bringing water up from lakes, rivers, canals, and other sources to ensure a
sufficient supply.221 Those unable to meet the heavy physical demands of such work
could still join the AFS, manning watch rooms at fire stations or driving the trailer
pumps.222 Youths were asked to enroll as messengers to ensure continued communication
even if the telephone network stopped working.223 Women were particularly encouraged
to volunteer for the “essential if not exciting” jobs of watch room work or record keeping,
which they would be able to do “as well as men, perhaps better.”224 While women did
enroll in the AFS, things did not always go smoothly. In 1938, Lady Reading, Chair of
the WVS, complained to Sir Thomas Gardiner that the way women were being treated in
the London Fire Brigade was “most unsatisfactory,” and that many were resigning
because of the poor conditions under which women were being trained and the
unsatisfactory allocation of responsibility assigned to female officers.225
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The training of auxiliary firemen focused most heavily on fighting fires, but
included other ARP aspects, as well. Training varied between the various jobs of the AFS,
with as many as sixty hours required for the full fire fighter, while other tasks required as
few as thirty hours of training.226 The latter stages of AFS training were also supposed to
provide practical experience of fighting fires to the new auxiliary firemen, but the large
number of AFS volunteers and the relatively small number of fires prior to September
1940 often meant that any peace-time fire saw an unnecessary number of firemen
responding.227 Thus, when the London Blitz began, four-fifths of London’s auxiliary
firemen had never seen a fire.228 Anti-gas training was also an important component of
training for auxiliary firefighters and all volunteers undertook the full anti-gas course.229
Even the AFS messengers received some anti-gas training.230
Recruiting for the AFS was often easier than for other civil defense services, but
more stringent requirements meant enrollment numbers did not meet needs. Men between
30-50 were sought for the AFS, although those over 50 could enroll if they were capable
of doing the physical work.231 Additionally, the AFS restricted its volunteer pool by
requiring all enrollees to be natural-born or naturalized British citizens.232 In 1938 the
estimated number of volunteers required for the London AFS alone was 30,000; women
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could make up 5,000 of those needed.233 Over 1,000 AFS recruitment posters were
displayed at London Underground stations.234 The London Fire Brigade also sought to
increase recruitment through exhibiting posters on the sides of buses and trams, as well as
hoping to show in cinemas a five minute “talkie” about the AFS.235 An advertising
official, however, felt the AFS posters lacked the necessary appeal, emphasizing the need
for exaggeration.236 Another advertising agent thought a cartoon film was most likely to
be shown by cinema proprietors and absorbed by the public, but that the serious subject
of the AFS could not be treated in such a form.237 Exhibitions often served as a useful
publicity and recruiting tool. At an ARP exhibition in London it was suggested to
showcase working fire appliances and for the AFS to periodically exhibit how to fight
incendiary bombs.238 Another suggestion involved stationing a fire engine with its
complete equipment in Trafalgar Square for a week to act as a “propaganda and recruiting
depot.”239 The LCC also agreed to hang streamers across the road outside of each London
fire station with slogans such as “Enrol here for the A.F.S.” to supplement the poster and
newspaper recruitment campaigns.240 One type of AFS advertisement had been intended
to scare people into volunteering, but this was quickly shut down by the LCC, who
agreed that the scare appeal held many advantages, but would have to depict a state of
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affairs so dire as to possibly be unfavorable to recruiting.241 To address a lag in
recruitment, the London Fire Brigade considered asking for time on the BBC to have an
AFS volunteer “put over his own story in a comradely style” to provide a more personal
pull to recruitment that was lacking in national service campaigns.242 By mid-1939,
22,000 volunteers had enrolled in the London AFS, but at least 40,000 were required as
the bare minimum.243 5,000 youths between 14-18 years of age were needed as
messengers for the London AFS.244 Particularly early on, with the AFS still in its infancy,
some recruits may have been reluctant to join because of rumors of inefficient equipment
and uniforms, as well as sub-par AFS posts.245
Incentives were thought to improve recruiting. Service in the AFS was often
portrayed as adventurous and interesting to encourage recruits. In a recruitment
broadcast, the training of the AFS was referred to as “varied and interesting.”246
Volunteering for the AFS was the closest an amateur could come to doing a professional
fireman’s job.247 Another mentioned incentive was that in peacetime, once volunteers had
passed training, they were also allowed to ride out to fires with the regular fire brigade.248
While men volunteering as a whole-time firefighters could receive the regular civil
defense pay, those who undertook positions of greater responsibility, such as Company
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Officers, Group Commanders, and Deputy Commandants, could earn between £4 to £8 a
week.249
The work of the AFS was particularly vital to the nation. Incendiary bombs
presented a special danger to lives and homes and an efficient system of dealing with
fires was required. Civilians were urged to enroll in the AFS to ensure the prompt
extinguishing of fires and the safety of their homes and families.250 Incendiary attacks
produced conflagrations unimaginable in peacetime—the first night of the Blitz in
London produced nine fires that each alone required three to ten times as many pumps
and men as a peacetime “big” fire.251 During the first 22 nights of the Blitz, the London
Fire Brigade, their auxiliaries, and reinforcements attended nearly 10,000 fires.252 The
raids of December 29th caused over 1,500 fires in the City of London, conflagrations so
intense great clouds of smoke seemed to overwhelm the entire city, and one observer
thought it impossible “that the City, that London, could be saved.” Only through the
unrelenting efforts of the AFS was St. Paul’s Cathedral, and the city, saved from the
flames.253
Volunteers of the AFS regularly exposed themselves to great danger to save lives
and property. Incendiary bombs falling on arsenals or railcars sometimes saw volunteers
fighting fires among boxes of live ammunition and crates of nitro-glycerine, while bombs
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continued to rain down around them.254 At the docks, pepper fires made breathing
unbearable, while rum fires blasted firemen with burning liquid. Paint and rubber fires
exposed the men to toxic fumes and black smoke, coating equipment and uniforms in
varnish and soot.255

The Casualty Services
While the Home Office had heavily invested in teaching civilians how to protect
themselves from air raids through education campaigns and the Wardens’ Service, as well
as providing shelter and other protective measures, it was inevitable that air raids on the
nation would cause casualties. The several thousand casualties from zeppelin raids in the
previous war in London alone made clear that if heavy raids were to occur the numbers of
civilian casualties would quickly overwhelm existing systems of first aid, ambulance, and
hospitals. What was required was a system similar to that of the AFS, a supplemental
service to boost existing first aid structures and ensure civilian casualties of war were
treated quickly and appropriately. The casualty services were comprised of the First Aid
Post (FAP), ambulance service, and stretcher parties (called first aid parties in some
areas). Volunteers of the casualty services often found themselves at the frontline of the
aftermath of an air raid, rushing into sometimes dangerous situations to provide treatment
and transportation for injured civilians.
The services worked together to provide swift and competent care for air raid
casualties. Ambulance drivers manned auxiliary ambulance stations and would drive out
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to wherever casualties were reported to take them to hospitals or FAPs.256 The ambulance
staff consisted of one driver and one attendant, manning either a stretcher-carrying
ambulance or “sitting case” cars that could carry minor casualties to FAPs.257 The
members of the stretcher parties were the first line of casualty treatment and their
decisions, made swiftly and often under the dangers of an air raid, could decide whether
someone lived or died. Stretcher parties diagnosed casualties and decided on the need for
priority in treatment, decided on and applied first aid treatment, and decided whether a
casualty needed to be sent to a hospital, FAP, or whether no further treatment was
required.258 Each stretcher party consisted of four persons, one of whom acted as a leader,
along with a driver and a car, used to carry the party to the scene of the incident and carry
the first aid equipment and stretchers.259
The first aid posts were specifically intended to divert non-serious casualties away
from hospitals. They were set up to cover convenient areas and were staffed by a doctor,
a nurse, and a number of nursing auxiliaries.260 The FAPs were intended to treat nonmajor and non-operative injuries, generally providing preliminary first aid treatment,
such as administering anti-tetanus serum or morphine.261 While some beds existed in
each FAP, it was imperative that they not be filled up with casualties requiring bedrest so
that a steady stream of casualties could pass through the post.262 In rural or less densely
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populated areas a First Aid Point was established, usually comprising a room set aside
with a limited amount of first aid equipment that could treat minor injuries and served as
a collection point for casualties requiring a FAP or hospital.263 In some urban areas First
Aid Points were also set up by wardens or householders, usually at houses with a person
qualified to render first aid.264
Training varied between the first aid services, with the FAP attendants and stretcher
parties most heavily trained in first aid measures. All personnel at FAPs, including those
employed in cleansing duties, were required to complete the full First Aid Course of 18
hours of instruction.265 The full course was also mandatory for all members of first aid
parties and ambulance attendants.266 Select members of the stretcher parties, usually the
leader, also took an 18-hour special first aid course that focused more intensely on
wartime first aid, including lessons on casualty aggregation in air attacks, air raid first aid
procedures, casualty transportation, types of air raid injuries, faking injuries, and
collaboration with rescue parties.267 By 1942 first aid parties were also being trained in
some elements of rescue work since trapped casualties often took some time to extricate
and the workload of the Rescue Service was sometimes exceptionally heavy.268 In some
areas, such as London, first aid parties were subsequently being converted to Light
Rescue Parties.269 Ambulance drivers, and domestic staffs at FAPs, completed the six
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hour short course on first aid.270 For ambulance drivers the primary skill needed was
driving a motor vehicle. Initial training for drivers consisted of learning to handle heavy
vehicles and, particularly in London, learning the topography and quickest routes within
their duty areas.271 Additionally, ambulance drivers had to learn how to drive ambulances
at night without lights, due to blackout restrictions.272 The average woman could become
efficient in these skills after about nine lessons.273 Training for drivers also included map
reading, and the general maintenance and cleaning of vehicles to ensure they were always
in working condition.274
All three services received extensive anti-gas training. Drivers took the full, ninehour anti-gas course.275 Ambulance attendants, first aid party members, and volunteers at
the FAP were required to complete the Anti-gas Full and Voluntary Aid Course, because
these volunteers, in particular, would comprise the frontline in the treatment of gas
casualties.276 Anti-gas training also involved practicing one’s duties in anti-gas clothing.
Ambulance drivers practiced driving by day and night while wearing respirators and full
anti-gas clothing.277
Volunteers for the casualty services often required specific skills or physical
abilities and thus recruitment could be difficult. Stretcher party recruitment
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advertisements called for men willing to go out into the street “under conditions of
danger” to bring casualties to safety and described it as a job requiring “nerve and
courage.”278 The physical nature of the first aid parties’ duty also required that younger
men be able to volunteer and full-time members were reserved from liability to military
service at the age of 30 in the provinces and 35 in the London region.279 While by 1942
women were allowed to join first aid parties, other than drivers their numbers were quite
low and only women of “suitable physique” were enrolled.280 Recruitment adverts for
FAPs pointed out that women have “always borne the main burden of caring for the sick
and wounded,” and asked women between 18-55 to train as nursing auxiliaries.281 For
women ambulance drivers their “ability to drive [was] an asset to the nation,” and women
were urged to offer their services as drivers whether or not they owned cars.282 Women
were especially recruited for this service because there were already “so many other calls
on the male citizen.”283 Women between 18-50 were the primary recruitment targets,
although anyone older was eligible to enroll if they could prove physically capable of
carrying out the work.284 A First Aid Certificate enabled a volunteer to work as a First Aid
Helper at FAPs, but untrained volunteers could still be employed as First Aid
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Assistants.285 The London Ambulance Service specifically sought to target places women
would frequent for recruitment advertising. Recruiting posters were exhibited in large
department stores’ female lavatories, beauty parlors, and hair dressing salons.286 Another
suggestion called for a recruiting depot set up on the premises of Harrods department
store, if possible with an actual ambulance on show at the store.287 It was also suggested
that by approaching all local women’s hairdressers to request that they display
recruitment posters, the ambulance service could be sure of “getting practically every
woman motor driver within a month.”288 Under consideration was also the targeting of
matinee performances at theaters and cinemas to specifically reach women and one
official lamented that a great idea would have been to have current ambulance drivers
picket the West End theaters “if only they had uniforms!”289 In London a recruiting
leaflet was also sent out with the renewal of every woman’s driver’s license.290 One
official suggested that instead of spending money on press advertisements actually
opening ambulance stations in a few districts would attract more volunteers.291
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The London region also sought to gain publicity for civil defense through an exhibition
where female ambulance drivers were present to exhibit their uniforms and training.292
Nonetheless, as of February 1939, the London Ambulance Service alone was still short
17,000 drivers and attendants.293

The Rescue and Demolition Service
The destruction that air raids would wreak on urban infrastructure was a major
concern, both in terms of property damage as well as the danger to life and limb. Debris
on roadways could make streets impassable for ambulances or civilians trying to reach
first aid posts, while unsafe structures damaged by bombs could present hazards even
after a raid. Most important, however, was the need to rescue casualties trapped under
rubble and debris after raids. The Rescue and Demolition Service was formed specifically
to remove, demolish, or secure debris, rubble, and unsafe structures that presented
hazards to civilians and civil defense services after a raid. The service’s primary mission
was to reach civilians trapped in the ruins of their homes or shelters. Volunteers in rescue
parties provided vital services that directly saved lives and enabled the other civil defense
services to complete their own missions.
The training and organization of the Rescue and Demolition Service was important
to ensure the effective carrying out of their work. While initially the service had been
divided into Light and Heavy Rescue parties, by 1942 this distinction had been
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abolished.294 Each rescue party consisted of ten men and a driver, although this number
was sometimes reduced to eight in some areas.295 Wardens or police reported incidents to
the borough control center, from where the officer-in-charge of the rescue service would
send out rescue parties depending on the information received.296 The leader or foreman
of the first party to arrive at the scene would take charge, deciding on the method to be
adopted and the scale of effort put into the work.297 Incidents of material importance
would also see a clerk of works sent out to assess the scene, to ensure the work was being
done correctly, and to keep progress under review.298 Upon arrival at an incident, the
party leader would decide if another party was required or special equipment needed.299 If
a fire had broken out and could not be contained with a stirrup pump, the fire brigade was
also summoned.300 The rescue party also inspected gas and water mains, as well as
electricity cables, to determine if workmen needed to be sent out to shut them off
(although a training manual suggested controlling gas leaks by ramming lumps of clay
into the gas main).301 Before any rescue could commence the party leader also needed to
inspect the site and determine whether demolition or shoring was required, and then
organize volunteers to move debris, sending for men from nearby shelters if necessary.302
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Volunteers of the Rescue Service were trained primarily in aspects of casualty
rescue. Rescue party members completed the basic training of all civil defense services,
as well as the short course on first aid, because they usually were the first to reach
trapped casualties and could thus provide a modicum of care before the arrival of first aid
parties.303 First Aid Parties were generally not sent into unsafe structures and thus it was
imperative that members of the rescue party could render basic first aid before casualties
were extricated.304 Of special importance was that rescue party members knew how to
recognize and deal with shock, as well as how to move casualties gently to prevent
further injury and shock.305 Specialized training for rescue workers also included lessons
on building construction, safety measures, shoring, ropes and knots, lifting heavy
weights, cutting with an acetylene torch, scaffolding, demolition, damage to public utility
mains, and the rescue of casualties.306 It was also necessary to adapt training for both
services to local conditions, as each locality had its own special type of building
construction, and in some areas multi-storied buildings were more common.307
Members of the Rescue and Demolition Service were trained in anti-gas measures.
Rescue party members would still be required to rescue casualties in the event of a gas
attack and thus would be likely to come into contact with contaminated people and work
in a contaminated environment. Rescuers completed the full anti-gas course, which
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taught the use of protective clothing and in-depth anti-gas measures.308 Prior to beginning
any rescue at an incident site party leaders needed to test for poison gas. If wardens had
not reported gas initially, the rescue party would arrive at the incident in overalls, with
their protective clothing along in a box.309 If a war gas was recognized on site, the rescue
party would immediately don respirators before proceeding. In the case of a persistent
agent, such as mustard gas, the party would withdraw to an uncontaminated district, dress
in their anti-gas clothing, and seal their regular clothes in a box with adhesive tape.310
Work in anti-gas clothing would have made an already physically demanding job almost
unbearably taxing, official instructions describing work in anti-gas suits as “very
exhausting.”311
These jobs involved some of the hardest physical labor in the civil defense system.
In one MHS publication rescue work was described as “the heaviest and most dangerous
work of all the [civil defense] services.”312 While the service’s purpose was not the wide
scale shoring up of debris or demolition, rescue party members nevertheless performed
difficult work in destroyed structures to ensure civilian safety and rescue.313 The work of
the rescue services involved three primary operations. The first operation was the moving
of debris, using picks, shovels, crowbars, and barrows.314 The second operation was the
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lifting of heavy weights, for which members used jacks, levers, and lifts.315 The Rescue
Service also worked to shore up walls and floors and carried out any demolition work
necessary to safeguard the public and to carry out further rescue work.316 Rescue parties
were usually the first to reach trapped casualties and one training manual warned that
rescuers be prepared to encounter “horrible and revolting injuries” and to steel their
nerves against this sight so their efficiency in rescue would not be impaired.317 Rescue
work also involved the unpleasant task of extricating dead bodies, although volunteers
were instructed to treat all casualties as gently as possible in case victims were still
alive.318 Where possible the rescue service employed dogs trained to find casualties,
although numbers were so limited that the entire London region only had two pairs of
Alsatians for the purpose.319 A third task sometimes undertaken by rescue parties was the
recovery of essential foodstuffs. This was only undertaken after the rescue of all
casualties, under guidance from the Local Food Officer, usually a few days after an air
raid.320
Only specific types of civilians could volunteer for the Rescue or Demolition
Service. The heavy physical demands on rescue workers meant only men were eligible to
enroll in the service and men of good physique and stamina at that.321 Prior to the
experience of actual air raids, the theory had been that men from the building trade would
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be best suited for rescue work and the initial composition of each rescue team consisted
of one foreman, four skilled and five unskilled men.322 To draw skilled labor to the rescue
and demolition service, the Home Office set a rate of pay above that normally approved
for full-time civil defense volunteers: £3 17s. a week for skilled men and £4 5s. a week
for foremen.323 Unskilled, regular volunteers received the same pay as other civil defense
volunteers.324 By 1942, however, practice had shown that rescue work required a
technique all of its own and volunteers could be quite well trained from the start without
prior knowledge of construction.325 Like the first aid parties, men over 30 who
volunteered full-time with the Rescue Service were not liable for military service to
ensure a sufficient number of physically fit men could enroll.326
Public perception of the rescue and demolition services was not always positive.
After several months of air raids, the North Midland Region found that heavy raids could
mean that it took as long as two weeks for dead bodies to be recovered from the
wreckage of their homes and that this created a doubt in the mind of the public that
people may have been saved if they had been extricated in the first 24 hours.327 To ensure
that no person (whether dead or alive) be kept under wreckage beyond 24 hours it was
proposed to enlist military assistance, as well as draw on rescue parties from across the
region to concentrate on the most damaged areas.328 In Weybridge, an official worried
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that rescue parties were being dismissed before all reasonable doubt had been removed
that there were bodies under the wreckage, citing an incident where a body was recovered
after ten days delay.329 Lack of speed in rescue work was a complaint common across the
civil defense regions. Officials were concerned that rescue parties lacked proper technical
supervision, that modern buildings were too large to be tackled by parties of ten men, and
that sometimes equipment, such as cranes, were used by unskilled men.330 In other parts
of the country complaints suggested that rescue parties were not sufficiently numerous,
that they were slow to extricate casualties, that they were unnecessarily destructive, and
that they did work they were not supposed to do.331 One woman rescued from the debris
of her house complained to the Daily Mail that the rescue party was refusing to continue
to work in order to free her trapped mother and sister, although the government report on
the incident countered the claim, stating that two rescue parties had been working fulltime at the incident.332 Accusations of “lack of vigour” in the workers’ attitudes to their
job was a particularly concerning complaint, because it could undermine public
confidence in the service and thus negatively affect morale.333 The number and types of
complaints led to an official investigation into the Rescue Service, which found that the
number of complaints in comparison with the number of incidents was relatively small
and there was no reason to suspect a general defect with either the service or its
volunteers.334 The investigator also concluded that the conditions under which rescue
329
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parties worked was particularly apt to cause misapprehension in the uninformed
onlooker, especially when his judgment and susceptibilities were affected by personal
grief.335 Additionally, the nature of rescue work did not always allow all ten members of a
party to work simultaneously, so to avoid men standing around idly, which could be
perceived negatively, the report suggested dividing parties into teams of three, with one
skilled and two unskilled men each, who could then work three different points
simultaneously.336

The Gas Services
While all of the civil defense services were trained to deal with poison gas as part
of their jobs, there was also a need to provide personnel specifically intended to deal only
with a gas attack. A major concern was how to decontaminate civilians who had fallen
victim to a gas attack and, as a result, cleansing centers were created. To decontaminate
roads and buildings it was necessary to create a Decontamination Service. While wardens
received some training in recognizing types of gas, if a gas attack occurred a special
person trained in the recognition of gas would be necessary. The Gas Identification
Officer (GIO) would be responsible for testing gassed areas and making
recommendations as to further precautions and treatment. Regional Gas Advisers would
oversee the network of GIOs and liaise with the Home Office on issues of chemical agent
identification and protection.
The duties of both the GIO and the Decontamination Service only began with a gas
attack. The very first use of gas by the enemy would require collaboration between the
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Gas Identification Service and the MHS because “utmost care is necessary before an
accusation of the use of gas is made.”337 The GIO would report the first use of gas, along
with the region’s Senior Gas Adviser, to the MHS, where scientific and military advisers
would carefully examine the evidence, before reporting the use of gas to the
government.338 Thereafter, any use of gas would be reported by wardens or police
patrolling their districts and the control center would subsequently send the GIO, and a
decontamination squad if necessary, to the scene.339 The decontamination squad, each
consisting of seven men, would be sent to deal with the liquid decontamination of streets
and buildings, arriving in a lorry that also carried their equipment and supplies.340 Using
bleaching powder and wearing full oilskin anti-gas suits with respirators the
decontamination squads would work during daytime to decontaminate gassed areas.341 If
the GIO discovered that food had become contaminated with gas he would summon the
Gas Contamination Officer of the Ministry of Food, who would assess the situation and,
if necessary, call out the Food Treatment Squads, specially trained to deal with the
decontamination of foodstuffs.342
Contaminated civilians would be directed to wash their skin immediately at one of
several options. Public Gas Cleansing Centers (GCC) fell under the purview of the First
Aid Post Service, with the centers either directly attached or affiliated with specific
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FAPs.343 Staffs at the GCCs received training in the cleansing of contaminated persons in
order to provide assistance to civilians, particularly as those who may have received other
injuries during the raid would have been unable to wash themselves. 344 Civilians splashed
with blister gas would make their way either to a street gas cleansing service, a private
house available for decontamination, or a GCC, where they could remove their
contaminated clothes and wash their skin.345 Contaminated clothing would be
decontaminated free of charge and GCCs stocked some emergency clothing to allow
decontaminated persons to return home.346 Laundry operatives engaged in the
decontamination of clothing had to received special training to carry out the process.347
The training of both GIO and Decontamination Parties therefore heavily revolved
around anti-gas measures, but also included other aspects of civil defense.
Decontamination Squads completed the basic Individual Training First Stage, as well as
second stage training that included incendiary bomb control and the short course on first
aid.348 The 13-hour full anti-gas and decontamination course was also required. GIOs
underwent the same training as Decontamination Squads.349 GIOs also attended special
courses given by members of chemistry departments at universities and colleges.350
Volunteers for both decontamination squads and the Gas Identification Service
needed special qualifications. In general, the men and women of the Gas Identification
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Service already had some training in chemistry prior to volunteering as GIOs and their
scientific experience would allow them to properly advise the other services about poison
gas.351 The heavy work of the Decontamination Service and the physical strain of
working in anti-gas clothing required men of good physique and stamina and only men
had been enrolled for this service by 1942.352 Manpower difficulties, however, made the
MHS consider enrolling a limited number of suitable women, particularly after trials
showed that women could carry out ordinary decontamination in streets, as long as no
shifting of debris was involved.353

One Million Women - The Women’s Voluntary Services for Civil Defence
One of the largest and usually untapped sources of labor in the nation were women.
In WWI women had proven their capabilities in the workforce and prior to the start of
WWII it was expected that women again would rise to the occasion to work in factories
and offer their time for civil defense. Several of the other civil defense services recruited
female volunteers, but a major component of civil defense was staffed entirely by
women—the Women’s Voluntary Services (WVS). This service offered women the
opportunity to volunteer their time to assist fellow citizens in their time of need through a
variety of jobs. The WVS was a vital service without which many aspects of the
government’s civil defense scheme would have been unsuccessful. With its volunteers
engaged in all aspects of civil defense and its mission often revolving around the welfare
of British civilians, the WVS’s image was one of hard work, enthusiasm, and devotion to
350
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duty: “No job is too strenuous, too dangerous, too dirty or too small — if it must be done
, the W.V.S. will do it.”354
The WVS came into being prior to the outbreak of war. The service was formed in
May 1938 in response to a request by the then-Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, for the
help of women for the task of enrolling ARP volunteers and for the education of women
in ARP measures for themselves and their families.355 The Home Secretary wanted such a
service specifically because women were not engaged enough in ARP, because women’s
organizations would be better able to reach other women, to make women aware that they
could play a part in national defense, and because through energizing women for civil
defense men, householders, and local authorities could be stimulated to do so, as well.356
Subsequently the WVS was also tasked with recruiting women for the various hospital
services and to aid with evacuation. Although initially titled “Women’s Voluntary
Services for Air Raid Precautions” by the end of 1938 the service had taken on such a
variety of tasks that its founder and leader Stella Isaacs, the Dowager Marchioness of
Reading, asked that the name be altered to “Women’s Voluntary Services for Civil
Defence.”357 By early 1939 the WVS was represented in over 80% of 175 schememaking authorities in England and Wales.358 The WVS, headquartered at Westminster,
consisted of nine departments each responsible for various aspects of civil defense and
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coordination with the government. A Technical Department dealt with all questions of
ARP training, the Transport Department coordinated with the AFS and Ambulance
Service, the Meetings Department supplied speakers for meetings, while other
departments dealt with regional cooperation, evacuation, architecture, and publicity.359
The WVS offered more than one type of job to its many volunteers. Most women
who enrolled with the WVS did not directly work with the service, but were parceled out
to the other civil defense services in need. In London, for instance, the WVS enrolled
several hundred drivers who were then sent on to the London Ambulance Service.360 The
WVS was actively involved in recruiting women for hospitals as emergency nursing
assistants, casualty workers, hospital auxiliaries such as clerks, storekeepers, telephonists,
ward maids, and surgical dressing makers.361 Women recruited and trained by the WVS
also worked across the civil defense services as telephonists, clerks, messengers, laundry
maids, and drivers.362 One of the WVS’s largest tasks involved evacuation, particularly
the education of householders of the plan, securing billets, collecting names and
addresses, stimulating interest in the plan, and, in general, providing assistance to officers
engaged in evacuation.363 In receiving areas, WVS volunteers also offered health
services, communal cooking, and home services to evacuees and those billeting them.364
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The outbreak of war further expanded the WVS’s activities. Work parties made
hospital supplies and clothing.365 Canteen services supplied food and tea in public
shelters, British restaurants, and rest centers.366 Volunteers manned rest centers and other
refuges for those bombed out of their homes, while others organized salvage collections
on behalf of the Supply Department.367 WVS volunteers staffed war-time nurseries for
children under five who could not be evacuated on their own.368 The WVS was also
involved in the distribution of ration books, as well as ensuring that children received the
free issue of nutritious fruit juices and cod liver oil.369 The Architect Department of the
WVS offered a panel of over fifty women architects and surveyors who were prepared to
place their technical knowledge at the disposal of housewives, tenants, and others
desirous of advice on structural problems in connection with the preparation of refuge
rooms. This panel was solely intended for the assistance of those who could not afford to
pay for expert advice, and specifically excluded large corporations or factories.370 The
work of the WVS also concerned troop welfare and volunteers knitted for troops, staffed
service hostels where service members could enjoy a meal and bed, arranged sightseeing
tours for allied troops, distributed books, and offered free food through mobile and
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permanent WVS canteens.371 By the end of the war, the WVS was aiding 20 government
departments with both the civil defense and war efforts, including the MHS, the Ministry
of Health, the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Board of Education, the
Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Information, and the Ministry of Supply.372
The Housewives Section of the WVS was an opportunity for those women who
wanted to help, but had only a limited amount of time that they could volunteer. All
women were encouraged to volunteer time with the local Housewives Service if domestic
duties prevented them from participating in the civil defense services, and if no local
Housewives Service existed they were urged to start their own with help from the
WVS.373 Every trained housewife displayed a blue card in the window of her home,
indicating a place where a civilian might obtain assistance for a variety of problems.374
Much of the duty of a member of the Housewives Service involved information gathering
and record keeping. Housewives were instructed, for instance, to provide the local
wardens’ post with a list of people sheltering each night in each home on the street, to
keep a list of the next-of-kin of every housewife in the road, and to compile a list of who
owned ladders in the street and where they were kept.375 Housewives also made first aid
dressings to be distributed to every house in the street for emergencies.376 Additionally,
the Housewives Service was intended to foster cooperation and the boosting of morale
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through social gatherings, ensuring there were no lonely people in the street and sharing
hospitality with one another in the case of houses becoming too damaged to live in.377
The training for the WVS was comprehensive, but largely depended on the type of
job. While the WVS offered some broad ARP training for its members, most women
subsequently received the training specific to their job in civil defense. Members of the
Housewives Section were required to complete basic training in first aid, fire fighting,
and elementary ARP.378 Anti-gas training was included for women in both services. The
WVS’s anti-gas training included the short course, but many women who volunteered for
jobs such as wardens, messengers, or in the casualty services or AFS completed
additional anti-gas training.379
Recruitment numbers for the WVS and the Housewives Service usually suffered
from the same issues as the other civil defense services. The WVS found that large
numbers enrolled at times of crises, but that at other times recruitment was “very
poor.”380 At the outset of war there were 336,000 members; by 1943 over one million
women were in some way engaged in WVS work.381 The WVS also assisted in recruiting
for other services. To recruit drivers for the London Ambulance Service, the WVS sent
out copies of the leaflet Calling All Cars to all women’s clubs, car clubs, and to select
garages and hire firms, and subsequently followed this up with personal visits.382
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The work of the WVS was consistently praised and received attention from all
quarters of the government. The Ministry of Information developed a picture set to
showcase the WVS’ work, suggesting that this service was best suited for publicity
purposes as the WVS would be the only one of the civil defense services likely to have
continuing function after the war.383 The title of this picture set, “One Million Women - A
Picture Story of the tireless enthusiasm and great achievement of the Women’s Voluntary
Services for Civil Defence,” indicates the perception of the WVS among the public and
government agents.384 The work of the WVS was judged invaluable and an official
claimed the public would not know how to carry on without the help of the WVS.385
Home Secretary Herbert Morrison, when asked to sum up the importance and
achievements of the WVS, said the service was one of “a million magnificent women,
who are simply applying the principles of good housekeeping to the job of helping to run
their country in its hour of need […] it is something no man could do, and something that
the whole nation will not forget.”386 By 1944 WVS members had been awarded five
George medals and 78 Empire Awards for acts of gallantry.387
The contributions of the WVS were often defined in how they supported British
morale. A Ministry of Information picture set on the WVS commented on a mobile
canteen “A cup of tea and a snack when it tastes best—inevitable prop to British
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morale.”388 Much of the WVS’s work involved caring for people post-raids and thus they
were directly responsible for shoring up morale among the homeless and injured. WVS
workers staffed the Rest Centers that offered temporary accommodations for the
homeless, alongside tea, sandwiches, and clothes in the immediate aftermath of a raid.389
As part of the Queen’s Messenger Convoys they drove into bombed towns to cook and
serve hot food in the first hours of distress, providing a vital service to boost civilian
morale.390 WVS mobile canteens offered tea and sustenance to civil defense workers
engaged during air raids, ensuring that vital work could continue.391 Housewives, too,
were instructed to “keep cheerful, and keep others cheerful, too,” because cheerful faces
would make the days seem brighter even in the dire circumstances of air raids.392
Four years of war proved the success, and the necessity, of the civil defense
services. Despite continued issues of enrollment and ever-worsening conditions, the
volunteers of the civil defense services performed a vital function that directly supported
the larger war effort. Civil defense workers ensured that the country could continue to run
in the face of enemy attack and they helped to boost and maintain civilian morale during
strenuous times. Many civil defense volunteers either directly or indirectly helped to save
the lives of British civilians, often risking their own lives in the process. Without the
effort of all of the civil defense services the nation could not have withstood the
onslaught of enemy bombs and many more civilian lives would have been lost.
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Chapter 5 - “The gasmask is not a talisman:” Protecting the Civil Population from
Poison Gas, 1915-1945
The use of poison gas in WWI had drawn significant attention and worry in Britain
and the most recognizable symbol of chemical warfare, the gas mask, had become
entrenched in the British public consciousness. Anxieties that a future war would see
civilians targeted by poison gas were widespread among both the public and the
government. During the interwar period various branches of the British government
sought to find a solution for the problem of how to protect the entire civilian population
from a gas attack, if one came in a future war. Throughout the 1920s the solutions
revolved around proofing rooms or shelters against gas, with officials arguing that it was
financially and physically impossible to outfit the entire population of Britain with
respirators. By the mid-1930s opinions had changed and the government decided, as
much for reasons of perception and psychology, to issue every man, woman, and child
with their own mask. ARP education taught civilians and civil defense workers how to
protect themselves in the case of a gas attack, but the gas mask formed the cornerstone of
not only anti-gas measures, but British civil defense, in general.
British civilians did not directly interact with poison gas in WWI, but the
experiences with chemical warfare and gas masks of their own armed services, as well as
those of civilians on the European continent, shaped their perceptions of gas and anti-gas
equipment. British soldiers were subjected to gas attacks and made use of increasingly
sophisticated respirators for protection, sharing those experiences with families and
friends left at home both immediately during the war and in the years to follow. The gas
mask was the most readily visible and permanent symbol of chemical warfare, an item
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that was defined by both its protective properties, but also the horror of modern warfare it
represented.
The first use of gas in 1915 also immediately led to the first development of
protective equipment. Initial masks were crude and usually improvised by the soldiers
themselves. Canadian troops who had been gassed at Second Ypres found a wet sock to
be effective.1 To protect against the fumes of chlorine gas others urinated on
handkerchiefs.2 Days after the first gas attack the War Office issued a call to the British
public to produce a homemade respirator for the troops, made of bleached cotton wool
and gauze to cover nose and mouth.3 Dubbed the “Daily Mail Respirator” the call ran in
several national newspapers and the response was so enthusiastic demands had been met
within a day.4 This respirator, however, was not only inefficient and useless, but may
have also been an asphyxiation danger to the soldiers using it.5 The first official respirator
issued by the War Office consisted of pads of cotton waste soaked in hypo solution,
wrapped in cotton veiling or muslin long enough to tie around the back of the head,
intended to cover the wearer’s nose and mouth.6 Following the mouthpad respirator came
various iterations of hooded gas masks. First came the Hypo Helmet, a hypo-impregnated
flannel hood with a mica window, then the P Helmet, two layers of phenate-soaked
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flannelette with round glass eyepieces and an exhale valve, and lastly the PH Helmet,
which added another protective chemical to the impregnation.7 This unattractive and
uncomfortable gas helmet came to be known colloquially among British soldiers as the
“goggle-eyed booger with the tit.”8 By 1917 respirators had become increasingly more
sophisticated, offering better protection and comfort to the wearer. The Small Box
Respirator (SBR) consisted of a form-fitting full-face mask of rubberized fabric and an
inflated rubber edge with two separate triplex glass eyepieces and head straps. A valve
allowed air to be exhaled more easily, but to inhale air was drawn through a corrugated
rubber hose that attached to a tin canister carried in a satchel on the soldier’s chest.9
British civilians could avail themselves to commercial models of respirators, most
of them offering little or no protection. Such commercial models were marketed either to
be used by civilians at home in case of a possible attack or to be sent by worried families
to their loved ones serving on the front. Ambitious entrepreneurs, like Wallach Brothers,
Ltd., placed ads in British newspapers selling various forms of “respirators” marketed in
some way as protecting the troops. The “Combat” Respirator was an aluminum mask,
marketed as providing “protection with comfort” and to be used at the front. While the
ad never states what the mask is intended to protect the wearer from, its inclusion of the
word “respirator” and “front” was likely intended to convey gas-protective properties to
the reader.10 Harrods, too, sought to profit from the new threat and ran newspaper ads
7
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instructing readers on which type of respirators were available for purchase in various
departments. These respirators included ones made from cotton wool, double stockinette,
and even models knitted from fine or scoured wool.11 Like the similar Daily Mail
respirator, these models sold by Harrods provided no actual protection from gas and may
have even proved dangerous to the wearer.12 Marshall & Snelgrove of Leeds sold
prepackaged parcels customers could have sent to soldiers overseas, which contained
socks, gloves, a scarf, a belt, and a “protective gas mask.”13 While it is unclear how
many commercial respirators may have been sent to troops by well-meaning family
members or friends, numbers proved problematic enough that the War Office urged the
public to stop sending non-official respirators to the front.14 For civilians fearful of a gas
attack at home the War Office urged that they purchase only respirators made to
government standards.15 Enough civilians purchased and wore masks that news even
reached British soldiers in the trenches. One soldier wrote in a letter of his amusement at
hearing that Londoners were wearing masks which sounded useless compared to the
official equipment and urged his sister not to bother using such a mask.16
While civilians did not directly experience gas attacks during WWI, they had
learned of the horrors of the new weapon and come to recognize the gas mask as its
symbol. Even the limited aerial raids on Great Britain during the war had given rise to
anxieties that gas could be used against civilians in such attacks, although this never
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came to pass. It was easy to extrapolate, however, for government officials and civilians
alike that a future war, with improved machinery could see civilians directly targeted by
chemical weapons and such anxieties continued to exist even after the end of the war. The
gas mask, as the best means of protection against poison gas, also continued to receive
attention in the years following WWI.
Despite the condemnation of chemical warfare and its subsequent ban, there was
considerable concern in the interwar period that poison gas would be used again and this
time against civilians. The limited success of German zeppelin raids on England had
shown that in a future war the civil population was going to be a likely target and the
British government needed to find ways to protect its citizens, particularly against gas.
The Air Raid Precautions Sub-Committee and the Sub-Committee on the Production of
Respirators, under the purview of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), took up this
issue in the 1920s, seeking a solution that would allow for the wholesale protection of the
entire British population. With the responsibility of ARP transferred to the Home Office,
both sub-committees came under the direction of the MHS in 1936.17 During a decade of
discussion the CID considered several options, largely based on financial and physical
possibilities, before arriving at the decision to issue respirators to the entire civil
population prior to WWII.
In 1924 the CID first addressed the problem of protecting civilians from a gas
attack. A report by the Chemical Warfare Committee titled “Memorandum on the
Protection of the Civil Population Against Gas Attack” outlined the potential of a gas
attack against civilians and concluded that such an attack would have “serious and far17
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reaching effects” if not guarded against.18 The Committee suggested several means of
protection for the civil population, including the dissemination of knowledge on gas
attacks and precautionary measures, an air raid alarm, the provision of shelters, the
creation of a decontamination service, and the creation of a casualty service.19 The report
considered the idea of gas masks, but dismissed this as impracticable for several reasons:
Respirators did not protect the body against mustard gas, a respirator needed to be fitted
to work and the person wearing it required training in its use, there were no respirators
for infants, and manufacture of the numbers needed would be impossible.20 Instead the
Committee recommended that people go indoors during a gas attack as the main line of
defense and to further improve on the protection by selecting one room and sealing it to
create a gas-proof refuge.21 The CID agreed with the Chemical Warfare Committee and
adopted their recommendations, stating that the principle civilian protection against gas
was to go indoors and remain there until the all clear had been given.22 Arguments against
providing civilians with respirators were not only concerned with feasibility and cost.
One official argued that if the government provided people with respirators it might give
them the idea that they were immune from danger.23
Over the next decade opinion on the necessity and feasibility of civilian respirators
shifted significantly as a result of several issues. While a gas-proofed room had always
18
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been considered to be the first line of defense against a gas attack, recalculations of
expected bombardments necessitated a change in policy. By 1930 officials envisioned a
much greater intensity of bombardment in a future war, which would in turn also cause
higher concentrations and less dispersal of gas clouds.24 Additionally, heavy
bombardment would likely break windows and walls and render any room no longer gasproof.25 This meant not only that civilians would require more effective protection, but
that the gas masks supplied to police and civil defense services would need to offer better
and longer protection against gas.26 Researchers concluded that while the first line of
defense ought to still be a gas-proof room, it was now necessary to provide some form of
individual protection, as well.27 Porton Down, the military’s research complex that
housed the Chemical Defence Research Department (CDRD), began research into
designing a cheap form of respirator that would offer a degree of protection for the
civilian population.28
By 1934 government committees had reached the conclusion that some type of
civilian respirator was necessary. Initially, this meant encouraging private manufacture of
respirators to a government-specific design that companies could then sell for a
reasonable profit.29 The government would then urge civilians to purchase masks, but
only those of an approved design.30 Companies were naturally eager to adopt this strategy
and several wrote the Home Office to encourage the idea and seek approval for their
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products.31 One agent likened the purchase of a gas mask to the buying of any other form
of insurance, such as life insurance.32 Others thought that even if the public were not yet
ready to buy respirators, “demand [could] be created by skilful publicity.”33 By early
1934 the CID argued for legislation to cover the design, construction, and materials of
respirators for sale to the public and to ensure that only officially approved respirators
could be sold.34 Additionally, they sought to make it an offense to sell any respirator other
than one of an approved pattern.35 Officials, however, did see some potential problems
with the commercial model of protecting the civil population. The CID considered that at
the outbreak of war demand would significantly outstrip supply, which also raised
concerns over foreign imports, the quality and efficacy of which could not be properly
controlled.36 Another concern was that private enterprises, naturally wishing to advertise
their product, would create publicity or propaganda that could cause undue concern
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among the population.37 A major problem, which had been ignored by officials prior to
the CID’s March 1934 report, was that many families would be unable, or unwilling, to
pay the estimated ten shillings per head for a respirator they might never require and
which needed to be replaced in some years’ time.38
Ultimately the government realized it would have to bear the burden of producing,
issuing, and storing respirators for the civilian population. In March 1934 the Air Raid
Precautions Sub-Committee considered for the first time whether it was not possible to
produce “a really cheap respirator at a much smaller price” and whether it was desirable
to provide such an item to the public.39 The Committee particularly cited the cost of
private purchase and the psychological aspect of the issue.40 It was also pointed out that if
the government suggested civilians purchase their own masks for protection that this
could imply some obligation to provide respirators for all those who could not themselves
afford to buy one.41 A special ARP Sub-Committee meeting in mid-1934 determined that
a civilian respirator should be suitable for wear by men, women, and children, that it
should allow the wearer to be recognized in order to avoid frightening young children,
that it should provide adequate protection against gas, that it should be both of a low cost
and suitable for mass production, and that it should have a long life in storage.42 The aim
was to keep production cost of the civilian respirator at two shillings or less per mask and
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that materials preferably either be produced in Britain or be available in large enough
quantities in the country in a time of emergency.43 The standard of protection afforded by
the civilian respirator against gas was set as approximately two minutes protection in
heavy concentrations and at lesser concentrations at a quarter to half an hour of
protection.44 While the Committee did not yet have a solution for the protection of
children and babies, it was suggested to have a different pattern respirator “less good for
intelligent people” that could be used for babies and irresponsible persons.45 The
Committee also expected to accumulate and store millions of respirator prior to an
outbreak of war, estimating at minimum a store of ten million with the assumption that
stored respirators had a life of five to ten years.46 Initial plans called for a supply of 40
million civilian gas masks for free issue, with a supplementary five million added in
1938, to be produced by 1939, at a total cost of over £4.5 million.47
What had swayed governmental opinion was public perception and psychology. At
a meeting of the Air Raid Precautions Sub-Committee in 1934 one member pointed out
that at the start of an emergency, when the civil defense services would be issued with
masks, there would also be “an insistent clamour from the population in general […] for
the supply of an efficient respirator […].”48 In early 1934 the CID considered the
likelihood of the public demanding the government provide respirators at the outbreak of
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war and concluded that “pressure might be so insistent that this might have to be done.”49
The CID also pointed out the discontent and social unrest that would likely occur when,
at the outbreak of war, the only respirators available were financially out of reach of a
considerable percentage of the population.50 Without the production of a cheap and
simple respirator there was also not going to be a sufficient supply of gas masks at the
start of an emergency, even if the government decided to issue its existing stocks to
civilians.51 The CID expected “tremendous public demand” on the outbreak of war for
respirators and concluded that a simple mask needed to be produced to meet demand and
prevent social unrest.52 Even after the government had decided to lay in stores of civilian
respirators for issue in case of war not every civilian would have been eligible to receive
one. Plans had initially involved grading populations on the likelihood of attack and
about seven million people (graded as D) would not have been issued respirators,
however, by 1937 the Home Office decided that to delimit areas where no respirators
would be provided was “politically impracticable.”53
During the interwar years research into respirators and other possible means of
protection had been extensive. In 1928 an experiment intended to find a cheap means of
gas protection by treating various textiles with common household items.54 Only thin
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toweling and wool stockinette offered the right breathing resistance, but when treated
with alcohol, glycerine, borax, common salt, vinegar, sugar, starch, soap, tea, or milk this
improvised respirator offered little or no protection at all against phosgene.55 While some
minimal protection against diluted phosgene was achieved through several layers of
material treated with certain soaps, it was found that this solution had a caustic effect on
the skin when worn.56 In the case of mustard gas only fatty or oily substances offered any
protection.57 The report concluded that if a respirator were to be made entirely of
household items it would require six strips of stockinette soaked in washing soda and six
strips treated with melted butter or lard tied together and wrung out, with the butter layer
worn against the skin. This could offer as many as thirty minutes of protection against
phosgene and forty minutes against mustard, but the researchers suggested a much higher
order of protection could be achieved through a simple charcoal respirator.58
Foreign inventions were consistently tested and evaluated at Porton Down. Early in
1931 Porton collated information on civilian respirators in other European nations, but
could only get detailed information and confirmation of masks provided to civilians from
Russia. 59 A Belgian respirator intended for the civil population, constructed from an old
inner tube, was dismissed by researchers at Porton because despite its production clearly
having been intended to keep cost low “this had been carried beyond the limit for which
reasonable protection can be provided.”60 Foreign children’s respirators were of a
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particular interest at Porton, who had yet to develop protection for British children. A
Russian child’s mask tested was found to be of good gas tightness, but with a face piece
so uncomfortable the mask was unwearable for long periods of time and Porton
researchers concluded the design was not worthy of note.61
Finding a cheap, efficient civilian respirator capable of being mass produced was
not easy. While other European governments were conscious of the gas threat, they
balked at the cost of supplying free respirators to their populations and in most nations
civilians were required to purchase available masks.62 Some researchers worried that the
feature-obscuring properties of gas masks would prevent civilians from wearing them,
suggesting that an effective civilian mask must therefore allow the wearer to be seen and
recognized by friends and family.63 One official worried that if the government put out a
design for a cheap respirator, rumors might arise that suggested that although a better
mask could be produced it was impossible because the government was interfering with
private manufacture.64 Additionally, there was concern that if a respirator was too cheap
the public would think it was not as effective as a more expensive model.65 Porton
eventually developed a design that largely met the requirements of cost, protection, and
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fit, and began production of the model in 1936.66 The first fit tests of the new civilian
mask followed soon after.67
As tensions rose in 1938 the government determined the danger was sufficient and
began issuing their stock of respirators to the civil population. Civilians would go to one
of several distribution centers in their area to be fitted with and receive their mask.68
Some local authorities held fitting drives that would ask civilians to come to one of
several fitting centers, try on the masks, and be issued with a color-coded card (yellow for
large, blue for medium, red for small) they would hand in to be given a respirator during
an emergency.69 In rural areas those who had been fitted previously were supplied with
respirators in their own homes, while others went to distribution centers to be fitted and
supplied.70 Another two and a half million respirators were sent to Norther Ireland, Egypt,
Malta, and other parts of the British empire.71 After tensions eased and it became clear
there would be no war the Home Office considered withdrawing the respirators it had just
issued, but decided it was easier to leave them distributed and ensure civilians knew how
to take care of their masks, instead.72 Boxes were to be delivered to local authorities for
issue to civilians for the protection of their respirators and the Home Office instructed the
wardens’ service to make a complete record of who had received a respirator and to

66

“Gas Masks For All,” Ballymena Observer, July 24, 1936.

67

TNA: WO 189/4421, Porton Down, Porton Report No. 1787, First Fitting Report - General Civilian
Respirator, September 20, 1937.

68

“Gas Mask Distribution,” Sevenoaks Chronicle and Courier, September 30, 1938.

69

“Gas Mask Fitting Starts Tomorrow,” Gloucestershire Echo, September 26, 1938.

70

“Gas-Mask Distribution,” The Chronicle and Courier, September 30, 1938.

71

TNA: HO 45/18536, Home Office, Home Office Memorandum No. 9/1939, Civilian Respirators, April
24, 1939, 1.

72

LMA: CL/CD/1/212, Mr. W. Eady to the Clerk of the County Council, Civilian Respirators, October 28,
1938, 1.

174

inspect the ones that had been issued.73 Experience had shown that the civilian respirator
was “not a robust article” and significant wear and tear had occurred in the months since
issue from civilians carrying their masks with them.74 The rush to issue respirators as
tensions seemed to escalate also meant that masks were not always properly fitted for the
person, requiring re-fitting and re-issue of respirators several years later.75 Less than a
year after the September Crisis the Home Office found that initial estimates of 45 million
needed respirators had been low and requested a total number of 60 million respirators
for the 43 million British civilians over the age of four.76
The General Civilian Respirator (GCR) was the answer to the need for an
affordable gas mask that offered complete protection from poison gas for a majority of
the British population. Available in three sizes (small, medium, and large) the GCR
consisted of a thin sheet-rubber face piece that covered eyes, nose, and mouth, a large
cellulose acetate window, and a filter container attached directly to the mask near the chin
by means of a rubber band. Webbing straps kept the mask in position on the head and
allowed the wearer to tighten the respirator for a gas-tight fit.77 Initially the GCR cost two
shillings, but minor improvements in design had raised the price to three shillings per unit
by mid-1939.78
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Abnormal facial features could make it impossible to achieve a proper fit with the
regular civilian mask. To provide a proper seal and offer gas protection the face piece of
the respirator needed to lie flat against the wearer’s face. Achieving gas-tightness was
often impossible for persons with abnormal facial features, such as hollow temples or
cheeks or a narrow face and the MHS needed a simple, and cheap, solution to allow these
civilians to wear the regular respirator. The solution was elongated, round pads of sponge
and sheet rubber that were glued to the respirator face piece in the areas of the face where
the seal could not be achieved.79
Much of the Home Office’s ARP education campaign revolved around the gas
mask. Not only was the gas mask the most easily visible aspect of civil defense, but the
high-cost program also represented the government’s attempt to protect its civilians.
Public Information Leaflet No. 2, issued before the outbreak of war, specifically
instructed civilians on the care and storage of their respirators, as well as urging them to
practice donning and doffing the mask.80 Another pamphlet urged civilians to treat the
respirator as “your best friend; know all about it.”81 One official worried that British
civilians, unlike their German counterparts, were too untrained in gas discipline to ensure
the proper working of the respirator during an attack, and urged the government to
increase the education campaign through leaflets and broadcasts.82 Government radio
broadcasts, given by officials of various departments, usually mentioned the need to carry
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the respirator, to ensure a good fit, and how to care for it.83 Cinema trailers that discussed
the respirator served as a visual reminder for the public.84
Instilling gas mask confidence in civilians was vital. Civilians needed not only to
have confidence in the physical function of their respirators, but in the respirator
program, and in turn the government, itself. Education campaigns ensured civilians knew
how their masks worked and offered reassurances of the respirators’ efficacy, but doubts
persisted. An unofficial test done by a newspaper dismissed the GCR as ineffective,
forcing the Home Office to issue a statement that the GCR was well-tested and worked as
advertised for brief periods of time in low concentrations of gas.85 ARP officials were
often called on to reassure the public that their respirators would offer complete
protection, particularly when rumors sometimes suggested otherwise.86 Newspapers
played an important role in convincing the public of the efficacy of their respirators. An
article in the Aberdeen Press and Journal reminded readers that gas was an effective
weapon only against the unprepared and that they need not be victims as they had
“dependable” gas masks.87 Another newspaper urged its readers to hold a weekly family
gas mask drill to instill confidence in using the mask among all members of the
household.88 Others reported on the confidence gained in the respirators by civilians
going through tear gas chambers, suggesting to their readers that the masks could be
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trusted.89 One official, however, cautioned the Times not to oversell the protective
qualities of the mask, particularly in light of Herbert Morrison’s broadcast claim that the
GCR offered “complete protection against every form of war gas,” as this could prove
problematic in the event of a gas attack.90 “The civilian gasmask,” he wrote, “is not a
talisman, and its powers are limited as its name denotes […],” urging that while civilians
train with their masks and carry them, they nevertheless needed to comprehend its limits
and take other protective measures in the event of an attack.91
A vital aspect of respirator training involved putting the public through gas
chambers where they could directly experience the efficacy of their own respirator
against tear gas. Home Office officials suggested that gas chamber training worked to get
the public “gas-minded” and to allow them to gain confidence in their masks.92 Gas
chamber training was not mandatory and the percentage of civilians taking part differed
greatly in each locality. In Gateshead local officials sent 50% of the population through
the chamber, in part to combat press rumors that a large percentage of gas masks were
faulty.93 One regional officer boasted that anti-gas propaganda had sent thousands of
persons through his gas chambers to test the fit of their masks.94 In Kingston-on-Thames
local officials set up a gas chamber because many of their civilians were dubious about
their masks and while many people arrived rather nervous at the test, after going through
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the chamber they left “with a store of confidence.”95 Such gas chamber tests were vital
not only to instill confidence in the public that their masks could actually protect them,
but also served to prove the government’s claim that the respirators were effective and
that it was doing everything possible to protect its civil population.
To be of use in a gas attack the respirator needed to be donned swiftly and civilians
were instructed consistently to always carry their masks. Rumors of the Germans
planning to use gas in mid-1940 made the need to carry masks appear more urgent and
Winston Churchill instructed that civilians be “enjoined to use [their respirators] and
carry them everywhere.”96 Difficulty of enforcement, however, prevented any order to
carry respirators from being compulsory.97 It was also considered to bar anyone without a
respirator from places of entertainment, but the cinema industry were strongly opposed to
this on grounds of possible loss of custom.98 Some cinemas, however, did bar entry to
patrons without masks, usherettes checking each person carried their respirator before
admittance.99 Other venues, such as dance and concert halls, followed.100 The members of
both Houses of Parliament were asked to set an example for their constituencies by
regularly carrying their masks.101 Government departments were instructed to ensure that
all civil servants carried their respirators and civil defense workers were similarly asked
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to set a good example in their carrying practices.102 A column to be published in the
morning papers made the claim that most people were complying with the carry
instructions and that the sight of the mask carrier had become so commonplace that to
meet someone without it immediately made one wonder what was wrong with his
appearance. The column also, however, urged civilians to keep carrying their masks.103
The Illustrated London News depicted the Queen as cheerful despite troubled times,
pointing out specifically that she was carrying her gas mask in a satchel.104 Newspaper
articles continued to remind civilians to carry their masks, sometimes even going beyond
what the Home Office had envisioned. The Manchester Evening Chronicle drew the ire
of some officials when it called for drastic measures against those caught not carrying
their masks, particularly when local businesses and cinemas refused to admit people
without at the behest of the paper.105 While propaganda and education campaigns led to
increases in civilians carrying their masks, but officials felt that the number of the public
doing so was still unsatisfactory.106 Women were often a special focus of the carry
campaign, as officials feared that during a gas attack a man would give up his mask to a
woman who was not carrying hers.107 Tear gas exercises being held in the streets were
thought to increase the number of civilians carrying their respirators.108 One such
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exercise in Birmingham, however, found that while most civilians carried their masks the
day of the exercise, having been forewarned of the need in the papers, the day after the
exercise few Birmingham citizens were observed carrying their respirators.109 Tear gas
tests held without warning caused a number of citizens to suffer “inconvenience and
discomfort” and incurred “a good deal of odium” for the government department in
charge.110
Despite being urged to carry their masks everywhere at the start of the war, many
civilians did not comply. An inspector from Porton was dismayed at the indifference of
the average Londoner to respirators and anti-gas measures. 111 At a brewery he found no
more than five workers out of 300 carrying their respirators, although among the office
staff 85% had their masks with them.112 The same pattern repeated at other workplaces,
with the laborers failing to bring their respirators and office staff largely complying with
the carry instructions.113 Many asked the inspector why the government had not made it
compulsory to carry masks, and the suggestion was made that entry to entertainment or
public transport should be barred for anyone without a respirator.114 The general public
apathy in regard to gas masks led the Home Office to consider altering the guidelines as
early as 1940, although officially the guidelines were not to be relaxed, only the wording
altered.115 Civilians were now instructed to not leave their respirators where they could
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not reach it on short notice, however, this was vague enough to cause confusion.116 One
London hospital complained that a large number of patients admitted had come without
their respirators, the majority of them juveniles.117 The hospital blamed the parents, who
often refused to send the child’s respirator even after being asked to do so.118 By 1942,
however, rubber shortages made the repair or replacement of damaged masks
prohibitively expensive or near impossible and the Home Office decided to relax carrying
guidelines to save respirators from damage.119 The government expected to have some
hours notice if a gas attack came and instructed civilians that they would warn them
publicly if such an attack was imminent and the public needed to carry their masks with
them.120 One leaflet now instructed readers to always take the respirator when leaving
home overnight or entering a dangerous area.121 Relaxing carrying guidelines not only
saved respirators from damage, but also made the very obvious defiance of government
instructions less visible or a non-issue entirely.
Inspectors consistently encountered respirator complacency and apathy during their
duties. Not every civilian was eager to have his respirator inspected and some officials
considered an Order that would require civilians to bring their masks to a predetermined
place in each locality to be inspected, and if they did not comply a warden would visit
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their residence to carry out the inspection.122 The Home Office, however, was reluctant to
officially compel inspection, as they did not believe local authorities would wish to
enforce such an order through prosecution.123 One official considered inspecting workers’
respirators at the factories where they were employed, but quickly dropped the idea
because he did not want to be accused of interfering with production.124 When produced
for inspection some respirators, although in working condition, were found to be dirty
and full of dust.125 One respirator carton was found to have a mouse nest inside.126 Some
civilians mislaid their respirators at department stores, buses, trains, and eateries.127 One
newspaper article claimed that seventy gas masks were brought into lost property offices
daily in London, with no one bothering to claim them.128 In Hull a large number of
civilian masks were recovered from municipal refuge dumps.129 One official worried that
a first gas attack would catch many members of the public without respirators and even
those who did carry or keep them nearby would find them faulty as a result of neglect.130
The resulting loss of confidence in the respirator and public panic was the primary
concern.131
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The GCR was also easy to damage. In February 1939, just a few months after the
GCRs were issued, a house-to-house inspection in Islington revealed 11% of the
respirators required replacement due to damage.132 A 1941 inspection of respirators in
Region 6 found between 5% to 10% of gas masks damaged beyond the local ability to
repair them, while numbers of those who had simply lost their respirators were generally
negligible.133 One regional officer complained that it seemed those who obeyed
instructions and carried their masks had damaged respirators and that the masks “of the
unconscientious only are in good order.”134 Inspectors often blamed unofficial containers,
usually those of a tin variety, causing the majority of damage, such as cracking of the
eyepieces and breaking down of the rubber.135 The metal containers allowed the
respirator to move about, which caused damage through jostling and chafing, while soft
containers allowed respirators to be crushed and often led to the face piece being folded
incorrectly.136 The majority of the damage of inspected respirators consisted of small
holes in the face piece, cracked eyepieces, or worn-through rubber parts.137 Others were
damaged by dampness, had dented filter containers, or were missing their rubber bands or
inlet valves.138 Within months of issuing the GCR to all civilians, the CDRD were already
investigating a more durable type of civilian respirator, which ultimately became the
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Mark II GCR.139 Some respirators were damaged or destroyed as a result of air raids and
the Home Office instructed local authorities to ensure those persons could have their
respirators replaced or repaired immediately, even on a Sunday, at no charge.140 Those
civilians who had damaged masks not due to air raids were charged one shilling and
sixpence to repair a damaged face piece and one shilling to repair a broken container.141
Complaints about the gas mask were widespread. After the distribution of Public
Information Leaflet No. 2 some civilians complained that the pamphlet instructed them to
care for a mask they had yet to receive.142 The people of Cheltenham experienced “great
anxiety” at the delay of their gas mask issue in mid-1939, arguing that they would have
been helpless should an air attack have come.143 One lawyer criticized the lack of
instruction right before the school holidays on whether or not to bring respirators along
on family travels.144 Some civilians thought the mask was rather flimsy.145 Many people
who tried on the respirator felt claustrophobic and feared suffocation, tearing it off
anxiously after only a few minutes.146 Women or girls with long or thick hair sometimes
were unable to achieve a gas-tight fit, because the hair raised the gas mask too far off the
face.147 The filter container, attached to the bottom of the mask, was relatively heavy,
139
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straining the neck muscles and forcing the mask and head down among some of the
population.148 One of the biggest concerns among some members of the public was that
spectacles could not be worn with the respirator, as it would undermine gas-tightness and
many worried about being able to see while wearing the mask.149 The design of the mask
also regularly caused the face piece to mist up with condensation, sometimes making
vision near impossible.150
Despite some public apathy in regard to the respirator, the gas mask nevertheless
became concomitant with life in wartime Britain. It served as a physical reminder of both
the dangers of war and the duties of each citizen in civil defense, as well as the
government’s effort to protect its population. While early fitting tests discovered several
issues, officials nevertheless concluded that they instilled confidence in civilians by
“making them aware that efficient measures are being taken to provide for their safety
[…].”151 Such fitting tests that allowed civilians to interact with the respirator also
stimulated public interest in ARP.152 As such a symbol the gas mask featured particularly
in imagery that directly associated it with civil defense efforts and protection. Civilians
were often depicted being fitted for gas masks, such images working to both remind the
viewer of the threat of gas and his or her own duties in being prepared.153 Civil defense
workers were shown practicing for emergencies or carrying out their duties in gas
148
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masks.154 Children, too, absorbed the gas mask into their everyday lives; even before the
outbreak of war British toymakers began offering a variety of military-themed toys,
including a toy gas mask that sold for sixpence.155 The civilian gas mask was enough of a
symbol of the British government that members of the IRA burned scores of respirators in
Belfast.156
The gas mask also featured in more humorous ways that clearly showcase its
adoption as a necessary part of wartime living. One town held a civilian gas mask dance
competition, with a prize going to the person able to keep their mask on the longest.157
Gas mask races were also popular, such as one event that had participants racing in masks
and hoods they were then asked to remove mid-way before returning to the start.158 At the
Plymouth Greyhound Stadium a hound named “Gas Mask” participated in a race.159 The
gas mask was also commemorated in popular music, with songs such as “My Wee Gas
Mask” and “I Did What I Could With My Gas Mask” entertaining crowds with lyrics that
used the respirator in non-approved, but humorous, ways.160
While developing a cheap and functional civilian respirator had not been easy,
finding a way to protect small children was an even bigger concern. In the 1930s Porton
Down was working on developing a mask for adults, but no protection as of yet existed
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for children and babies. This issue was concerning enough that Parliament specifically
asked for solutions to protect young people and infants against gas.161 Young children had
smaller faces, often making it impossible to achieve a proper fit with a normal-sized
respirator. Their smaller lungs could also make it more difficult to draw or expel breath
through the mask. Additionally, the gas mask was uncomfortable enough for adults who
could be persuaded to wear them for their own safety, but young children were likely to
tear off their respirators or become frightened by them. The British Small Child’s
Respirator was developed specifically to address most of these concerns.
It was designed to fit small faces and to be worn safely by young children. Since
children breathe less air than an adult, the container attached to the child’s respirator was
smaller and of a lighter weight than that of the GCR.162 The cone-shaped type face piece
of the GCR did not properly fit children’s faces and a more form-fitting face piece was
necessary to ensure airtightness on a child’s face.163 Its facepiece was made of a
lightweight, non-irritating, and soft rubber that would easily conform to the shape of the
child’s face.164 The head harness was specifically designed for small children, providing a
good fit without pulling too tightly and making it difficult for the child to remove the
mask himself.165 The special construction of the mask also meant that its cost was more
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than that of the GCR, costing as much as five shillings to produce in 1938.166 By 1943 a
lost children’s gas mask cost three shillings and six pence to replace.167
It was important that a child’s respirator not be frightening. Some thought it very
likely that children would become terrified at the sight of the “strange and rather awful
looking piece of equipment.”168 The Small Child’s Respirator was made of colorful red
rubber, two large eyepieces, red imitation nose, and blue filter. The soft but lightweight
face piece and hard-to-remove harness made it ideal for small faces, while the
“attractive” coloring was intended to entice children to wear it.169 Its unique coloring and
makeup gave the mask the nickname Mickey Mouse gas mask.170 Not everyone agreed
that the mask succeeded in being non-frightening to children. One mother at a trial of the
mask wrote that despite belief that the color would attract a child, the bright color, two
eyes, and nose actually made it more frightening than the adult mask to an older baby just
beginning to recognize features.171
While the mask overcame the basic physiological problem of protection small
children, psychological issues persisted. The Mickey Mouse mask was intended for
young children who were not always obedient enough to wear a respirator without
attempting to remove it and were too young to understand its purpose. It was likely that at
some point a child would become tired of wearing the respirator and attempt to remove it,
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requiring either constant adult supervision or some form of restraint for the arms.172
While the mask was designed specifically to make it difficult for a child to remove, a
child’s struggles could still displace the mask enough to leak and allow gas to enter.173
Fitting trials found that the Mickey Mouse mask ought to be issued more as a matter of
psychology than physiology, finding that it was near impossible to protect very young
children determined to resist.174 Some resistant children were strapped into their masks
by two adults using “sheer force” and, unsurprisingly, the researchers found these
children became hysterical and unable to tolerate the mask.175 The trials also found that
children who had at some point previously been given a general anesthetic for surgery
regarded the wearing of the respirator with terror.176
These issues made it vital that parents accustom their children to the wearing of the
mask. Government instructions suggested introducing the mask to young children “in the
manner which is most likely to win their interest and collaboration in wearing it.”177 The
best option was considered to be introducing the mask as a play object and to introduce it
to a group of children at once.178 Even nervous children, it was suggested, could be
inspired to don the respirator when seeing other children wearing it with confidence.179
Children who failed to tolerate the Mickey Mouse respirator or became unduly frightened
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while wearing it would need to be issued a Baby’s Anti-Gas Helmet, instead, although
parents were urged to remove the child’s fear through persuasion.180 One parent crafted
toy gas masks for each of her child’s dolls and teddy bears to accustom the child to the
sight and idea of a respirator.181
The Mickey Mouse gas mask and the GCR provided protection for all British
children over two years of age. The Mickey Mouse mask protected younger children,
with smaller faces and less-developed lungs. Children as young as five could also be fit
with the GCR. The three sizes of the GCR allowed it to fit a variety of faces and almost
all British schoolchildren were issued a GCR for protection.182 The rapid growth of
children, however, meant that a mask that was fitted properly one year might no longer
afford efficient protection a year later. Teachers inspecting their students’ masks, often in
the case of evacuated children, found many had outgrown their respirators and asked
local authorities to fit the children with new masks.183

Children, however, were the

biggest perpetrators of respirator wear and tear. Schoolchildren were mandated to carry
their respirators to school and regularly had them inspected in class.184 Children were
thus the only part of the population to regularly and consistently carry their respirators
with them, causing damage to the masks at a higher rate than the rest of the civil
population. In Oxfordshire a respirator inspection found around 5% damaged beyond
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local repair, nearly every case one of a schoolchild.185 In Feltham an inspection
discovered that 75% of schoolchildren had defective masks.186 The masks of
schoolchildren often showed cracks in the eyepieces and perforation of the rubber face
pieces, generally caused by normal wear and tear on the carton.187 Many masks were
worn through where the rubber joined the mouthpiece through the constant movement of
the mask against its container.188 Weather conditions sometimes exacerbated the wear on
both carton and respirator.189 Some children carried their masks in metal containers
instead of the cardboard box, which easily led to damage of the glass eyepieces.190 The
Home Office also considered a national campaign to stop the use of soft carrier,
especially among children, which they blamed for the majority of the damage done to
respirators.191 Evacuation was a significant contributor to respirator damage. The LCC
instructed its Head Teachers to inspect the masks of evacuated children and to make
enquiries about the location of masks that may have been lost.192
Not all damage done to respirators was due to wear and tear, however, and there
were consistent complaints from wardens and other inspectors about children’s treatment
of their masks. One warden complained that the children did not at all care about their
respirators, even kicking them about as footballs.193 One child had painted his gas mask a
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vivid red in order to play “red Indians.”194 In Bradford two groups of children in their
newly-issued respirators staged mock battles across parallel park trenches.195 Other
children were playing conkers with their masks, a game that involved holding the carrier
by its string while another child would attempt to hit the carrier with his own.196 One
alderman was disgusted at seeing children playing soldier at night in the streets wearing
their masks.197 Subsequently some local areas simply stopped inspecting children’s
respirators on account of the shortage of spares and the impossibility of replacing the
damaged masks.198
Evacuated children and their gas masks were a consistent problem for authorities.
Children in reception areas, after the long travel or as a result of living in close quarters
with many other children, often had broken, lost, or ill-fitted masks that required repair or
replacement. Local authorities in the reception areas did not always feel responsible for
the gas masks of non-local children.199 In some cases the local authority was unable to
supply respirators to evacuated children because of low stock, as respirators had initially
been supplied by the Home Office based on local population.200 One teacher in the
Infants Department applied locally three times to have the broken mask of an evacuated
child fixed, but was told the child would have to return to London for a new mask.201 The
headmistress of a London girls’ school, finding several girls in need of bigger masks,
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worried that if she sent them back to London to be fitted they would not return.202 Even
when local authorities agreed to help, the solution was not always easy. A teacher of a
London infants’ school found that the local ARP center in the reception area was only
willing to repair masks for the price of 1 shilling and sixpence, which neither the school
or foster parents could be expected to pay.203 Some schools paid the money for gas mask
repairs and then sought to recover the cost from the child’s parents in London, but one
school official worried about those parents who would be unable to pay.204
Fitting a respirator to a small child had been problematic, but protecting babies
from poison gas presented an almost impossible problem. Babies under two years of age
were too small, and too unwilling, to wear any type of mask on their faces at all. Their
lungs were too underdeveloped to be able to draw breath through a gas mask filter. In the
years leading up to war Porton Down, the MHS, and the War Office conducted extensive
research and experiments to find the most effective and affordable means of protecting
babies from gas. The Baby’s Anti-Gas Helmet was an imperfect solution that nevertheless
offered full poison gas protection to the most vulnerable members of the population.
Researchers tested many different concepts of gas protection for babies. One
suggestion for reducing the concentration of gas that would reach a baby was to wrap the
infant completely in a blanket, overcoat, or waterproof, although it was admitted that this
would not offer effective protection.205 A Belgian baby protection device was found to be
inadequate, as it required an adult to wear a mask attached to a tray and bag combination
that the baby would be inserted in, with the adult drawing breath through a filter for both
202
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of them.206 Not only was the air flow not enough, but such a setup would prevent the
adult from handing the baby off in an emergency.207 A baby bag invented by Messrs.
Jenkins and Banners was found unsatisfactory because two hands were needed to operate
the bellows, the pressure of pumping was imposed on the infant’s stomach, and the
arrangement of the bellows was unsound.208 A different baby bag sought to have the baby
supply its own air through a mechanism that would operate the bellows when the infant
kicked.209 Ideas also included a gas-proof bed, which offered humidity control.210 Gasproof perambulator designs were considered inferior protection because it would require
the purchase of a special perambulator and enclosed the child completely without a
means to draw air inside.211 By the end of 1938 researchers determined that gas
protection for babies would likely have to be a device which did not fit against the face
like a gas mask, but enveloped the baby’s head or body in an airtight manner.212 The main
requirements for such a device were its efficacy in protection, portability that would
allow the baby to be passed off, a minimum of discomfort for the baby, and that it be
acceptable to mothers.213
The Baby Anti-Gas Helmet (initially called the Protective Helmet Design)
overcame the major issues of protecting babies. This design was developed because it
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met all of the requirements and early trials showed it to be a “workable” design.214 After
positive early trials in October 1938 the Home Office adopted the baby helmet as its
design and began production.215 It consisted of a bag-like device of rubberized fabric that
covered the baby completely from the waist up, a large cellulose acetate window to allow
the infant to look out, a string around the opening to close the bag tight, and an external
air pump that had to be operated by an adult.216 The hood was surrounded by and
fastened to a light metal frame, lengthened on the underside and with an adjustable
tailpiece to provide support and protection for the baby’s back.217 The underside of the
bag was padded, although this could be removed since it was likely to be soiled by the
baby, and mothers were encouraged to provide some type of washable padding or cover
instead.218 The rubber bellows attached to the hood and, when operated, would draw air
through a container that filtered all poison gas.219 The air would then pass through a
specially shaped orifice that directed the air away from the baby’s head. A slow and
steady rate of pumping at about 40 strokes per minute was enough to supply even an
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older child with air and pumping could be stopped for several minutes if necessary.220 At
trials it was found that an unassisted mother could insert her child into the helmet in an
average time of about thirty seconds.221
Despite the helmet being the best solution for babies there were lingering concerns.
Inserting the infant into the helmet was not always easy or quick and some worried that
the hurried insertion during an air raid alarm would upset and terrify the child. The
resulting screaming and struggling infant fighting the helmet was “most undesirable.”222
Others recognized a potentially fatal flaw in the design for older children: if the child ran
away from the adult in charge of the air pump the air would stop and the child could
suffocate.223 During trials a four-year-old struggled determinedly when the mother tried
to put her into the helmet, running away and attempting to escape out the door before the
mother, instructed to imagine gas was entering the room, succeeded in inserting her into
the helmet.224 The manpower required to supply air to the enclosed infants was a
particular concern in hospitals and nurseries. One maternity hospital worried that
although they had plenty of anti-gas helmets for the babies that in a crisis there would not
be enough people to operate the pumps of each individual baby helmet.225 It was near
impossible to safely feed the enclosed child and thus lengthy periods under a gas alarm
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could easily led to hungry, crying infants.226 Cost was also a considerable issue. At a price
of nearly £2 the Home Office and local authorities kept tight control of the baby’s helmet.
There were many suggestions on how to ensure a calm and compliant baby inside
the helmet. One couple wrote to the MHS to offer suggestions, pointing out that they had
acclimated their newborn son to his helmet by inserting him into it regularly and that
there was no fear of the helmet on the part of newborn babies.227 They also argued that
although the baby could see its mother through the window of the helmet, the mother
would be wearing a feature-obscuring gas mask, as well, and suggested she regularly
wear a bright article, such as a turban, while feeding the child that she could also wear
with her gas mask to allow the baby to recognize her.228 A government memorandum
suggested that most children took quite well to the helmet and many even went to sleep
once inside.229 A rebellious, older child, the memo continued, could be quickly placed
inside the helmet by an adult despite its resistance and, once inside, “such children
usually cease to resist and appear contented.”230
At the start of the Munich Crisis there were no supplies of any type of protection
for babies or children too young to wear the GCR. A temporary solution was to provide
children over two with the regular small size civilian respirator and to tighten the top of
the face piece back over the head to make the mask fit closely on the cheeks.231 While
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this would mean the eyepieces did not line up with the child’s eyes and impair visibility,
parents were assured that the safety of the respirator would not be affected.232 While
children over two could be partially accommodated with regular civilian masks, infants
who had not yet been issued a baby helmet had no such options. It was suggested instead
to prepare a gas-proof refuge in the house, through covering doors and windows with
blankets and stuffing cracks with newspaper, and in case of an air raid warning to also
place the baby inside a washtub or drawer, which could be covered with a blanket in case
of a gas attack.233 This airtight and unventilated blanket-covered receptacle would offer
gas protection for a few minutes and allow an adult to remove the child to a safe
atmosphere.234 By mid-1939 limited supplies of both the baby helmet and the child’s gas
mask became available, but local authorities planned to keep the masks in stock until an
emergency arose.235 Production was still lagging behind need, however, and one
suggestion was to use the Baby Anti-Gas Helmet, the production of which was ahead of
the Mickey Mouse mask, for children over two but too small to wear a GCR
effectively.236 Similar to the procedure adopted for the GCR, parents in some districts
were asked to bring their infants into a center for fitting. In the City of Westminster
wardens and other volunteers staffed five fitting centers for eight hours a day during one
week in August 1939 to fit babies for the anti-gas helmet.237
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Once war broke out in September 1939 authorities were quick to issue protection
for children and babies. The Secretary of State ordered that baby helmets be issued on
September 7th, 1939 from distributing centers in the local authority.238 Supplies were still
extremely limited and no protective helmet was to be issued to a child over two.239 By
October all supplies of protective helmets and Mickey Mouse masks had been distributed
already and the Home Office was only able to supply local authorities with around 40 to
50% of their estimated requirements.240 The Home Office instructed the local authorities
to issue the Mickey Mouse mask only to children who were under three and too big to
wear the protective helmet.241
The General Civilian Respirator, the Small Child’s Respirator, and the Baby AntiGas Helmet offered sufficient protection from poison gas for the vast majority of the
British civil population. Some elements of the civil population, however, could not be
fitted with regular respirators and, although this group represented a relatively small
number, the government sought to find means of protection for those who fell outside the
norm. Additionally, while the civilian respirator offered gas protection for someone
quickly fleeing the scene of an attack, those civil defense volunteers who would be
exposed to gas for longer periods of time in the pursuit of their duties required more
sophisticated equipment. Volunteers of the civil defense services were issued either the
Civilian Duty Respirator or the Service Respirator, depending on their specific duty.
Civilians with medical conditions often had difficulty using the regular gas mask.
The General Civilian Respirator lacked an outlet valve and air passed out between the
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edges of the face piece and the wearer’s face.242 This significantly increased the effort
required to exhale and making it unusable for persons with respirator difficulties.243 The
MHS found that the cheapest solution was simply adding an outlet valve to the existing
respirator face pieces for people with asthma, fibrosis, tuberculosis, cardiac disease, old
age, or obesity, who could produce a medical certificate signed by a doctor specifying
that they required this special addition.244 The outlet valve added six pence to the cost of
the General Civilian Respirator.245 A special helmet-type mask was developed
specifically for persons completely unable to wear a conventional respirator and was
intended for disabilities such as tracheotomy cases, facial deformity, extreme dyspnea or
cardiac disease, tuberculosis, and head wounds with bandages.246 This helmet, similar to
the Baby’s Anti-Gas Helmet, included bellows to provide filtered air to the wearer.247
Supplies of this helmet were primarily intended for hospitals, with some issued to persons
who could produce a medical certificate, as the price, over £1, was significantly more
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than the regular civilian respirator.248 Despite the extra cost the MHS and Treasury
Department decided to issue these special masks free of charge, arguing that persons
required these adaptations through no fault of their own and often as a result of war
wounds.249
The volunteers of the civil defense services also required special respirators to
properly allow them to perform their duties. Initially called the Special Service
Respirator, this mask was intended for personnel who would be asked to perform their
normal duties in the presence of gas, but were not likely to be continuously exposed to
higher concentrations.250 While similar to the Service Respirator, this gas mask was
modified to simplify production and reduce cost.251 It consisted of a rubber face piece
with a cylindrical container filter directly attached to the mask, two valves to facilitate
breathing, and strong glass eyepieces.252 It was available in two sizes, “Normal” to fit
most men and some women, and “Small,” intended for most women and adolescents.253
The rubber face piece allowed the respirator to be boiled in hot water for decontamination
purposes, which was a vital property if a gas attack had occurred to ensure a sufficient
supply of respirators and to save cost.254 Some special face pieces were also made to
allow the attachment of microphones, especially intended for telephone operators whose
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speech was too distorted by the normal CDR to be heard.255 The Civilian Duty Respirator
filter offered significantly improved protection, filtering, for instance, mustard gas at
average concentrations for one week at six hours of use per day.256 Against phosgene in
high concentrations, however, the CDR offered only five minutes of protection, although,
since phosgene was expected to dissipate in five to ten minutes, this was not considered a
problem.257 The cost, if produced by the government, was around six shillings.258 In mid1939 estimates for numbers of CDRs needed was over 1.3 million, with nearly half of
that intended just for air raid wardens.259 A year later the number needed for local
authorities and civil defense had increased to over 2.3 million.260 The CDR was issued to
all civil defense workers who might be exposed to gas during the carrying out of their
duties and who would need to be able to continue working even during a gas attack. This
generally meant almost every civil defense worker was issued a CDR, particularly
wardens, ambulance drivers, FAP staffs, Report Center staffs, stretcher bearers, and
messengers. 261
Some select civil defense workers received the Service Respirator. This gas mask,
issued to the British armed forces, offered the best protection against poison gas. The
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complete Service Respirator was made up of hand-moulded khaki-covered rubber face
piece, two non-splinterable eyepieces, outlet valve, and adjustable head harness, anti-dim
outfit, container, and haversack.262 The respirator weighed a total of about four pounds,
and weight reduction was one of the primary requests in the re-design of the mask.263 The
container of the Service mask was worn on the chest and connected to the face piece
through a corrugated rubber tube, making the mask itself lighter to wear.264 It was also
fitted with a double face piece so arranged that the intake of air passed between the two
layers and across the eyepieces, keeping the eyepieces from fogging up.265 Its filter
provided “an almost indefinite period” of protection against mustard gas and as long as
forty minutes of protection against phosgene in a high concentration, significantly better
than that offered by the CDR.266 The most expensive of all of the masks, the Service
Respirator cost 18 shillings, six times as much as the GCR.267 This respirator was
intended for those civil defense workers who might need to perform work in high
concentrations of gas, such as firefighters and decontamination squads.268
Even the more sophisticated and expensive Service and Civilian Duty respirators
were not free from problems and complaints. Requests for a means to automatically
remove condensed moisture from the CDR face piece were not met and wearers were
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instead instructed to follow the official method of bending forward to allow accumulated
moisture to pass out through the outlet valve.269 On the Civilian Duty Respirator the
rubber rib between the eye pieces pressed on the nose and sometimes caused significant
discomfort.270 The head harness sometimes slipped from position, undermining gas
tightness.271 In early trials, the Duty Respirator significantly interfered with speech,
which was especially noticeable by telephonists.272 Like with the Service Respirator, the
Duty Respirator had a problem with condensation. In early trials water collected quickly
inside the face piece and eventually ran down the outside of the wearer’s neck and throat,
a considerable concern especially in cold weather.273 Constables on the Isle of Wight
complained that the anti-dim compound on the eyepieces was faulty at night and lasted
for no more than thirty minutes, finding that a raw potato smeared on the eyepieces
instead was far more effective.274 Unlike the General Civilian Respirator, however, the
two special respirators did allow for the wearing of spectacles through the use of special
frames that could fit under the face piece of the gas mask without undermining gastightness.275 While the numbers of the CDR lagged behind expectation, production was
especially behind in the case of haversacks to carry the respirator.276
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Despite these issues the CDR was a superior respirator to the GCR and civilians
consistently tried to argue they needed it for the performance of their duties. The British
Medical Association pressed the Home Office for an issue of CDRs to doctors on the
ground on the basis that doctors may need to attend patients during an air raid.277 The
Home Office agreed on the basis of the doctors paying cost price for the CDR.278
Members of the clergy, who often ministered to the injured and dying during air raids,
also requested better equipment from the government, some complaining that equipment
was being issued to “all and sundry,” except the clergy who performed such a vital
service.279 The Home Office eventually gave permission for clergy to purchase CDRs for
those members specifically detailed by their church to aid casualties in the streets, at a
price of seven shillings and six pence per respirator.280 In some locations superior gas
masks were simply stolen, as was the case in Newcastle where Service Respirators were
taken from soldiers and depots and the local newspaper had to remind civilians that if
they carried such a respirator in the street they would be stopped by police to be
questioned.281
The British government’s gas mask program was one of the most comprehensive
anti-gas protection measures in the world at the time. Every British man, woman, and
child, whether or not they carried or cared about their masks, were issued with a free
respirator that would serve as the primary protection in the case of a gas attack. The

277

TNA: HO 186/1490, Letter to G.D. Kirwan, July 20, 1940, 2.

278

ibid.

279

TNA: HO 186/64, East Greenwich Baptist Church to Home Secretary, September 19, 1939.

280

TNA: HO 186/64, Letter by Arthur Dunnett, August 30, 1939; TNA: HO 186/64, Letter to T.B.
Williamson, October 31, 1939.

281

“Service Gas Masks Stolen,” Newcastle Evening Chronicle, March 6, 1941.

206

costly program was both a response to an anticipated gas attack that would wreak havoc
on an unprotected population and the government’s effort to forestall panic and revolt if
masks were not available or only available to the rich. The gas mask also served as a
visible reminder to the civil population of both the very threat of war and a possible gas
attack, as well as a symbol of the government’s effort to protect its civilians. While the
overall response to the gas mask program and government instructions thereof were often
underwhelming, the gas mask nevertheless was a potent symbol of the war and civil
defense.
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Chapter 6 - “The Modern Troglodyte:” Sheltering Civilians from Air Raids
The damage that could be caused by aerial raids became apparent during the course
of WWI, and it was clear to government officials and researchers that future raids with
high-explosive (HE) or gas bombs would devastate the civilian population. The
experience of soldiers on the Western Front had shown the usefulness of burrowing into
the ground for protection and this concept influenced the development of shelter
programs for the British civil population in the interwar period and leading up to WWII.
While the limited raids on Britain during WWI did not necessitate the creation of special
shelters, the expected intensity of future raids required that the government develop a
shelter program to protect its civil population from bombs. In WWII this shelter program
comprised an extensive collection of various types of shelters that sought to protect the
vast majority of the British population. Ranging from structures for individual protection
to communal deep shelters, the British air raid shelter program was a successful and vital
aspect of civil defense that ensured the protection of civilian lives and the preservation of
morale.
In WWI, there were generally no shelters made available by the government, and
civilians improvised so as to find protection from air raids. The government’s official
instructions told civilians to seek shelter in their homes, but many people in poorer
neighborhoods, particularly the worst-hit East End, sought better shelter elsewhere.1 The
most obvious place to shelter for most was London’s Underground Railway, or the tube.
After one false warning in 1917, people thronged the staircases and platforms to the point
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where movement was almost impossible and railway staff were unable to cope.2
Realizing it was impossible to keep shelterers out of their 90 stations, the railway
company made arrangements with police to assist in regulating the incoming crowds.3 So
many people massed in the stairwells and on the platforms that it often impeded regular
tube travel and conditions became deplorable, with many individuals and families
camping in the stations all night.4 At Shildon, in the county of Durham, a colliery drift
was used as shelter by women and children, but conditions were considered to be too
unsafe to allow the drift to remain open.5
In London, the primary target of raids, officials arranged for some protection.
Police stations and government departments were allowed to be used as shelters by the
public, with a placard exhibited outside reading “Air Raid Shelter” upon the issue of a
warning.6 While not bombproof, these shelters would provide protection from splinters
and flying glass. These arrangements could accommodate around 900,000 people, but
this still left many Londoners, particularly those in poorer districts, without shelter.7 A
special committee sought to find other possibilities for shelter and considered providing
dugouts in the parks, but as these were thought to provide no better protection than the
average house the idea was dismissed.8 The LCC instructed its schools to prepare plans
of action in case of an air raid. Children were to be kept indoors and away from the
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windows.9 Under no circumstances was more than one department to be kept on one
floor, to prevent mass casualties should a hit occur.10 Issues arose when some parents,
alerted by nearby warning sirens or police patrol, attempted to force their way into the
school to remove their children before a raid and the London Education Department
asked the police for help in keeping order outside of its schools.11
The damage to infrastructure and loss of life had been relatively limited in WWI
raids, but it was clear that future raids with improved technologies would have a much
more devastating effect. While in the interwar period the CID sought to find ways to
protect civilians from poison gas, they were also asked to answer questions on how to
protect the population from bombs. Various commissions sought the best type of
protection while remaining fiscally feasible, and Porton Down conducted extensive
experiments into the blast and splinter protection conferred by certain shelters and
materials. Similar to the government’s decision on gas masks, Britain’s WWII shelter
policy was driven by both concerns over cost and psychology.
The government decided early on that shelters would be required for the civil
population. In 1924, the CID concluded that the Office of Works should prepare plans for
the provision of public shelters.12 While the interest lay primarily in protecting civilians
from HE bombs, the CID also recommended that shelters provide protection against gas
and that the Chemical Warfare Committee be involved in designing shelter plans.13 In a
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1925 meeting to discuss the protection of civilians against gas the CID again determined
that shelters ought to be provided at the outbreak of war.14 The Chemical Warfare
Committee included public shelters as one of the main components in protecting the civil
population from poison gas.15 In February 1939 a conference was convened, under the
chairmanship of Lord Hailey, to advise on certain aspects of shelter policy. The resulting
Hailey Report was to be the most influential on British shelter policy, the committee
members having been charged by the Lord Privy Seal to advise him on air raid shelter
policy.16 One of the primary conclusions of the resulting report was that shelter ought to
be accessible. The report argued that it was better to offer more widely-available shelter
even if it offered less complete protection.17 Since bomb-proofing shelters was not
feasible, a communal or individual shelter needed to protect the population from
splinters, blast, and falling debris.18 The conference also determined that people could go
no more than 300 yards by day and 150 yards by night to reach shelter after a warning
sounded.19 Surface shelters were more practical than tunnels because of the difficulty of
tunneling in major cities, such as London, with their sewage, gas, and electricity lines.20
The report also heavily advocated the protection of workers at their jobs, particularly
because skilled laborers were an irreplaceable asset.21
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Ultimately, the British government’s shelter policy was to provide protection for all
of its citizens, largely at government expense. The Civil Defence Act of 1937 authorized
local authorities to build shelters for their civil population that would be eligible for
grants from the government.22 The grant payable to the local authority depended on its
population, and ranged from 60 to 75% of the cost of the shelter.23 A committee formed
to address the air raid shelter problem recommended that to provide the necessary
accommodations to the public the government ought to construct sectional steel shelters,
propped basements, and pill-boxes, to strengthen lower floors of tenement houses, and
the basements of shops, offices, and large houses, and construct communal shelters and
trenches.24 It was also recommended that no future residential building should be erected
without the inclusion of an air raid shelter of a size to accommodate all inhabitants.25
Many in the government preferred domestic-level protection over communal shelters, in
part due to people being forced to leave their homes at all hours of the day to reach a
neighborhood shelter, overcrowding risks, health risks, and potential chaos.26 While the
government accepted responsibility for protecting its citizens at home and in the street,

21

ibid, 20.

22

Thomas Simey and Mary Williams, The Civil Defence Acts 1937 and 1939 (London: Charles Knight &
Co, 1939), xli.

23

ibid, xlii.

24

David Anderson, B.L. Hurst and Henry Japp, Air Raid Shelter Policy (London: HMSO, 1938), 8.

25

David Anderson, B.L. Hurst and Henry Japp, Air Raid Shelter Policy (London: HMSO, 1938), 5.

26

TNA: HO 45/18226, House of Lords, “Air Raid Precaution Policy,” February 16, 1939, 836.

212

the responsibility for protecting civilians at work fell largely on the employer.27 Local
authorities were to be responsible for providing shelter for those who could not afford to
provide it for themselves and for people caught out in the streets, using financial and
material assistance provided by the government.28
Dispersal was considered one of the primary objectives of British shelter policy.
The Hailey Report directly recommended a shelter policy of dispersal, arguing that mass
catastrophes, as might happen if all occupants of a large shelter were killed, would have a
far greater effect on the public mind than a similar number of isolated casualties.29 The
shelters, more than any other aspect of ARP, needed to follow the government’s policy of
dispersal and deep shelters ran particularly counter to this idea. A deep shelter,
necessarily large to accommodate perhaps thousands of people, could also have
potentially led to high numbers of casualties in the case they were not as bomb-proof as
assumed.30 One official worried that despite advice to disperse being given in a pamphlet,
not enough people would follow it to ensure a “sufficiently wide dispersal of the
population at night.”31 A communal shelter was to house no more than 50 persons in
order to minimize casualties resulting from a direct hit.32 Where this restriction was
impossible due to available space, the maximum allowable number of persons in a shelter
was 200, with strong dividing walls providing internal bulkheads to mitigate the
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explosive consequences of a direct hit.33 Part of the policy of dispersal was the concept of
sheltering at home. Encouraging the public to shelter at home would prevent them from
massing in other types of shelters where high numbers of casualties could occur. In a
statement to the House of Commons, the Home Secretary pointed to the advantages of
sheltering inside of the home, listing dispersal as the first point.34 In an October 1940
speech Winston Churchill urged civilians not to shun small shelters in favor of larger
ones, adding that “dispersal is the sovereign remedy against heavy casualties.”35
Sheltering at home also partially put the responsibility for civilian protection on the
civilians themselves, removing some of the burden on the government. A 1941 pamphlet
detailed civilians’ options for sheltering in their own homes, suggesting that wanting to
remain at home was a natural inclination and a sound instinct.36 The Ministry of Health,
too, advocated for the use of domestic shelters, suggesting that the advantages in safety
and health of the domestic over large public shelters be impressed upon the public at
every opportunity.37 What one official referred to as “the calamity risk” also led to the
decision not to include nursery bays in large public shelters, fearing that an incident that
at once injured or killed scores of babies and toddlers would be particularly detrimental to
the morale of the public and parents.38
There were to be no deep shelters under British shelter policy. In accordance with
conclusions drawn in the Hailey Report, the primary aim of shelters was the protection
33
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from falling debris, splinters, and blast. There were also some concerns that deep
sheltering would negatively affect civilian psychology. Some worried that if deep shelters
were provided only for a section of the population, such as for laborers engaged in work
of national importance, it would have a detrimental effect on the psychology of the rest of
the population.39 Another argument was that once people were safe in their deep shelters
they would refuse to come back out even after the danger had passed.40 Crowd control at
shelter entrances was also a concern.41 Many worried that a shelter that was to house
hundreds or thousands of people could cause massive crowds at entrances that might lead
to panic and disaster.42 After the outbreak of war, it also became clear that building deep
shelters was physically impossible, as there was already such a shortage of materials,
cement especially, that there was barely enough to build the needed surface shelters.43
Some in the House of Lords, however, worried that if the government did not construct
bomb-proof shelters prior to the outbreak of war, there would come a time when the
demand from the public would be so high as to force compliance at a time when it was
both dangerous and nearly impossible.44 One Lord suggested that deep shelters could
serve the dual purpose of car parks and could thus produce a substantial revenue, as well
as bomb-proof protection.45 Another Lord argued that deep-level shelters would provide
great moral support to the civil population.46
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Deep shelters were also rejected because there was a general antipathy towards the
idea of going underground. One Lord compared the idea of modern deep shelters to the
cave dwellings of his Pictish ancestors, saying that “[t]he wheel has come full circle. We
are back to barbarism […].”47 Others referred to deep-level shelters as “funk holes.”48
The Lord Privy Seal, in a speech to the House of Commons, undermined the idea of deep
shelters by arguing that Britain could not be asked to adapt its whole civilization to
compel people to live and work “in a troglodyte existence deep underground.”49 Another
official wrote that regularly going deep underground would be fatal to the morale of those
who did it.50 If people were to use the few deep shelters the government had built, he
added, it would be better to assign those “already infected than to infect 40,000 fresh
ones.”51 After London’s five deep shelters were opened to the public, the Illustrated
London News wrote an article about the thousands of Londoners “now living the lives of
troglodytes far underground […].”52 Lamenting the fact that many people had set up
permanent residence in underground shelters, one reporter referred to them as
troglodytes, admitting, however, that it was preferable to be “a live troglodyte than a dead
householder.”53
Despite the issuing of gas masks to every civilian, officials nevertheless were
concerned about poison gas entering shelters. One Lord considered that, unless some
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provision was included to prevent gas from entering deep shelters, the results would be
“too terrible to contemplate.”54 The proposed car park deep-level shelters were to include
an air filtration and drainage system to prevent gas from entering air vents or drains.55
The Hailey Report had recommended no gas precautions for shelters, citing the issue of
gas masks, although it was suggested that gas protection might be advisable in larger
shelters.56
While the gas mask program had been sufficiently advanced to offer protection for
most adults at the start of the September Crisis, the shelter program significantly lagged
behind needs. Home Secretary Samuel Hoare wrote that while the government had gone
far in providing gas protection they were “dangerously backward” in regard to protection
against high explosives.57 While at the start of the crisis the Home Office advised local
authorities to hold off on digging trenches, just a few weeks later it instructed local
authorities to take immediate steps to begin digging.58 Trench shelters were to be dug in
public parks, squares, and playgrounds. Even these preparations, however, were
inadequate—across London the trench shelters were intended to accommodate just over
300,000.59 Instructions to local authorities suggested trench shelters should accommodate
10% of their populations.60 With no public shelters in place, the Home Office called on
householders to dig shelter trenches in their backyards for protection. Unsurprisingly, this
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drew significant criticism, particularly from those who could not afford the materials.61
While many of the hastily-built trenches were never completed, there were nevertheless
questions on what to do with the existing trench shelters once the crisis passed. Members
of the House of Lords called on the government to make a decision on the trench shelters,
arguing that while they had offered temporary and makeshift protection, they still offered
some value in more rural districts.62 The Home Secretary suggested that the trenches
ought to be completed, lined with concrete, and roofed.63 Furthermore, realizing the lack
of progress on the government’s shelter program, he recommended making detailed
preparations and surveys for trench systems in vulnerable areas, surveying buildings
suitable for use as shelters, providing detailed recommendations for householders on
digging trenches, and requiring workplaces to provide shelter accommodations for their
employees.64
The criticisms of the government’s poor shelter preparations were widespread. The
Labour Party referred to the government’s lack of air raid precautions and shelters during
the crisis as a “criminal failure.”65 “Nowhere has the government muddle been greater,”
they wrote, “than in shelter policy.”66 The News Chronicle questioned the lack of street
shelters, citing a recent air raid exercise in Chelsea that had shown the only available
shelters were roped-off areas that offered no protection at all.67 The Evening News
criticized the lack of any progress report given by the government as to the production,
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distribution, and fitting of shelters.68 In order to address these criticisms the government
now focused on providing a newly-produced domestic shelter to householders and to
encourage local authorities to construct communal shelters.
Unlike other combatants, Britain sought to offer protection for many of its citizens
within the vicinity of their own homes. Shelters that offered protection for just a few
people were financially inferior to larger shelters, but smaller shelters fitted into the
government’s larger policy of dispersal. As bomb-proof shelters were not practical
officials expected shelters to receive direct hits resulting in casualties. A direct hit on a
family shelter would be a tragedy, but in the grander scheme would not greatly influence
casualty statistics. A bomb falling on a communal shelter could cause hundreds of
casualties and negatively affect morale. Additionally, a shelter in a family’s home or
backyard was more likely to be used and cause less disruption to sleep and schedule.
Criticism over the government’s lack of a shelter program after the September Crisis also
meant that some type of shelter was needed to pacify public opinion. As a result the
government sought to provide domestic protection to as many civilians as possible. The
most prominent of these types of shelter was the Anderson shelter.
The Anderson shelter offered protection for families or small groups of people.
Officially called the Galvanized Corrugated Steel Shelter, it derived its colloquial name
from then-Home Secretary Sir John Anderson. The shelter consisted of several steel
panels to be sunk partially into the ground and its rounded top piled with dirt. At six feet
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tall and four by six feet wide, conditions inside the shelter could be relatively cramped.69
Erection of the shelter required the digging of a hole to the depth of four feet into which
the shelter would be sunk.70 A minimum of 15 inches of earth on top of the shelter was
needed to provide adequate protection and hold the shelter in place.71 The shelter was
intended for cottage-type houses on modern building estates with ample garden space and
two-storied terrace types of houses with backyards, both of which were unsound or
flimsy in nature and could not be properly strengthened in other ways.72 Some Anderson
shelters were erected indoors, although this was very rare as the requirements of an
emergency escape, space, and lateral protection could not be met by most dwellings.73
While the Home Office provided detailed instructions and encouraged householders to
erect their own shelters, many were erected by the local authorities.74 Issue of the first
Anderson shelters began in February 1939 and within six months of the start of
production, over 800,000 shelters had been distributed to householders and local
authorities.75 Not every family, however, received their own shelter and on average two
Anderson shelters were shared by less than three families.76
The government heavily subsidized the distribution and erection of the Anderson
shelter. A 1938 report on the air raid shelter problem determined that the sectional steel
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shelter was the best solution to provide shelter, and in light of the criticism experienced
during the 1938 crisis, that such shelters needed to be supplied by the government.77 The
report concluded, however, that the Anderson shelter should satisfy public opinion.78 In
mid-1939 approximately £20 million had been set aside by the government to provide the
shelter to householders.79 The Anderson shelter was provided free to all who were
compulsorily insured under the National Health Insurance Act, or, for those not so
insured, to householders earning less than £250 per year (increased by £50 for each
school-aged child in excess of two).80 Where the local authority erected Anderson
shelters for the householders, their expenses were partially reimbursed by the
government.81 For those whose income disqualified them from receiving a free shelter,
the government made the materials available for purchase at cost.82 Most local
authorities found that there was a low demand for the purchase of shelters, so
Birmingham, for instance, had just 150 inquiries, partially because by the time shelters
were available for purchase most householders had made other arrangements.83
As had been the case with respirators, supplies of Anderson shelters did not always
meet demand at the outbreak of war. In one region just over 10% of local authorities had
received the promised Anderson shelters by early September 1939.84 The Home Office
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was also greatly displeased to find that many people who had been issued free shelters
had failed to put them up and considered making it a penal offense to fail to erect the
Anderson shelter within ten days.85 Those wishing to purchase the shelter had to wait
until shelters had been issued to everyone who qualified for a free one, causing some
anxiety.86
The Anderson shelter may not have been proof to a direct hit, but it offered
significant protection for many British civilians. Prior to the distribution of the shelters,
one member of the House of Lords worried that as soon as a few civilians were killed in
their Anderson shelters the public at large would refuse to continue to use them.87 Tests
showed that occupants in a correctly-erected Anderson shelter were safe from a 500 lb.
bomb at 30 feet.88 J.B.S. Haldane, who observed the tests, concluded that the shelter was
by far better than anything the ARP department had done previously and that it provided
better protection than sheltering inside a house.89 One official suggested sending an
information leaflet with each shelter, explaining the tests to which it had been subjected,
to improve public confidence in its efficacy.90 The public was less convinced of the safety
of the Anderson shelter, however. The shelters’ shape and seemingly dubious efficacy led
some to label them as “steel mousetraps.”91 Others referred to the shelters as “dogkennels.”92 The volume of correspondence received by the Public Relations Department
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made it clear the public was very uneasy about their new shelters.93 In Shoreditch, only a
quarter of those who had an Anderson shelter available used it for shelter, the rest seeking
protection in the larger public shelters.94 A 1942 poll found that at least four percent of
people were not intending to use their Anderson shelter in the event of a raid, although
those most skeptical of future raids occurring were also less likely to use their shelter.95
Six percent of householders had failed to use their Anderson shelter in past raids.96 Some
skepticism was due to reports or personal knowledge of people having been killed inside
their Anderson shelters and government officials discussed how to convince civilians of
the efficacy of the shelter.97 One official suggested collecting examples where the shelters
had withstandood air raids to be used as “propaganda for the use of Andersons in the East
End and elsewhere.”98
There were also consistent complaints and problems with the Anderson shelter.
Made from sides of steel and covered partially with dirt the Anderson shelter was
particularly uncomfortable in wintertime. The walls were highly thermo-conductive and
thus very cold to lie against in winter, which also led to excessive condensation on the
walls enough to soak clothes or bedding coming into contact with them.99 The unscreened
opening of the shelter also allowed cold air to penetrate, significantly lowering the
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temperature inside.100 Many people had little knowledge of the official requirements for
the earth covering of their shelter, exposing themselves to danger.101 Some people had
installed oil stoves or suspended car batteries and water bottles from the ceiling, creating
potentially hazardous conditions.102 Perhaps the biggest issue with the shelter was
flooding. Damp arose from water seeping from the subsoil or flowing into the shelter
from the entrance, sometimes enough to cover the shelter floor.103 In many areas with
high water tables or poor drainage, water leaked into the shelters, in some cases making
them unusable.104 An official investigation found that most civil defense regions had
some flooding of their Anderson shelters, with the proportion of flooded shelters ranging
from 24 to 42 percent.105
The MHS sought to address some of the issues through improvements to the shelter.
Householders were issued a pamphlet with instructions on improving the conditions
inside the Anderson shelter during the winter.106 For personal comfort MHS suggested
bringing hot drinks for consumption and using hot water bottles or bricks inside the
bedding for warmth.107 Hanging a blanket over the shelter entrance would prevent cold
air from entering.108 The public was warned, however, not to use oxygen-consuming
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heating appliances, such as lamps or oil stoves, inside the shelters for risk of
suffocation.109 Newspapers reiterated the information given by the Home Office to
distribute the information on how to make the shelter more comfortable to an even wider
audience.110 Such articles particularly focused on how to improvise sleeping
arrangements and how to keep warm while spending the night in the shelter.111 To address
the problem of flooding, most local authorities decided to concrete and seal the pit the
shelter was sunk into. Four inches of thick concrete lining was found to waterproof the
Anderson shelter even in areas with very wet sub soil and could be accomplished at a cost
of just over £3 per shelter.112 Despite efforts to waterproof the shelters, just two years
later a poll found 15% of householders complaining about damp or wetness in their
Anderson shelters.113 While concreting the shelter pit was the primary solution, some
local authorities in areas with wet subsoil simply instructed their householders to erect
the Anderson shelter indoors.114 Initially, an official report opposed the construction of
Anderson shelters inside the home because of space, limited protection against shrapnel,
the danger of the collapse of the shelter should the house collapse, and debris trapping the
occupants.115 Several local authorities reported satisfaction among the public with their
now dry and warm shelters, particularly in areas that had previously suffered extreme
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wetness. 116 Erecting the shelter indoors, however, incurred significant extra costs at over
£5 per shelter, due to the need for extra protection and strutting.117
The increased duration of air raids also came to alter the purpose of the shelter.
Initially it was thought that the Anderson shelter, in close proximity to one’s home, would
allow civilians to seek protection at the sound of the air raid siren and then return to
normal life once the raid was over. While in early raids people spent a few hours in their
shelters they eventually waited out the raids for the entire night, never returning to their
beds.118 Once it became clear that people were preferring to sleep all night in a shelter
rather than be roused constantly by air raid sirens, the Home Office realized the need to
provide some type of sleeping arrangements. To draw people away from the large public
shelters, where people had been spending their nights, the Home Office decided to issue
bunks for the Anderson shelter.119 The bunks came in two sizes, adult and child, and up to
four adult and one child’s bunk would be supplied free of charge to householders who
had qualified for a free Anderson shelter.120 In the small space of the Anderson shelter the
bunks were fitted with two six foot adult bunks on the floor along the sides of the shelter,
another two adult bunks mounted above those and a shorter, but wider, child bunk
transversed the adult bunks at the closed end of the shelter, creating very cramped
conditions.121 Some balked at the cost of providing free bunks, at over £2 per set, and
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suggested instead householders should be encouraged to find their own way to make the
Anderson shelter suitable for sleeping in.122 Some local authorities found, however, that
those shelters that had been concreted against flooding could not properly fit the bunks
and adjustments were required to thousands of bunks to fit them into the shelters.123
The Anderson shelter offered good protection to many civilians, but a few months
into the war the government shifted its attention to a new type of domestic shelter. By
December 1940 it was decided that there should be a shelter that could be placed indoors
and that could be built with existing materials. Steel shortages made the production of
more Anderson shelters impossible and the requirement for a backyard or large-enough
space to construct the shelter meant many families went without one. The cheaper and
more practical solution was a shelter that used less steel and could fit into existing spaces
of a family’s home. The result was the Morrison shelter.
The Morrison shelter offered protection in a more practical manner. Named after
then-Home Secretary Herbert Morrison, the shelter was also referred to as the steel
indoor shelter and the table shelter.124 It consisted of a strong frame, a flat top made of
steel, an attached spring mattress forming the floor, and mesh sides to prevent the
entering of debris or shrapnel.125 Its flat top allowed the shelter to be used as a table
during the day and it could be moved after construction, thus being much less
cumbersome indoors than an Anderson shelter. To allow shelterers to escape if the house
collapsed, the Morrison shelter was to be placed in the middle of a room, with open space
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on all sides.126 Along with the materials, recipients of the shelter were also given
instructions on how to put it together. The pamphlet How to put up your Morrison
“Table” Shelter offered illustrated instructions in seven steps, as well as information how
to use the shelter as a table.127 While construction of the shelter was said to be easy, and
in some local areas boy scouts had been recruited to build them, one official worried that
without special staff to complete the work it would lead to badly erected shelters and
future trouble and expense.128 The Morrison shelter also solved the problem of outdoor
sheltering in areas with wet subsoil. Government engineers specifically instructed local
authorities to provide one or two Morrison shelters to householders instead of erecting an
Anderson shelter indoors in those areas where flooding was common.129 The Morrison
shelter was also offered to householders whose Anderson shelter had already flooded, but
where no steps had been taken to remedy the problem.130 By 1942 a two-tier Morrison
shelter had come into production, intended for families with two adults and more than
two children.131 This larger shelter was over four feet tall, allowing for two mattresses to
be placed inside and thus offering protection for twice the number of people.132
Capable of withstanding significant weight, the Morrison shelter certainly saved
lives after its introduction. The CDRD conducted several experiments to test the weightbearing capacity of the Morrison shelter, finding that the shelter was capable of holding
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up a collapsed floor.133 There were repeated reports of Morrison shelters saving their
occupants whose houses had collapsed and trapped them under heavy debris.134 Demand
for the shelter was high, amounting to as many as 5,000 requests per day in London by
mid-1944.135 The commencement of the flying bomb attacks also led to a higher demand
for Morrison shelters, and the government ordered more shelters and expanded eligibility
as a result.136 Shelters were also collected from other parts of the country to be issued to
Londoners and, particularly, to those living in the corridor that made up the likely path of
the flying bombs.137
Like the Anderson shelter, the government also subsidized the Morrison shelter.
Shortly after its introduction, with sales and demand lagging, one official suggested that
this was due to people waiting to see if the income limit for free provision of shelter
would be raised.138 Qualifications for free issue of the Morrison shelter were similar to
that of the Anderson shelter, but the Home Office, with the consent of the Exchequer,
raised the annual income limit to £350.139 Anyone who had already been issued an
Anderson shelter, however, or who had a share in a nearby communal surface shelter, was
not eligible to receive a Morrison shelter, unless they wished to purchase it.140 Preference
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in distribution was given to those civilians who had no reasonable shelter of any kind
available to them.141 The purchase price of the Morrison shelter was reduced by mid1941 from nearly £8 to £7.142 By October 1943, one million table shelters had been
produced.143
Both of the domestic shelters offered good protection in a convenient manner and
while the government ensured that even the poor had access to them there were still
families without the space to erect either shelter. Poor and crowded neighborhoods and
particularly those in an urban environment often did not have a yard to install an
Anderson shelter or the space in the house for a Morrison shelter. The solution had to be
some type of communal shelter, yet a type not so big as to cause massive casualties in the
event of a direct hit. Communal shelters were built by the local authorities and could take
one of several forms, but most common were surface brick shelters and trench shelters.
In many communities the surface brick shelter offered protection for several
families. Such shelters were made of brickwork, mass concrete, or concrete block
masonry with a reinforced concrete roof and a concrete floor.144 The standard design
allowed room for six persons, but this could be extended for up to twelve.145 Communal
surface shelters were sometimes the solution to a lack of Anderson shelters. Regions
where the delivery of Anderson shelters had fallen short of need often asked permission
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to build surface shelters instead.146 Persons entitled to a free Anderson shelter who lived
in areas in danger of flooding or who lacked the space to erect the steel shelter, were
generally provided with a surface brick shelter by the local authority.147 By 1941 there
were also some safety concerns about the surface shelters built early on. Earth shock or
blast had, in some instances, caused failure of the surface shelters and vulnerable shelters
were strengthened by the adding reinforced concrete to the existing brickwork.148
The Home Office began an education campaign to encourage civilians to make use
of their local shelter. In 1941, a meeting involving several departments of civil defense
was called specifically to discuss how to extend the use of public shelters.149 Members
present suggested that the Home Office begin a campaign to convince the public that the
surface shelters provided a high degree of safety, although they recommended waiting to
begin the campaign until all faulty shelters had been closed.150 The factual information on
surface shelters was to be disseminated via newspaper articles, broadcasts, short films,
posters, and the wardens.151 While officials recognized that many people went
underground simply to get away from the noise of the air raids, they also claimed people
could be dissuaded from doing so.152 Surface shelters, civilians were to be told, would
allow children to be put to bed at a normal hour and cause less disruption to family life
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and sleep times.153 It was also suggested to have an exhibition of a small-scale fullyequipped surface shelter near the Town Hall or some other well-visited locale, with a
warden nearby to offer information and advice.154 The Home Office was aware that it
required concrete proof of the safety provided by the surface shelters to convince people
to use them.155 One suggestion was to have experts say that they had overestimated the
dangers of blast and splinter, against which the surface shelter offered less protection, and
had underestimated the dangers from flying glass and debris, against which the surface
shelter provided good protection.156 To prove convincingly the superiority of the surface
shelter over one’s own home, a poster campaign was started showing surface shelters
standing intact besides demolished houses.157 The Home Office also collected
information from its civil defense regions on how the shelters stood up to air raids. A
report from Region 7 lists the incidents of surface shelters that survived nearby
explosions, although an aside mentions that there were other incidents where such
shelters were badly damaged but that the information was not included because the Home
Office was not interested in it.158 While some officials worried that putting up posters in
areas that had yet to be raided would lower morale, others argued that it was the perfect
time to educate people regarding the shelters as they were now more receptive to the idea
after disaster had struck other areas.159 In some areas, surface shelters were being
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frequently used by firefighting parties, which proved to have a positive effect on the
opinion of the rest of the population.160 Suggestions for increasing interest in surface
shelters also included adding bunks, heaters, and a bay for smokers, with signs posted
outside to inform people of these amenities.161
A second aspect of the education campaign was to convince civilians to take a
personal stake in their public shelter. Not owned by any one person or family the surface
shelters were often in poor condition. Some officials believed that the public’s reluctance
to use the surface shelters often stemmed as much, if not more, from a lack of amenities
than anxiety over their safety.162 The 1941 meeting on shelter policy recommended to
educate the public in how to make public surface shelters “pleasant and homelike
[…].”163 They also suggested fully equipping one shelter in each neighborhood and
telling other civilians their shelter could be similarly equipped if they were to use and
take care of it.164 Such equipment usually included a door, with the key being given to
one family, and whitewashing the interior walls.165 In some surface shelters, bunks were
installed, but since these shelters were not always of uniform size, fitting bunks was left
to the local authority.166 Comfort, appearance, and amenities were deemed essential for
the surface shelters if the government wanted to prevent a mass exodus from them into
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deep shelters.167 Officials believed that if surface shelters were fitted with proper, nonslatted doors and a key given to the family intending to use it, a sense of proprietorship
would result that would see the shelter being used and cared for regularly.168
Trench shelters were less sophisticated and were often intended as an emergency
shelter for those caught out in the streets. Such shelters were the responsibility of the
local authority and were often built near nodal points where people congregated.169 Many
of those in existence at the start of war had been hastily built during the September Crisis
to unexacting standards and some were left unfinished. By the end of 1938 the Home
Office issued official instructions for the construction and permanent lining of trenches to
ensure uniformity and proper protection.170
Trench shelters were often uncomfortable and lacked the amenities that drove
people to the larger public shelters. One official report admitted that comfort in the trench
shelters was “not easy to obtain.”171 The space was usually cramped and limited, with bad
lighting that did not allow for reading.172 The nature of trench shelters meant that drafts
were common and these contributed to the uncomfortable conditions, particularly during
the winter months.173 Suggestions for improving these conditions included installing
better lighting, providing doors or curtains to prevent drafts, and, where possible, having
some type of mobile canteen arrangement.174
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While trench and brick shelters were most common, communal shelters also took
other forms. In the LCC’s Council Estates, often lacking the space for a brick surface
shelter but requiring shelter for hundreds of people, one solution was to convert the
ground floor apartments into air raid shelters.175 Initially this was done by using steel
struts, but when steel became scarce brick supports were used instead.176 Many housing
estates were outfitted with semi-sunk shelters in the courtyards, although this was only an
option in areas where they were not likely to flood.177 In larger public and private
buildings the best solution for protection was often the basement. To offer good
protection such basements were required to be strutted and strengthened, as well as
outfitted with certain amenities according to Home Office guidelines.178 In some
boroughs shelterers sought refuge in church crypts.179 In St. James’s Church in the
Borough of Paddington the crypt shelter was outfitted with amenities such as electricity,
bunks, fans, and chemical closets.180 In one town, civilians could lease shelter space in a
former chamber of horrors entertainment venue, complete with the severed head of
Charles I, for a price of five to ten shillings.181 Government departments often had their
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own sophisticated shelters, which they were reluctant to share with the population. When
it was suggested civilians might use the Ministry of Labour shelter during nighttime,
when the shelter was empty, the Ministry refused, claiming that their own staff or another
department’s staff might still need the shelter.182
There were some efforts to gas-proof the various communal shelters, but these were
mostly unsuccessful. By mid-1940 there were some efforts to outfit public shelters with
gas curtains, treated fabric that could be dropped to cover doorways of shelters to prevent
the penetration of gas. In a Home Security circular, the MHS urged local authorities to
provide these curtains and render public shelters gas-proof.183 This presented various
concerns, however, and some local authorities refused to comply. The associated cost and
amount of labor and materials required made provisioning all public shelters with gas
curtains difficult.184 Respirators were to be the primary protection against gas and
providing gas curtains might undermine public confidence in their respirators and
perhaps lead them to think they did not need them.185 Additionally, it was impossible to
make most communal shelters gas proof and thus a curtain would only extend the time
until gas penetrated the interior.186 Lack of ventilation in shelters was also a concern, and
with doors covered by a gas curtain the conditions inside the shelters could quickly
deteriorate to the point where people would abandon the shelter.187 One official pointed
out that as people continuously enter a shelter after the siren had sounded, the curtain
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would actually be quite useless.188 Gas-proofing communal shelters but not the domestic
shelters could also have had the unintended effect of people abandoning their Anderson
and Morrison shelters for the public shelters.189 By 1941 the Home Office had withdrawn
its initial instructions with another circular stressing the need for proper shelter
ventilation.190 It was estimated that only 5% of surface shelters and 25% of trench
shelters had been provided with any kind of gas-proofing equipment.191 The problem of
gas-proofing public shelters, however, was a continuous one and the Home Office again
attempted to address the issue at a meeting in 1942.192 The committee members again
concluded that the respirators ought to be the first line of protection and that it was
impractical to gas-proof public shelters, suggesting that no systematic program of gasproofing should be undertaken.193 Officials also worried about potentially gascontaminated civilians entering an occupied shelter, where the gas vapor in confined air
could prove disastrous to the other shelterers.194 Solutions to this issue lay in asking
wardens to guard shelter entrances, to close shelters entirely after a gas alarm, or to install
a gas curtain that would allow contaminated persons to shelter outside the curtain but
under cover.195 Despite respirators being the first, and often only, line of defense against
gas, many civilians failed to carry their respirators when entering a public shelter. While
188
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no one was to be denied entry into a shelter for lacking a gas mask, local authorities were
urged to remind culprits to carry their masks or have them repaired or replaced in the case
of problems.196 In large shelters posters were exhibited that read “This Shelter is not Gas
Proof—Always bring your Gas Mask with you.”197
There were problems with the communal shelters, too. While ideally a shelter
would remain open all day to allow people to seek shelter during a raid, experience
showed that in many places pilfering, misuse, and vandalism occurred in shelters that had
been left open. In most areas, public shelters were thus kept locked during the day and
opened at a specific time each evening.198 In the case of some surface brick shelters,
selected families would receive the key for the shelter, allowing them to use the shelter
when needed and giving them a sense of the shelter being theirs.199 Like the Anderson
shelter, some communal shelters were also prone to flooding, particularly those partially
or completely sunk beneath the surface.200 Over a quarter of the LCC’s outside shelters,
provided primarily to their housing estates, were unusable due to flooding.201 Many
trench shelters were not bunked which made spending the night in them an
uncomfortable experience that many avoided by sheltering elsewhere.202 In many public
shelters the lighting was not up to reading standards.203 The slatted doors installed on
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many of the brick surface shelters offered no privacy and let in drafts during the colder
months.204 Furthermore, the brick shelters were often cold and uncomfortable, although
the officially-recommended “flower-pot stove” was said to provide enough heating. This
consisted of a flower pot with a candle set near its center, set on something allowing a
free draft of air, and another flower pot turned upside down on top of the first one.205
Similar to the Anderson shelter, the Home Office also issued a pamphlet for the
communal shelters, titled Your brick street shelter this winter, to educate people on how
to keep warm in the shelter, what type of bedding to use, how to keep drinks hot, and
what items to bring along.206 Lack of heating and proper ventilation led to frequent
complaints of the surface shelters, particularly when condensation built up inside.207
Tenants of LCC housing estates were sometimes found to frequent public shelters other
than those to which they had been assigned, complaining of overcrowding in the official
council estate shelters.208 One official complained that those sheltering in trenches were
“frequently disinclined to be organised,” for purposes of entertainment and shelter
improvements, and were less of a community than those sheltering in surface or basement
shelters.209 The extremely limited space of a trench shelter made entertainment activities
even more difficult. In one trench shelter an official crowded as many people as possible
into the angle of the bay, conducting a discussion and cinema show, and then moved on to
the next corner of the trench for a repetition.210 Officials also struggled to find ways to

204

TNA: HO 207/386, Comfort and Amenities in Shelters, December 4, 1940, 7.

205

ibid.

206

Ministry of Home Security, Your brick street shelter this winter (London: HMSO, 1940).

207

LMA: CL/CD/1/170, Letter to Mr. Salmon, December 5, 1940.

208

LMA: CL/CD/1/170, H.E. Dennis to Clerk of London County Council, December 31, 1940.

209

TNA: HO 207/386, An abbreviated report on Shelter & Youth Activities, January 1941, 1.

239

offer entertainment options in surface shelters, but saw this as a vital component in
enticing families to use them.211 One option considered was to set aside one shelter in a
local group of such structures for play activities for children and recreation for adults, as
well as canteen arrangements, that would allow for some formation of social life even in
the surface shelters.212
The British government’s shelter program offered a variety of good shelters for its
citizens, whether in their own home or in a community setting. Most of these shelters
were on or near the surface and were clearly incapable of providing protection from a
direct hit. Despite education campaigns intended specifically to convince the general
public of the efficacy of the various shelters, many remained unconvinced that steel
panels, brick, or wood could protect them against bombs. Other civilians found the noise
of air raids too disruptive and nerve-wracking, which was compounded by hearing
bombs, ack-ack guns, and air raid sirens, while they took up space in their shelters. As a
result many Londoners, the hardest hit by German raids, found a different solution for
shelter— the London Underground Railway, or tube.
Initially the tube was not an authorized shelter. As the tube had been used mostly
successfully as a shelter during WWI, government officials considered the underground’s
potential for the next war. As early as 1936 the possibility of using the tube tunnels as an
air raid shelter was addressed.213 While estimates suggested 140,000 shelterers could be
accommodated on the platforms and 675,000 if the tube were shut down entirely, many in
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the government had reservations.214 The Hailey Report determined the potential shelter
contribution of the tube as being limited, due to the system’s extent and limited access
points, although it considered using the underground as a casualty clearing station.215 As
surface transport was likely to be severely interrupted by war conditions, some argued
that it was essential to maintain the underground railway as a transport system only.216 To
facilitate the continuation of transport, particularly of essential personnel such as police
and ARP workers, one suggestion was to install doors and barriers at stations to prevent
the system being rushed by “disorderly mobs.”217 There were also concerns about
flooding in tube stations arising from damage to nearby sewer or water mains that could
potentially cause casualties.218 Some considered, however, that if a decision was taken
that the tube was not to be used as a shelter, then there would be a public outcry in the
event of an emergency.219 Even members of the House of Lords called for the
government to consider the underground system as an official shelter, being unsatisfied
with the response of “technical difficulties” they had received.220 By the end of
September 1940, just a few weeks into the Blitz, the tube stations had been officially
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recognized as shelters, but overcrowding was so extreme that regulation was required.221
Even as the tube was recognized officially as a place of shelter and local authorities were
adding amenities, the Ministry of Information urged that nothing be printed in the press
about this that might attract people to shelter in the underground.222
No government directions or other available shelters could stop Londoners from
crowding into the tube at the first signs of an air raid. It had been clear to government
officials even prior to the war that it would be impossible to keep a crowd out of the
underground if they were determined to get in.223 Those seeking shelter in the tube simply
paid the minimum fare and then spent the night on the platforms and stairwells while the
air raid raged above them.224 On September 7, 1940, the first night of raids on London,
shelterers invaded the tube stations and there was no night subsequently during the war
that did not see scores of civilians seeking refuge there.225 Eighty tube stations were
ultimately used as shelters, plus three non-traffic stations and two tunnels.226 The
numbers of the nightly shelter population varied over the years as danger from raids
decreased. What officials referred to as a “hard core” of shelterers sought protection in
the tube even during times of enemy inactivity, that in some boroughs amounted to as
much as 50% of the regular shelter population.227 Many people also flocked to the tube
221
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for companionship, warmth, and light.228 The movement of trains and people offered
distraction, as did the shelter entertainment programs.229 Deep underground shelterers
were removed from the disruptive noise of air raids and could thus get a good night’s rest
that was almost impossible above ground.230 The shelter population was highest during
the Blitz, with the record for nightly shelterers, recorded in September 1940, at
177,000.231 Over three years the nightly population averaged around 36,000 and by mid1943 the total number of shelters up to that point had surpassed four times the population
of Greater London.232 During 1943 the average nightly shelter population was around
10,000, with an increase of about 7,000 if an alert sounded.233 The advent of the flying
bombs once again drove Londoners into the tube, with numbers during July and August
1944 averaging well over 25,000 shelterers per night.234 The tube had sheltered a total
population of 63 million by the end of the war.235
Many shelterers spent the entire night in a public shelter. After the start of the Blitz
it became clear that night raiding was to be expected and many civilians simply took
shelter from the evening until the next morning whether a raid occurred or not. This
meant that many shelters now became dormitories and required the type of amenities that
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would see crowds of people through the night. Just a few months into the Blitz, bunks
were starting to be provided in many of the stations and other public shelters. The type of
sleeping facilities used in the tube stations consisted of three tiers of bunks, one above the
other, with the middle bunk capable of being let down so as to form a backrest for
someone sitting on the bottom bunk.236 By 1943, 80 out of 120 tube stations had
dormitory arrangements, each accommodating approximately 1,000 people.237 Soon
ticketing systems were put in place to allow shelterers into tube stations and other large
public shelters. Such shelters were known as ‘reserved shelters’ and required ticket
holders to produce their ticket before being allowed to enter.238 It was common, however,
for shelterers to exceed bunked space, particularly in areas with many theaters, cinemas,
or dance halls that could suddenly see hundreds of people seeking temporary shelter. At
Covent Garden station, for instance, there were bunks for 180 people, but as many as 700
crowded into the station, with the majority sleeping on the platforms.239 At another
station, people crowded the platforms all the way up to the rail edge, making it nearly
impossible to carry a fainting case to the first aid post.240 Staircases and escalators were
often packed with people sitting, standing, or sleeping, making ingress or egress
difficult.241
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It was vital to maintain the well-being of the shelterers. While the Home Office was
concerned with providing shelters, the Ministry of Health was responsible for issues of
public health, medical care, public order, admission to the shelters, entertainment,
bunking, lighting, stoves, and canteen arrangements.242 To maintain order, a set of public
rules of conduct in shelters was adopted and posted in every public shelter. Such rules
prohibited nuisance behaviors like spitting, littering, and disturbing the peace and
discouraged unwelcome people who were drunk, “offensively unclean,” or verminous.243
Lavatories were considered one of the most important factors in the comfort and health of
shelterers.244 While all shelters had some type of lavatory, water-borne systems were
preferred over the Elsan-type chemical lavatories, which were small and required regular
emptying.245 Two lighting systems were recommended, one bright enough to allow
people to read, and another blue light system that would allow for sleep at a certain time
when the regular lights were switched off.246
A vital component of shelterers’ well-being and morale was the provision of
canteens. Many civilians came to the shelters directly from work and thus providing some
type of refreshment was almost a necessity. The Tube Refreshment Service commenced
by the end of October 1940 at the Holland Park station, but soon extended across the tube
network.247 Canteens were generally provided for all shelters with a capacity over 200,
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although some smaller shelters used for sleeping had canteen arrangements, as well.248
The Tube Refreshment Service was a sophisticated system that ensured access, at a
minimum, to hot tea and light snacks for the majority of civilians in London’s public
shelters. Canteens and service points sold items such as tea, cocoa, milk, cookies, Swiss
rolls, potato chips, fruit pies, and steamed potatoes, varying in price from a half to three
pence.249 Canteens had been set up in 80 tube stations, with the expectation of feeding an
estimated 80,000 people.250 Sales were particularly high during the Blitz, but continued
even during the calm periods. In one week of March 1944, the Tube Refreshment Service
sold 80,000 cups of tea, 63,000 slab cakes, 30,000 cookies, 30,000 Swiss rolls, and
40,000 buns.251 By 1945, the lack of air raids had so reduced the nightly shelter
population that the refreshment service was operating at a significant deficit and service
points were reduced to just 25, with the possibility of shutting the service down entirely if
the number of shelterers continued to fall.252 By the end of the war the refreshment
service had served over 545,000 gallons of tea to shelterers in London’s underground.253
To alleviate boredom, a variety of entertainment options were available in public
shelters. Space, however, was a consistent problem that undermined these entertainment
efforts. Many activities were chosen simply because they could take place in the limited
space of a public shelter. Libraries with a variety of books were available in many large
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public shelters, with bookcases provided at government expense.254 Some shelter wardens
kept toys and books for children to keep them entertained and out of trouble.255 In some
smaller shelters concerts, arranged by the Council for the Encouragement of Music and
the Arts (CEMA), were found to be very popular.256 The Emergency Music Scheme,
however, was primarily focused on entertaining the recent victims of bombing raids in
rest centers.257 Knitting parties were popular with both shelterers and shelter officials.
Knitting was a quiet activity that required little space and directly aided the war effort by
producing knitted garments that were sent to the troops, civil defense workers, or
evacuated children.258 The forming of shelter choirs was also strongly encouraged as it
was an activity suitable for any type of shelter, and competitions between choirs were
arranged to encourage participation.259 In several shelters, play centers were set up, one,
for instance, in a railway arch, but lack of space was a persistent problem.260 Shelterers
were also encouraged to care for their own well-being by arranging amateur theatricals,
spelling bees, singing songs, or arranging for small competitions between shelter bays or
compartments.261 In London’s boroughs, many public shelters arranged informal
Christmas parties, usually run by the shelterers themselves with no financial aid from
official channels.262 Entertainment options sometimes spread beyond the confines of the
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shelter and registered London shelterers, for instance, could receive half rate admission to
the London Zoo.263 Eight of the boroughs arranged some type of open-air recreation for
their shelterers during the day, such as concerts, picnics, open-air theaters, and
swimming.264 Competitions between shelters, covering vocal music, variety
performances, and drama competitions, were hoped to encourage participation and foster
a self-help spirit.265 Most of the London boroughs also created Shelter Welfare Councils
or Committees that were directly responsible for setting up entertainment and recreation
in their local shelters.266 The appointment of a borough Shelter Welfare Officer was
justified for shelter populations over 10,000, a requirement met by seven boroughs.267
One official, however, pointed out that since the overall policy emphasized dispersal, the
large public shelters ought not to be made too attractive.268 Another argued that focusing
on entertainment in shelters was losing sight of the dispersal policy, and particularly
complained about one large shelter were it was said people were living the entire time
and doing nothing to aid the country in its war effort.269 Professional entertainments were
therefore to be rare and could only be put on as a surprise so as to avoid advertising and
drawing people away from their communal surface shelters.270 Films were also restricted
and although they could be shown somewhat frequently, regular and recurring
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performance was to be avoided.271 Most films were around ten minutes long and covered
topics on the armed forces, the colonies, the allies, types of arms, jobs for women, and
the history of topics such as transport, the wireless, the postal service, and savings
banks.272 Health films were also readily available, educating viewers on immunizations,
eugenics, home nursing, maternity and child welfare, nutrition, personal hygiene,
physical education, physiology, disease prevention, road safety, and social hygiene.273 A
score of civil defense films urged civilians to volunteer and aid the war effort.274
Education programs and talks were particularly useful, as they served both a
practical purpose and could be put on easily in almost any shelter. In the small communal
shelters on their Housing Estates, the LCC set up education programs, consisting of travel
talks, needlepoint classes, and choral music.275 Each borough council, in cooperation with
the LCC, also arranged for classes in all of London’s public shelters. These classes were
usually only held during autumn and winter, when there was less daylight for people to
enjoy the outdoors.276 The shelter classes often revolved around topics of self help, such
as dressmaking, needlecraft, keeping fit, war time cookery, knitting, first aid, home
nursing, make-and-mend, boot repairing, rug making, infant care, and English.277 Other
classes instructed shelterers on travel, current events, appreciation of music, the story of
London, dramatic literature and elocution, civics and citizenship, community singing,
271
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general health, drawing, painting, international affairs, social questions, horticulture, and
psychology.278 One official suggested that shelters were a good place to spread
propaganda, as the shelter population was “almost terrifyingly receptive,” although he
cautioned that such propaganda speakers had to be amusing and interesting.279 Talks for
children between 5 and 14 covered such topics as careers, life in the armed forces, animal
care, and model-making for boys, while girls heard talks on dressmaking, knitting and
crocheting, cookery and housekeeping, nursing as a career, and elementary first aid.280
A major concern was also the health of shelterers, particularly in the larger and
crowded shelters, such as the tube stations. The Ministry of Health strongly encouraged
the provision of washing facilities and lavatories in every public shelter where people
slept.281 Shelters where 50 or more people slept regularly were to be cleaned daily.282
Drinking water was to be supplied either through a piped system or an appropriate
vessel.283 Shelters with capacities of 500 or greater were required to have a medical first
aid post set in a space screened from the rest of the shelter.284 The purpose of such first
aid posts was not to treat air raid casualties, but to tend to minor illnesses and injuries
arising from shelter living, as well as to facilitate the detection and prevention of
infectious diseases. 285 Groups of smaller shelters could be served by one first aid post in a
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convenient location no more than 200 yards from any shelter.286 Such posts were to be
staffed by nurses, with a doctor employed to visit the large shelter first aid posts
regularly.287 To prevent infectious diseases from spreading, health officers offered free
vaccinations for diseases, such as diphtheria, in the shelters.288 Those suffering from
tuberculosis were offered alternate shelter and each family with a tuberculosis case was to
have their own shelter, even receiving priority distribution of the Anderson shelter.289
Smoking was prohibited in all public shelters, but such restrictions were largely ignored
and pipes or cigarettes hastily hidden at the sight of an official or warden.290 One official
suggested sandwiching a health hygiene film between two amusing ones to ensure they
would be watched and enjoyed.291
Special shelter wardens were appointed to keep order. Any public shelter where
civilians regularly spent the night required shelter wardens, at the rate of one male and
one female warden for shelters with under 200 shelterers and two paid wardens per 500
shelterers in shelters with over 500 regular shelterers.292 The selection of shelter wardens
required care and only those capable of being firm without “adopting a bullying or
domineering attitude” were to be chosen.293 Wardens were also required to be
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sympathetic, tactful, and confident.294 Shelter wardens received training in such subjects
as crowd control, the prevention of panic, shelter cleaning, hygiene, sleeping
arrangements, canteens, women and girls in shelters, medical arrangements,
entertainment, and stimulation of self-help.295 In some shelters, after complaints were
received, shelter wardens received access to a small cubicle or other private space where
they could hang their clothes, write reports, eat their meals, and sleep, away from the
general public.296 Those who supported the idea of a private space for shelter wardens
argued that public morale was largely dependent on the morale of the shelter warden.297
Despite the relatively sophisticated system set up to run the tube shelters,
complaints were plentiful. Overcrowding was one of the primary complaints. At the
entrances to tube stations the crowds were particularly worrisome, all rushing into the
station at the sound of a siren, often with no system of order. Civilians suggested adding
strong handrails to entrances, forcing people to enter in a single, orderly line, or making
two entrances, one for men and the other for women and children.298 Sometimes those
who had been allotted bunks inside the stations had to fight their way through crowds
blocking stairways, escalators, and entrance halls.299 During a raid people sought
protection in the tube stations wherever they could find space, massing on escalators,
platforms, stairwells, and entrance halls and this caused particular problems when packed
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trains arrived with passengers needing to exit.300 One observer remarked at the crowds
pushing and people climbing over railings to escape the throng that “everything was there
for the making of a catastrophe.”301 Bug infestations were not uncommon in public
shelters. Old Street tube station drew particular ire from officials for its supposed bed bug
infestation and overcrowded conditions, although an official inspector failed to find any
vermin at the station.302 At Finsbury Park, shelter health officials traced an outbreak of
vermin to the bunk of one shelterer with infested bedding, worrying that bugs on the
platforms could be picked up by tube passengers and increase the infestation.303 Just a
few days later several more tube stations reported sighting bed bugs and London’s civil
defense and public health officials issued a circular on how to combat bed bug
infestations.304 Officials considered the shelterers’ bedding “one of the greatest sources of
danger” and a variety of solutions to the dirty bedding problem were proposed.305
Leicester Square, for instance, offered wooden cubby holes where shelterers could leave
their bedding during the day for the charge of one shilling.306 Other authorities contracted
with a laundry to have bedding collected in the morning and returned washed in the
evening for a small charge.307 The tight conditions also made nuisance behavior a
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particular problem. In one tube station shelterers complained about the disturbance made
by a woman’s pet monkey.308
Officials worried especially about the shelterers and passengers of the tube in the
case of a gas attack. The question of poison gas and the underground network was
addressed as early as 1936. One official called on the CDRD to investigate gas-proofing
the tube before any determination could be made on whether the underground could be
used as a shelter.309 While experiments indicated that some stations could be gas-proofed,
the extensive and overlapping system as a whole made generalizations impossible.310 The
Chemical Warfare Committee initially ruled out the tube as a sheltering system, because,
despite it providing good protection against HE bombs, they assumed the ventilation
system would draw gas into the tunnels and gas anyone sheltering there.311 By 1943 a gas
warning device had been installed at 34 tube stations to alert officials and shelterers
should gas enter the tubes.312 A protocol was also established for dealing with the
presence of gas near a tube station. If gas was present in the vicinity of the station, fans
were to be immediately switched off, the stations on either side notified, the drivers and
guards of each arriving train were to be warned, a sign displayed on forward headwalls to
indicate the presence of gas and slow the trains to 15 mph, and passengers exiting the
train alerted with a prominent sign of the presence of gas that also instructed them to don
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their respirators.313 The shelter warden was to be responsible for ensuring that those
sheltering on platforms put on their gas masks.314 As with the communal shelters, the tube
stations were not gas proof and thus the respirator was the primary method of defense
against a gas attack. Officials found, however, that only a minute proportion of the public
actually carried their respirators into the tube, creating concerns of mass casualties should
a gas attack occur.315 Borough of Kensington officials asked for permission to refuse
admission to the tube shelters to anyone not carrying their respirator, but civil defense
regional officers did not want to give such powers to local authorities.316 Officials
particularly worried about the panic that would erupt when gas entered a tube station and
only few people had respirators.317 Others envisioned the “rougher elements in the
shelter” appropriating the respirators of people too weak to fight them.318
While deep shelters had never been a priority for the government, five deep shelters
were eventually built in underground railway tunnels. Construction on these new shelters
began as early as January 1941 and even after they were completed at the end of 1942,
these shelters were held in reserve, not to be opened until necessary.319 The bunk capacity
of the deep shelters was around 64,000.320 One use considered for the deep shelters was
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as a dormitory for night workers who could thus sleep restfully during the day.321 The
press, however, found out about the shelters and published hyperbolic articles that the
government thought would undermine morale. The News Chronicle published a story that
described the new shelters as luxurious, with a “central avenue 16 ft. across, flanked with
miniature hospitals, shops, restaurants, offices and inquiry and washing stations.”322 The
shelters were said to hold one million people in total and were “bomb, gas, water and fool
proof.”323 Such exaggerated articles clearly undermined the government’s efforts to
promote existing shelters. One annoyed official, scrawling in the margins of the article,
asked “How did this silly story happen?”324 In a letter to newspaper editors the Home
Office urged them not to advertise the deep shelters, to avoid giving the world a false
impression of how London was coping with the new menace of the flying bombs and to
avoid instilling a deep shelter mentality in the public.325 Too much press coverage
concerning the deep shelters could also undermine the public’s trust in their existing
shelters and as there was not enough space in the deep shelters for likely demand, this
could potential lead to chaos and loss of faith in the government.326 The flying bomb did
ultimately induce the government to open the deep shelters. Over a period of two weeks
in July 1944 the five shelters were opened to shelterers transferred from other stations
and to new shelterers bombed out of their homes, as well as women and children.327
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Sheltering underground might have appeared as the safest option, but there were
nevertheless casualties in the tube shelters. There were relatively few fatal accidents
inside the tube shelters, but direct hits on tube stations did lead to casualties. On three
consecutive nights in October 1940, three tube shelters were hit, killing 90 shelterers
total.328 Direct hits also underscored the government’s dispersal policy, as casualties were
often significant for single incidents. 64 people were killed in a direct hit on Balham
station, while 53 shelterers died at Bank station during a raid.329 The worst loss of civilian
life during the war also occurred at a tube station, although this was not due to bombs,
but as a result of the very panic civil defense was aiming to forestall. On the evening of
March 3rd, 1943, an alert sounded that saw hundreds of those living nearby hurry to seek
shelter at the Bethnal Green tube station, a number that was quickly swelled by patrons
from two cinemas and three buses setting their passengers down outside the shelter.330
Within ten minutes of the alert, 1,500 people attempted to enter the shelter through the
stairwell when a nearby rocket battery discharged a salvo that created panic in the
crowd.331 Believing the noise to be enemy bombs the crowd surged forward and, when a
woman at the bottom step fell, the pressure of the crowd was so intense that many were
pushed forward, on top of others that fell, creating a mass of bodies five or six deep.332
The chief investigator wrote that in the span of ten seconds the stairwell was converted
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from a “corridor to a charnel house.”333 With the crowd on top of the steps still surging
forward to enter the shelter and those at the bottom a tangled mass, extrication was nearly
impossible.334 When the crowd was finally cleared and casualties removed and sent to
hospitals, the death toll was staggering. 173 people had died, most of them women and
children, and all had died as a result of suffocation and extreme compression.335 A special
investigator was appointed who blamed the disaster on a variety of reasons, both
psychological and physical. The tube station’s single entrance, poor lighting in the
stairwell, and lack of handrails and crush barriers were contributing factors, while the
mad rush of several hundreds of people attempting to push into the shelter was the
primary reason for the disaster.336 As the Borough had, as early as 1941, contemplated the
very disaster that actually occurred, yet had failed to address the issues they had
highlighted, some of the blame was also directed at the local authority.337 In 1939 the
Hailey Report had advocated ramps be provided over stairs in shelter entrances,
suggesting that stairs were likely to lead to disaster.338
Larger issues of civil defense were consistently at play in the British shelter
program. While physical protection of the civil population was the primary and most
important purpose of air raid shelters, the shelter program also served other purposes that
fitted into the wider objectives of civil defense. The British government certainly worked
actively to offer its population at least basic protection from air raids, but government
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departments and officials also aimed to make sure the population knew the government
was trying to protect them. The distribution of the Anderson shelters, although they did
serve a protective purpose, was also intended to quiet the rising criticisms of the
government’s poor shelter preparations. The goal of maintaining morale infused much of
the shelter program, as it did other parts of civil defense. While protecting civilians from
physical harm certainly had the side effect of preserving morale, the addition of amenities
in shelters, such as bunks, lighting, canteens, and entertainment programs were almost
entirely intended to serve this objective, as well. Despite the burden of providing shelters
falling on the government and local authorities, the concept of self-help, vital to the
success of civil defense, was pervasive in the shelter program, as well. This primarily
consisted of encouraging civilians to build and improve their own shelters and to take an
interest in their own protection, but was also reflected in the self-help-oriented shelter
classes given in large public shelters. Shelter officials specifically instructed that, in order
to ensure collective welfare, “the self help spirit must be encouraged and taught.”339
While the British shelter program most certainly saved civilian lives, it also reinforced
the general ideas of civil defense that were vital to the nation’s continued resistance.
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Chapter 7 - “Anything but house-trained:” Civil Defense and Issues of Class,
Gender, and Childhood
In the lead-up to WWII and during the war itself, civil defense became intrinsic to
British society, informing all aspects of everyday life. Many people volunteered their
time and efforts for some type of civil defense work so that civil defense became
integrated into many aspects of civilian life. Even those civilians who did not directly
volunteer interacted with elements of civil defense during their daily lives, whether by
carrying a gas mask, seeking protection in a shelter, or following blackout guidelines.
Civil defense became a part of war-time society to the extent that almost no aspect of
everyday life remained untouched. While civil defense had a direct impact on British
society, society and culture, in turn, also influenced civil defense. Issues of class were
pervasive in British society pre-war and even the great equalizing force of war could not
always erase biases and prejudices. Civil defense efforts also often caused great
consternation as many feared that war-time living would corrode moral values. Children,
unable to participate properly in civil defense and considered a particularly vulnerable
population, presented one of the largest challenges. Their physical and spiritual wellbeing
were ongoing concerns that required careful solutions. The primary response, evacuation,
directly correlated with the wider civil defense policy of dispersal.
There was a well-developed class system in British society prior to WWII. While
years of war certainly affected all classes and sometimes even required cooperation
between classes, the poorer working class, particularly those of dense urban areas like
London’s East End, carried the heaviest burden. Despite shared experiences of rationing,
sheltering, poison gas anxieties, and aerial raids, the prevailing view of the lower classes
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among their social betters remained relatively unchanged. Negative views of the working
class as uncouth, unintelligent, and troublesome also informed aspects of civil defense.
Issues over class arose in ARP jobs, shelters, with gas masks, and, in particular, with
evacuation.
Class issues were particularly evident in the shelters. A report on ARP measures in
WWI praised “the more educated and responsible” part of the population, who listened to
the advice to stay at home during a raid, in contrast to “the masses, particularly those
living in the East End” who were determined not to stay at home at the least sign of a raid
and sought better shelter in their thousands.1 Because most of these civilians sought
refuge in the underground stations, causing significant overcrowding and impeding
regular business, the government issued a request to news editors to refrain from
publishing articles that might add to “the apprehension already prevalent among the
poorest and most ignorant classes.”2 One newspaper correspondent complained about the
condition of shelters in Coventry, describing how “the atmosphere of the ‘great
unwashed’ met [him] at the head of the steps” and claiming he would not even send his
dog to shelter there.3 A Salvation Army officer found it remarkable that two female
workers had served tea to a shelter crowd of six thousand who were considered “to say
the least, rough” without being jostled, despite having not even a rail to separate them
from the masses.4
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Issues of class also played a role in public health. Old Street tube shelter, infamous
for its supposed bug infestation, had a shelter population made up largely of shelterers
from “poor and sometimes dirty houses” and the bugs found in a place where people slept
were “presumably brought in by shelterers.”5 The Birmingham Daily Gazette pointed out
that “poorer people” in shelters preferred the types of food condemned by nutritionists
and did “not take readily” to healthier food, although the sales figures of the Tube
Refreshment Service suggest all types of Londoners were guilty of such indulging.6 One
speaker blamed the poor hygiene and bad behavior of evacuated children on their point of
origin, explaining that slum children had unsocial habits and were not fit to mix with
children enjoying a private education.7 Another writer agreed that vermin infestation (and
nits on the head in particular) was a condition of poverty and a family ‘disease’ that was
spread between children and adults in their homes.8 He added that even if such children
were treated at school, they would return to dirty homes in their poor neighborhoods to be
reinfected.9
Parenting skill was also sometimes defined by class. In trials at Southampton of the
baby’s anti-gas helmet, four out of seven babies cried continuously throughout the test, in
two cases even driving the mothers to tears as they operated the bellows. The trial report
added that the mothers of the three infants who had remained calm were “intelligent and
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firmer than those of the babies who cried.”10 A second test, held in a different part of the
city, asked the mothers for their impressions on the helmet, because they were “of a
superior class” than those who had attended the Southampton test.11 One writer argued
that some people made extremely bad parents due to a disinterest in children, ignorance,
or poverty.12 Attempting to solve the problem of evacuated children, who had been
deloused and their behavior adjusted, returning to their poor homes and bad parents, the
writer suggested that a considerable proportion of such children could “live quite happily
away from their parents.”13 Evacuated children’s poor table manners were blamed on
parents and foster parents were appalled to hear that some children had never seen their
mothers cook.14 The Chief Inspector for the Board of Education suggested that in the case
of children who came from the worst homes the conditions that made for sound education
had been greatly improved by the children’s evacuation.15
The war also created a new type of class—those homeless as a result of air raids. In
some areas the newly homeless simply lived in public shelters where they had access to
sleeping arrangements and some basic amenities. While many said they would prefer
accommodations if they were available, they were ignorant as to how these would be
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obtained.16 Others refused new billets on the grounds that no shelter was available there,
preferring to remain in a less comfortable environment that offered protection.17
Conflict was not solely confined to issues of class. Jews often found themselves the
target of mistreatment or contempt. In one London shelter a man was removed and barred
from returning for causing a “disturbance” against Jews sheltering there.18 In a shelter
used predominantly by Jews the shelterers considered Jewish religious services
inadvisable.19 The LCC had to arrange for a rest center specifically for Jews, as it was
often too difficult to accommodate their needs, such as Yiddish speakers and kosher food,
in the regular rest centers.20
Foreigners also often faced mistrust. A “foreign element” in a public shelter was
justification for the appointment of a Shelter Welfare Officer, regardless of the number of
shelterers.21 Lack of British citizenship was also often a bar to volunteering for various
ARP posts. Even Shelter Welfare Officers were required to possess British nationality.22
The refugees from Gibraltar were none too popular. Overcrowding at three tube station
shelters was attributed to Gibraltarian refugees who refused to use the shelters provided
for them at their hostels.23 In some stations, groups of these refugees took over entire
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platforms to the annoyance of officials.24 At the South Kensington station they took
possession of the bunks at an hour earlier than shelterers were normally allowed to,
causing an uproar among the regular shelterers, who had to be sent on to another
shelter.25 Their habits were deemed “unpleasant” and they were separated from the other
shelterers.26 The Gibraltarians were also said to be unpopular due to their “none too
cleanly habits.”27 Some referred to the refugees as “anything but house-trained.”28 The
Borough of Kensington even wrote to complain, arguing that it was not their duty to
provide shelter for refugees.29 WVS workers, however, painted a different picture,
suggesting that the permanent shelterers had been extremely rude to the refugees and had
started the conflict.30 The problems seemed to disappear when two of the refugees were
appointed as shelter wardens.31 Another problem station was Notting Hill Gate, where,
one official wrote, the “Gibraltarian children have not yet been brought under control.”32
The children were said to have been seen begging from passengers and the shelter warden
wished to find a way to “freeze out the Gibs who are the trouble here.”33 Evacuees from
Malta were also maligned for declining to use their allocated shelters and heading straight
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for the tubes.34 One minister of religion blamed an influx of Irish, whom he deemed
“lazy, irresponsible, parasitic, and often treacherous,” for the filthy condition of many
evacuated children.35 Irish parents, he claimed, would rather spend their funds on pubs
than soap and allowed their children to become filthy and savage.36
While sheltering behavior was often correlated with class, people’s attitude towards
their gas masks was sometimes similarly described. In fitting tests of the GCR officials
concluded that people of at least the middle-class would quickly learn to adjust and wear
the respirator when the time came and that they would be unlikely to panic in an
emergency. For the poorer classes, however, it was felt that respirator demonstrations
would have more positive results and ought to be made compulsory.37
Issues over class also often revolved around ideas of morality. Religious figures,
charities, and moral crusaders concerned themselves with the potential corruption of the
moral fabric of society as a result of war-time living. Civil defense, forming such a
significant part of civilians’ everyday life, was concerning because of its potential to
upend family life and traditional societal roles. The potential corruption of youth was also
a persistent concern. In aiming to prevent a corrosion of morals the focus of most of those
concerned with the topic was firmly directed towards the lower classes, whose moral
fabric was often already questionable and easily influenced.
Shelter living presented a particular problem to those concerned about morality.
The Public Morality Council, established in 1899 and made up of several church
34
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denominations and social and educational societies, tackled the question of the moral
condition of public shelters in WWII.38 The Council considered that the shelter presented
a moral problem in two aspects: improper use of empty shelters during daytime and
crowds using the shelter during raids.39 One official wrote that the government’s
immediate efforts ought to focus on preventing the “unnatural shelter existence having a
deteriorating effect on health, morale, and morals.”40 He added that the public shelters’
worst feature was the destruction of family life and that the maintenance of the family
unit would ensure a strong public rejection of immoral behavior.41 The London Church of
England Temperance Society (LCETS) and the Churches’ Committee on Gambling
conducted a survey of 150 public shelters to determine the problems arising from shelter
living for youth, in particular.42 Their survey discovered concerning issues of gambling,
drinking, and apathy, exacerbated by limited religious instruction.43
The congregation and intermingling of large numbers of people naturally led to
complaints about behavior and disturbances, inside and outside of the shelters. Bad
behavior was to be dealt with through police action, as it was unfair to “decent, orderly
people” to have their shelter lives made miserable by “quarrelsome and disorderly
persons.”44 Youths under army age were found to be the source of a lot of the trouble, and
shelter wardens were instructed that it was not a sign of weakness to ask for a policemen
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to check in on the shelterers and to deal with quarrelsome behavior.45 One Juvenile Court
probation officer blamed shelter living and high wages for increases in juvenile crime.46
Children sometimes used empty shelters as playgrounds, and public toilets, during the
day to the consternation of officials.47 Foreign soldiers and sailors were accused of not
being accustomed to the moral standards of Britain and some complaints were received
about their behavior.48 One man was beaten by a crowd and subsequently arrested after
being discovered in a shelter with a three-year-old girl that he was accused of having
unlawfully and indecently assaulted.49 The shelters themselves also offered opportunities
for thieves and in many locations public shelters were robbed of their electric lightbulbs,
closets, picks, and shovels.50
The mixing of men and women, particularly in a dormitory setting, was especially
concerning. One official suggested that, in order to curb the anxiety arising out of this
mixing of the sexes, shelters, where it was possible, should so move or allocate bunks
that blocks of compartments of them could be reserved for different groups.51 The groups
would be arranged with unaccompanied men first, then older boys, family parties, girls,
and unaccompanied women.52 Screens were to be set up for nursing mothers behind
which they could nurse in privacy.53 The Chairman of East London’s juvenile court
45
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claimed that any young girl going into a shelter without her mother and father was
“simply asking for trouble.”54 One shelter warden claimed he kept his population under
control and out of trouble by separating the men’s beds from those of the women and
children.55 The same warden also turned away young, unaccompanied girls from the
shelter, claiming that the shelter was there to offer protection and not free lodging for
girls looking to attract men.56 Issues over the mixing of the sexes could occur even in
domestic shelters. One woman, whose family shared an Anderson shelter with a neighbor
and her male lodger, would refuse to lie down on the bunks as she could not put her feet
up in the presence of a man.57
The presence of vices in the population was consistently a reason for complaint.
Drinking was common “among certain groups of people” and some of these brought their
drinking into the shelters.58 Problems with drunkenness were particularly noticeable on
paydays, weekends, and evenings without raids when people would spend their time in
pubs before returning to the shelter.59 The presence of drink or drunkenness in shelters
sapped moral conduct among shelterers, although many people likely drank as a result of
boredom.60 Drinking among both young men and women was increasing and again
intense boredom was cited as the cause.61 One observer suggested it was the combination

54

“Shelter Perils,” Evening News, November 4, 1940.

55

“Coventry Shelters Live Down Bad Name,” Coventry Evening Telegraph, July 28, 1941.

56

ibid.

57

IMW: Documents.17427, Private Papers of John McCann, 3.

58

TNA: HO207/386, An abbreviated Report on Shelter & Youth enquiries, January 1941, 2.

59

ibid.

60

ibid.

61

LMA: A/PMC/071, The Churches’ Committee on Gambling, Youth in Air Raid Shelters, March 1941, 1.

269

of drink and women that led to “objectionable incidents.”62 Reports of drunkenness in
shelters were widespread. In some shelters drunken brawlers terrorized women and
children and continued their fights even during an actual air raid.63 Several such drunken
brawlers received month-long prison sentences, although magistrates wished they could
impose harsher punishments on such men.64 Gambling was an even more common sight
than drinking, with small groups of people engaged in various games, usually secluded in
a corner or bay.65 The presence of children in shelters, who might observe these games,
made gambling a more pressing concern.66 Social workers and the clergy particularly
wanted to avoid the initiation of youth into gambling habits and occurrences of gambling
in shelters were dealt with strictly.67 Across the country shelterers caught gambling could
be charged under the Vagrancy Act, which deemed anyone playing by way of wagering in
public a vagabond, or under the Gaming Act of 1845, which could see fines as high as
£50 or even jail time for an offense.68 In several cases, men, women, and juveniles were
fined between two and twelve shillings for playing games such as pontoon, Brag, and
rummy.69 Card sharpers, who moved from shelter to shelter and preyed on youth and
women, were considered a particular nuisance.70 While the responsibility for catching
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gamblers and notifying police rested with the shelter warden, shelterers themselves were
encouraged to report such behavior.71
Even outside of the shelters gambling and betting were considered immoral vices.
Although sports associated with betting were suspended at the outbreak of war, within
just a few weeks horse and greyhound racing, as well as football, returned and with them
gambling quickly rose to almost its pre-war levels.72 When it was suggested that betting
pools on football matches would improve the morale of the working man by giving him
something to do in the evenings, one official in the Northwestern Region commented that
this was a “confession of moral bankruptcy that needs no comment.”73
Shelters were also sometimes linked to inappropriate sexual behaviors. The
conditions of darkness and congestion in shelters were said to cause immoral behavior.74
In central London young men and women supposedly used the large shelters as meeting
points and then returned to unused surface shelters for sexual activities. 75 Most
concerning, however, were the rumors that in some districts prostitutes used shelters to
ply their trade.76 A member of the Church Army reported that “undesirable women” were
making use of a shelter in Portsea Place and that one woman in particular had made it a
habit to bring different men in and out while keeping to a dark corner of the shelter.77
Another observer claimed one basement shelter, its dim lighting making it difficult to see
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what was going on, was being used for immoral purposes and quoted the shelter’s warden
as claiming the shelter was nothing more than a brothel.78 Shelter wardens received
specific training in how to deal with prostitutes, although they were cautioned about
identifying a woman as a common prostitute, as a mistake could bring “serious
consequences.”79 The primary duty of a shelter warden in regard to prostitutes was
simply to stop solicitation and prevent the annoyance of shelterers.80 In another shelter a
teenaged girl commandeering the darkest part of the shelter was said to regularly invite
boys her own age to “share her blanket,” a state of affairs the Church Army found “very
distressing.”81 At several stations complaints were made about “luridly jacketed so called
novels” on display and officials quickly withdrew the offending books.82 At the Ramsgate
Tunnels shelter, officials had to institute new rules about the use of cubicles for sleeping
and remove curtains and doorways after public morality concerns arose.83 The City
Council of Gloucester also complained about immoral behavior occurring in their public
shelters, but police were too short-handed to effectively combat the problem.84 A juvenile
court probation officer blamed problems of immorality on adolescents sleeping huddled
together in the public shelters.85
Women, and their morality and plight, generally received special attention. The
presence of women in shelters sometimes occasioned concern. Shelter wardens were
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specifically trained to deal with “special cases” of women, including prostitutes, “strays,”
and women with children who were neglected.86 Strays included runaways from homes
or schools, stranded girls, and “generally wayward girls,” which, in all cases, required the
involvement of the police to return the young women to their proper location.87 When
women ambulance drivers asked to be issued the men’s combination suit, which was
more practical, instead of the traditional woman’s greatcoat, officials were initially
reluctant, pointing to the resistance of Herbert Morrison and Lady Reading to female civil
defense workers wearing trousers.88 One official thought that the opposition to trousers
was based on “the fundamental grounds of aesthetics” instead of practicality, however.89
The Home Office eventually acquiesced, allowing female civil defense workers to wear
uniform trousers, if their local authority approved.90 Some worried that women wearing
trousers, a much more common sight during the war as a result of women in the
workforce and the civil defense services, negated their function as women and that the
war would have been fought in vain were it to continue.91 One vicar considered the
wearing of trousers an “evil habit,” condemning the increasing practice on the basis of
the Bible.92 Others merely opposed women wearing trousers on the grounds of aesthetics,
wishing a law could be enforced to end the practice.93

86

TNA: HO207/386, London Region Circular No. 385, Training of Shelter Wardens', June, 1941, 12.

87

ibid, 13.

88

TNA: HO 186/26, Minute Sheet, October 10, 1939.

89

ibid.

90

“Uniform Trousers for Women in A.R.P.,” The People, July 20, 1941.

91

“Masculine Women,” Stirling Observer, September 17, 1940.

92

“Trousers for Women,” Western Gazette, August 25, 1939.

93

Disgusted Woman, “Women in Trousers,” Torquay Herald & Express, October 28, 1939.

273

The persistent apathy among shelterers was a concern for the government. Apathy
was particularly concerning because it undermined the civil defense principles of selfhelp and the upkeep of morale. One person complained that “the young industrialist in
the Shelter is becoming the spiritual and mental antithesis of his brother in the Spitfire.”94
The apathy among shelterers was also referred to as “dumb stoicism” and led to a lack of
enthusiasm for the war and the necessary work that could threaten to undermine the war
effort.95 To combat this apathy, suggested one civilian, it was necessary to increase and
improve the social amenities available in the shelters and to do this shelter space needed
to be enlarged, as well.96 The survey conducted by the LCETS found that lack of space
for welfare activities and social life resulted in apathy and a deterioration of “gay courage
into dumb stoicism […].”97
While actual cases of improper behavior may have been isolated, concerns over
immorality received widespread attention. So much so that the issue of shelter immorality
was serious enough to be addressed by the House of Commons, although the
Undersecretary of the Home Office reassured members that claims of immorality made
by the Public Morality Council specifically had been greatly exaggerated.98 Newspapers
were quick to take up the cause and both the Daily Mirror and the Evening Standard
published articles about immoral behavior occurring in shelters and the response needed
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to combat the problem.99 The News Review described moral conditions inside London’s
air raid shelters as horrifying and praised Bishop Godfrey Fisher, Chairman of the Public
Morality Council, for his dedication to eradicating the problem.100 Immorality was
concerning not merely for its spiritual implications, but because a decay in morality was
likely to impact public morale, in general.
Civilians, government officials, and the clergy were continuously attempting to
combat these perceived problems. A Salvation Army officer claimed that immorality was
an issue only in poorly-managed shelters, suggesting that close control and oversight
were the solution.101 The primary method to address vice was to alleviate boredom, as
most officials and clergy believed that boredom was the main impetus for bad
behavior.102 A strong community spirit also aided the prevention of immorality.103 In
areas where a large proportion of one church’s congregation sheltered together the impact
of religion on shelter life was “bold and authoritative,” ensuring good conduct and the
absence of immorality.104 The presence of good shelter wardens would control conduct
and ensure a high standard of behavior in the shelters.105 Additionally, an increased police
presence could deter bad behavior and Scotland Yard formed an anti-vice squad of forty
policewomen specifically to prevent immorality in or around air raid shelters.106 An
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informal committee was formed to address social problems in shelters, made up of
representatives of organizations such as the Church of London Temperance Society, the
Church of England Moral Welfare Council, the Church Committee on Gambling, and the
LCC.107 The committee instituted a survey that asked youth about drinking, gambling,
and sexual immorality in shelters and what could be done to combat this.108 One vicar
asked the LCC to convert his unsuitable church building into an air raid shelter to have all
of his flock under his control, as the only alternative for the people was to shelter in small
groups in nearby basements and brick shelters.109 In one district the bothersome juveniles
were given jobs to do to keep them occupied and out of trouble.110 One group handed out
pamphlets detailing the dangers and immorality of games of chance through the use of
quotes and anecdotes in an attempt to combat gambling in the shelters.111
Religious ministration was one of the primary means of combating problems of
behavior and morality. The Salvation Army ministered to the spiritual, temporal, and
moral needs of those in the shelters, seeing the provision of refreshments to shelterers as
a means to attend their spiritual and moral needs, as well.112 The Baptist Union of Great
Britain and Ireland saw in the shelter population a “good Christian opportunity of
influencing them for moral or spiritual good.”113 One Reverend claimed “opportunities in
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Shelters are unbounded,” but cautioned his colleagues to first make the people “Godconscious.”114 The Church Army’s slogan was “Prayer in every Shelter every night” and
they issued a pamphlet with prayers specifically intended to uplift the spirit of those in
shelters.115 A Conference of Clergy met specifically to address how to make the best use
of spiritual opportunities in public shelters. One Reverend boasted of the success of
church services in shelters, explaining how in one shelter a group of men who regularly
played cards would drop their game when the service began to join in the singing and
prayer.116 The Derby Christian Social Council saw religious intervention as a means to
combat rising juvenile crime rates, suggesting that a more vital interest in Sunday School
work and wiser and stricter guidance in the home could solve the problem.117
Children, as a particularly vulnerable group, presented a pressing concern to both
government and civilians alike prior to the outbreak of war. Despite the issue of gas
masks and provision of shelters for the population, the remaining risk to children from air
raids was still considered unacceptable. Casualties were inevitable in war and even those
children who were not harmed directly by raids would nevertheless suffer from the
strains of war-time living. The best solution to protect vulnerable children in urban areas
likely to be bombed seemed to be an extreme form of dispersal—to evacuate them to
safer locations. The government’s evacuation program aimed to remove school-aged
children from big cities, such as London or Birmingham, and send them to live with
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volunteer families in rural areas of the country. While the evacuation program came into
action almost immediately upon the declaration of war in September 1939, its overall
success is difficult to determine.118
Evacuation was under consideration even before the outbreak of war. The idea was
part of the government’s larger policy of dispersal and proposed removing large parts of
the population from zones of danger in the case of war. Parliament, the press, government
officials, and the public at large considered whether evacuation was feasible and to what
extent. As early as 1925 the CID considered solutions to limit damage from air raids in
London and concluded that, although those vital to maintaining the city’s activities
should remain, arrangements ought to be made to evacuate “the unnecessary mouths.119”
A committee formed in 1938 to specifically address the idea of evacuation similarly
concluded that in order to ensure the continuance of the national war effort and supply
essential civilian needs, the large industrial towns needed to be maintained, but that
evacuation should be considered for non-essential parts of their populations.120 For the
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purposes of evacuation the country was divided into three categories: Evacuation Areas,
the most congested industrial areas in danger of attack, Neutral Areas, less congested
areas not to be evacuated but not suited for receiving evacuees, and Reception Areas
where evacuees were to be billeted.121 Three groups qualified for evacuation under the
government scheme: schoolchildren, who were to be accompanied by their teachers, preschool aged children accompanied by their mothers or other women, and adult blind or
handicapped persons.122 At the time of the September Crisis in 1938 hasty plans were
made for evacuation, which were then extended or replaced by much more detailed plans
in the intervening year before the outbreak of war.123
At the outbreak of war evacuation was to follow a set plan. The government
eventually established three evacuation plans to cover all schoolchildren, as well as
mothers with young children, although the initial wave of evacuation only dealt with
schoolchildren. Plan V, also referred to as “the Trickle,” evacuated school-aged children
to billets in reception areas.124 Plan VII transported mothers and young children through
the government’s scheme, while Ev. 10 allowed mothers and children to evacuate to selfselected billets, such as a relative’s house, using railroad vouchers.125 Emergency food
rations were to be issued or sent forward to last each evacuee 48 hours, to ensure that the
receiving area’s strictly-rationed food supply was not overwhelmed until proper supplies
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could be allocated.126 Each child evacuee received a bag containing one can of meat, two
cans of milk, one packet of biscuits, and a quarter pound of chocolate.127 Adults were
issued the same supplies, plus an extra can of meat, and were instructed to rely on the
emergency rations for the first few days in the reception area.128 A particular problem for
the evacuation scheme were children under school age whose mothers could not
accompany them. Mothers could send their young children with another woman willing
to look after them, who would qualify for the same lodging benefits as the mother, or
they could apply for one of the very limited spaces in a country nursery.129 To register for
evacuation parents were asked to contact the child’s school, or, if the mother planned to
evacuate, as well, to register at an emergency rest center.130 For each child the
government paid the receiving householder between eight shillings sixpence and 15
shillings, depending on the age of the child.131 Parents were obligated to pay six shillings
a week per evacuated child, although this fee was adjusted based on means.132 Similarly,
for mothers evacuating with their children, a lodging allowance would be paid to the
householder taking them in, although such lodgers were generally expected to supply
their own food.133 Parents were also asked to supply their children with boots, clothing,
126
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and little necessities before sending them off, but children whose parents could not afford
to do so were outfitted by the government and through charities, such as the WVS.134
Parents were allowed to visit their children, although they were encouraged to let the
children settle in and not to visit too often as not to clog up the roadways and railways
vital to the war effort.135 A fourth evacuation scheme, the Bombed Babies Scheme, dealt
with the evacuation of children being discharged from hospitals who normally resided in
an evacuation area. Unlike the other schemes, which were entirely voluntary, by 1941 a
regulation empowered authorities in evacuation areas to order the removal from the area
any child “suffering in mind or body as a result of hostile attacks or is in such a state of
health as to be likely to suffer if he remains in that area.136” Officials would strongly
encourage the parents of injured children to consent to evacuation, either with the school
class in the case of school-aged children or with a nursery party in the case of
unaccompanied younger children.137
The benefits of evacuation, for children especially, were plentiful. Removing
children from areas likely to be bombed was the best solution to providing safety.
Shelters, not immune to direct hits, could not only not guarantee safety, but offered poor
living conditions. Removing the children from danger would also allow parents to avoid
worrying about their safety, ensuring they could focus their full attention on supporting
the war effort. Evacuation was a particularly potent argument when it came to the
“bombed babies,” or children who were in the hospital as a result of enemy action.
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Government officials were anxious that such children, especially those sent to recover
outside of evacuation areas, not return to the dangerous cities and instead be evacuated.138
Besides safety, evacuation was touted as providing several other benefits to children.
Health and well-being of children was a popular talking point for those advocating
evacuation and was reiterated consistently by the evacuation propaganda material. The
fresh country air was seen as beneficial to children living in crowded cities.139 Shelter
living, with its associated lack of fresh air, sunlight, restful sleep, and risk of disease, was
considered a serious hazard to the health of children and evacuation was offered as the
alternative.140 A 1941 Ministry of Information pamphlet claimed that “practically all the
[evacuated] children have improved in physique, general health, poise and bearing […]”
during their stay in the reception area.141 Such an improvement was attributed to the fresh
air, as well as increased availability of fruit and vegetables.142
Education was another benefit of evacuation. While schooling in urban cities, and
London in particular, was severely interrupted, children could continue full-time school
work in the reception areas.143 Despite the LCC’s attempts to keep schools open if some
attendance could be achieved, many schools in the five boroughs and the City had to be
closed.144 LCC officials estimated that only one out of six London children were
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attending school and those schools that were open averaged fewer than fifty pupils.145
Additionally, the reduced school hours of twenty per week were even further diminished
by air raid alarms that would see pupils and teachers huddle in shelters for hours a week
without educational instruction.146 A pamphlet designed to convince mothers to evacuate
their children told readers that “it is not fair” for children to go without education or fresh
air and uninterrupted sleep.147 Evacuating the children was also said to make life easier
for those remaining. There would be more spaces in shelters and less food, fuel, and care
would be needed for those remaining in the city.148 Citing these benefits of evacuation
was not only intended to convince parents of evacuating their children, but also assured
them they need not worry. Dispersal, intending to reduce mass casualties and preserve
morale, was even more important in the case of children, whose deaths were likely to
negative affect morale across society. Thus evacuating and protecting British children
was another means by the government to ensure the preservation of civilian morale.
The press supported the evacuation scheme by publishing articles and pictures of
evacuated children enjoying their new surroundings. The Sphere depicted evacuated
London children enjoying an exercise session on the beach and roaming the woods and
fields in Devonshire.149 The Scotsman pictured smiling evacuees playing in a cornfield
and reassured readers that the children were settling down happily.150 A writer for the
Coventry Herald argued that, although six months after evacuation many people
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considered the scheme a failure, evacuation had had positive benefits. Not only were the
children safe, but they were improving in knowledge, outlook, experience, and health.151
Country life was said to have a remarkable effect on the children’s physiques.152 The
Newcastle Evening Chronicle showed evacuated local children happily smiling at the
camera surrounded by nature, while one of them held a dog.153 An official government
pamphlet, issued by the Ministry of Information, was similarly reassuring, depicting
evacuated children frolicking in hay, helping out with farm work, receiving education,
playing in nature, and cuddling with farm animals.154
Complaints about evacuation were nevertheless plentiful. Evacuation was hugely
unpopular among the population. Parents who did evacuate their children were
sometimes criticized by their neighbors.155 As the initial evacuation scheme only covered
schoolchildren, many doubted the government’s sincerity, questioning why younger
children were not included, as well.156 Evacuation officials also believed that parents had
a false sense of security as a result of Anderson shelters and balloon barrages, but feared
that compulsory evacuation would breed resentment and would be opposed by the
people.157 Evacuation officers estimated that as many as 80% of parents in London would
refuse to evacuate their children if the scheme were made compulsory.158 The Minister of
Health, although a proponent of compulsory evacuation, argued that forcing parents to
151
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evacuate their children would seriously impair the morale of the population.159 Some
people were wary about evacuation because of rumors that empty homes with furniture
would be commandeered by the government for billeting purposes, and the furniture
sold.160 While school-aged children were evacuated with their school class, younger
children could not be evacuated on their own. Mothers were encouraged to evacuate with
their young children, although, many women were reluctant to leave behind husbands,
older children, or other relatives who required their assistance. 161
With tensions rising in Europe, the evacuation scheme was put into motion two
days before the outbreak of war. On September 1st, 1939, the government evacuation
scheme came into effect and immediately required the transport of one and a half million
people across the country, more than half of them children.162 Evacuation was mostly
completed in two to three days, suggesting the detailed plans created after the crisis in
1938 had been successful.163 In London, the scheme evacuated 286,000 people on day
one, 192,000 on day two, and over 100,000 on day three.164 While tens of thousands of
people were evacuated under the scheme, things did not always go smoothly.
Transportation was complicated, particularly outside of London, and some schools found
themselves in remote locations with no local schools or education supplies, while other
schools were split up across several small villages.165 Many of the receiving areas, rural
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locations with small resident populations, had school accommodations only sufficient for
local children.166 Officials thus spent weeks moving schools, re-billeting children,
sending books and equipment, and pressing into service halls, large houses, and other
buildings to serve as school rooms.167
Finding places to billet the children and adults accompanying them was not always
easy, either. Some women and children evacuated to a Scottish town found themselves
bunked in a large hall with sacks of straw and jail mattresses as bedding, because the huts
intended for them were not yet available.168 Finding billets for mothers and their young
children was particularly difficult and the LCC considered the initial 1939 evacuation of
this group a failure due to the lack of skilled social workers to assist the receiving
authorities.169 Mothers were said to present the biggest billeting problem, as they were
often unhappy and prone to upset the householder of their billet. Many returned home to
their husbands in the danger areas, taking their children with them.170 Some groups of
people, such as the aged and infirm, invalids, the mentally disabled, and the blind, were
considered unsuitable for billeting with private householders and required hostels or
institutions in the reception area.171 Schoolchildren who were physically disabled,
behaved poorly, or were of difficult character were also not to be billeted in private
homes.172 Some civilians suggested making use of the unused country homes of the
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wealthy to accommodate evacuated children. One owner of such a house, however,
argued that there was not enough domestic staff to look after children, that the
government billet fee was too small, and that “the cottage is more suitable than the castle
for billeting purposes.”173
The government invested heavily in several publicity campaigns to solve this
problem. The Ministry of Information created posters and advertisements intended to tug
at the heartstrings of potential foster mothers, convincing them of the vital part they could
play in the war effort. Such advertisements mentioned the safety of the children, their
improved health and behavior, and the gratitude of parents and the government towards
the foster mothers.174 Taking in evacuated children was touted as “splendid service to the
nation.”175 While the National Service Campaign recruited volunteers for civil defense
jobs, caring for evacuated children was also advertised as “real National Service.”176
Householders who took in evacuated children were thus reassured that this represented a
vital contribution to the war effort and the nation. The Ministries of Information and
Health also published a booklet describing the difficulties of billeting and suggested ways
of overcoming these problems. The booklet mentioned three primary difficulties in
billeting evacuees: a hesitation among the population to accept evacuees, a bad
atmosphere that had sometimes developed between hostess and the evacuee mother, and a
lack of volunteers for the many services required to take care of the evacuees.177 To
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overcome these problems the booklet suggested breaking down the resistance among the
population in regard to evacuees, bringing the hostess and evacuee mother together to
make them see each other’s point of view, and making people in receiving areas
conscious of their responsibilities.178 To achieve this, solutions were sought by using
different avenues of publicity intended to saturate the receiving areas. Press advertising
was one of the easiest means of reaching local populations and evacuation advertisements
were specifically aimed at breaking down resistance to billeting and creating a better
feeling between parties.179 Other advertisements sought to recruit volunteer social
workers and other helpers, such as leaders of sewing parties and staff to man communal
feeding centers.180 Additionally, local meetings were advocated as a means of breaking
down resistance.181 The local press was encouraged to support the campaign by writing
articles that emphasized the danger of leaving children in crowded and bombed areas, as
well as by directing columns and articles directly at improving the atmosphere between
hosts and evacuees. 182
Unaccompanied children under five, however, presented the greatest problem.
These children were too young to be evacuated alone and, without their mother to
accompany them, they required adult supervision. Evacuated residential nurseries were
set up to take in these children, but space was extremely limited.183 Such nurseries for
children under five were run by the British Red Cross or the WVS and took in children
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according to their priority class.184 Children were classed under different priority groups,
with Priority 1 cases having been actual air raid casualties, while Priority 2 children were
suffering due to air raids but had not been actual casualties. 185 By 1942 there were 390
nursery parties and 12,000 total cots available for unaccompanied children between the
ages of two and five.186 The WVS was particularly involved in taking care of the underfives, keeping track of the over 28,000 who were sent to nurseries in the country and
running three receiving centers in London, where children were examined and outfitted
before being sent on.187
The negative opinion of evacuation among the public did not change even after
several months of successful evacuations. Many parents were refusing to evacuate their
children and officials began a campaign to stimulate interest in evacuation. In London, in
particular, officers aimed to make nightly visits to public shelters and daytime visits to
homes and public gatherings, such as queues.188 Home visits were believed to be more
fruitful and London’s dispersal officers aimed to make visits to all homes in each borough
where children might be living.189 In the County of London, officers were able to reach
over 134,000 parents, but only around 30,000 agreed to register for evacuation after being
spoken to.190 Over 20,000 refused outright and gave no reason, but many refused to
register their children because other family members, such as older children,
184
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grandparents, and fathers, were not eligible to go.191 Nearly 18,000 refused as a result of
an earlier unsatisfactory evacuation.192 Other parents believed London was just as safe as
elsewhere in the country, while some did not trust strangers with their children.193 The
Bombed Babies scheme suffered not only from a lack of available space, but the whole
process was much too slow to prevent injured children from being returned to a
dangerous area.194 The process could often take weeks during which the child recovered
and was either returned home or took up a valuable hospital bed.195 A rumor that
evacuated children were being asked to fight fires caused by incendiary bombs in
agricultural fields worried some parents, although officials were quick to reassure the
public that this was not the case.196 Those parents with the means to avoid government
evacuation paid their children’s way to a safer location, many as far away as America,
Australia, and Canada.197 Other parents bought weekend cottages in the countryside or in
Wales to evacuate themselves and their children to safety.198
There were also consistent complaints about the children themselves. Children
evacuated from Glasgow were reported to have arrived at the receiving area in a
“verminous condition.”199 In another area, both mothers and children were accused of
191
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arriving in dirty and verminous states to the point where mattresses they had used needed
to be destroyed.200 Elsewhere the children were not only verminous upon arrival, but
some of them also had “unsatisfactory house habits.”201 Some children were also accused
of being ill-clad, undisciplined, and unhealthy, suffering from scabies, impetigo, and
other skin diseases supposedly brought on by dirt and lack of good food.202 Their
behavior was also shocking to those receiving them, as they swore, lied, pilfered, refused
to sit down for meals, failed to use cutlery, or even asked for beer.203 One writer
considered the discovery of verminous and ill-trained children a national blemish, but
suggested that in this case war had rendered a service in allowing the country to fix this
problem.204 A minister called for severe penalties for parents who allowed their children
to become verminous and who refused to clean their homes.205 Some officials, however,
thought the claims of dirty children had been greatly exaggerated. The Secretary of State
for Scotland considered the idea that almost no child left its home in a clean state to be
nonsense, although he conceded that there certainly had been some cases of children
arriving at their billets in filthy condition.206 One reverend was appalled to hear that some
towns were refusing evacuees because of the rumors of vermin, explaining that while
some children had arrived in filthy condition they were not the majority.207 He suggested
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that remedying the problem was as simple as water, carbolic ointment, and patience.208
While the majority of the hundreds of thousands of evacuees were clean and wellbehaved, there certainly were cases of vermin and disease, some serious enough to
involve the police. Two Glasgow parents were sentenced to six months imprisonment
after the evacuated mother and her three children had been sent home from the receiving
area for being in a verminous and filthy state.209
While the government successfully evacuated hundreds of thousands of children,
the program was not entirely successful in protecting vulnerable populations. Between
the start of evacuation in September 1939 and the first intense bombing raids on Britain
almost a whole year passed, leading many civilians to believe there was no need for
evacuation. By October 1940, about 300,000 London schoolchildren had been evacuated
by the government or through private means, while evacuated mothers with young
children numbered over 100,000.210 During this period before intense bombing began,
however, half of all children evacuated with their school parties and nearly all children
evacuated with their mothers returned home.211 Some mothers had returned within just a
month of being evacuated.212 While many returned because of a lack of perceived danger
in the evacuation areas, others were dissatisfied with conditions in the reception areas.213
Some were said to have become “fed-up with country life.”214 For many parents the lack
of serious raids and the desire to have their children with them ultimately overcame the
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fears that had led them to evacuate the children in the first place.215 A large number of
children returned home when, at the end of October 1939, the parents’ first monetary
billeting contribution came due.216 London was the primary focus of evacuation schemes
and ultimately had the most people evacuated, but cities across Britain sent their
vulnerable populations to safer areas. In Scotland, a total of 175,000 people were
evacuated in 1939, most of them children.217
Interest in evacuation, and consequently the numbers of evacuees, rose and fell
depending on the perceived danger in big cities. All evacuation areas saw a slow trickle
of returnees almost immediately after evacuation had begun. By the end of 1939 only
about 63% of those who had evacuated remained in the reception areas and by April of
the next year only 300,000 evacuee children were still in the country.218 Authorities
estimated that roughly over 120,000 school children had remained in London, although
the start of the Blitz a month prior had again increased the interest in evacuation.219
Additionally, the German invasion of the Low Countries and France increased the threat
of air attack and invasion and also meant that some areas previously categorized as
reception areas were now evacuation areas.220 Roughly 17,000 mothers and children were
evacuated weekly from London under all schemes at the start of October, but even at that
rate officials worried full evacuation of vulnerable children would take several months.221
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The LCC urged another propaganda campaign to convince those parents unwilling to
evacuate their children, but London’s Dispersal Officers thought the public had reached
their saturation point with evacuation publicity.222 Also, the reception areas were also not
immune from air raids and many lacked shelter facilities, making parents cautious about
sending their children.223 Again several hundred evacuated schoolchildren returned to
London per week in October 1940, worrying officials.224 Some considered ordering the
railroad authorities not to carry children from reception areas to the cities without a
certificate signed by a responsible local official.225 By the end of 1940 the number of
children in evacuation areas had again risen to 620,000, although this was still well below
the numbers officials would have liked.226 The introduction of the flying bomb in 1944
again increased the interest in evacuation. On July 1st, shortly after the first buzzbombs
fell on London, children and mothers were again urged to evacuate and applications for
unaccompanied under-fives rose dramatically.227 The advent of this new weapon also led
to the inclusion in the evacuation scheme of a new group, the elderly, select cases of
whom were sent from London to special hostels.228 The knowledge that the rich had sent
their children to safety across the Atlantic led to calls of unfairness and this, coupled with
a growing threat of German invasion, led the government to form the Children’s Overseas
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Reception Board (CORB) in 1940.229 This scheme intended to evacuate children to safer
overseas locations, primarily to the Dominion countries of Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa.230 The program lasted only a few months before a ship
carrying evacuees to Canada was torpedoed and sunk, costing the lives of over 70
children.231 The public outcry and the blame directed at the government and CORB led to
the abandonment of the scheme and ultimately fewer than 3,000 children were evacuated
under the program.232 Despite the various evacuation schemes many children remained
in, or returned to, urban areas that ultimately saw extensive air raids.
Officials consistently complained that there were too many children in London
shelters. One report argued that children’s parties in shelters were to be “deplored,” as it
would only encourage parents with evacuated children to retrieve them in order to take
part in such events.233 While some Christmas festivities were allowed in public shelters,
officials urged that there be no reference to children’s Christmas parties so as to avoid
encouraging parents who kept their children in domestic shelters from bringing them into
the public shelter.234 Unofficial parties occurred nevertheless, and 11,000 toys were
distributed to shelter children on Christmas Day 1940.235 Children living in shelters were
sometimes described as neglected, as families spent as much time as possible in the
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shelter and otherwise wandered the streets or sat in public parks, the children never
receiving a proper bath and becoming “verminous or diseased.”236 Those officials
working in public shelters, such as shelter wardens, were encouraged to persuade people
who brought young children into shelters to evacuate them.237 Doctors and nurses were to
be part of this task, and were asked to convince parents that shelters were no place for
small children.238 It was also considered to have Child Welfare train workers specifically
to go into the shelters in which there were a number of children in order to talk with the
mothers and “preach the gospel of evacuation.”239 As a private initiative, the Association
of Psychiatric Social Workers specially trained 150 women to go to shelters with an
“abnormal” number of children and contact the mothers to “preach evacuation.”240
The behavior of children in shelters was often a source for discontent. One report
referred to the young children frequenting public shelters as “little hooligans.”241 Shelter
wardens and officials were instructed to record the names and addresses of children in
shelters and find out which ones were not attending school, passing on this information to
school attendance officers.242 “Young hooligans” was a repeated description used in
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complaints about youth behavior, particularly the damaging of shelters.243 Outside of the
shelters, children with nothing to do since schools had closed in many urban areas
roamed the streets as “batches of young hooligans,” thieving and generally causing
mischief.244
Solutions to this problem usually revolved around occupying the children in some
way. One suggestion was to draw the children into groups where quiet occupation could
be arranged for them, such as drawing, charades, or quiet games.245 Sometimes this
welfare work with shelter children extended outside the shelter. One official was very
positive about the “Save the Children Fund’s” effort to engage children outside of the
communal shelters where they slept, watching as “approximately 40 slum children”
worked in the street at carpentry, modeling, sewing, and drawing, and judged this to be
good welfare work because it was done in the open air.246 Another solution was the
provision of dormitory shelter at the local Boys’ and Girls’ Clubs, allowing the clubs to
continue their work during the evening and removing a major source of nuisance,
adolescents, from the larger public shelters.247
While participating in the war effort and civil defense drew together all factions of
British society, some negative aspects could not be overcome. Different elements of
society often mingled to a greater extent than they had before the war, working together
as civil defense volunteers, standing in food queues, working in factories, living in
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shelters, or being evacuated together, yet old prejudices persisted. A negative perception
of the lower classes permeated almost every aspect of civil defense, but particularly
shelter living and evacuation. Opinions of foreigners and Jews also sometimes affected
how people viewed certain shelters or workers. The mingling of the sexes, increasing
through civil defense work and shelter living, was concerning to some members of
society who were particularly focused on issues of immorality. Wartime living, in
general, was accused of having a negative impact on morality, especially through
sheltering, but also the increasing role of women in society and the breakup of families.
As a vulnerable population that could offer little help to civil defense efforts, and whose
deaths would certainly be considered more tragic and undermine morale, children
consistently received special attention. Following civil defense principles of dispersal, the
government’s solution was to evacuate all children from dangerous areas, ensuring not
only safety for the children themselves, but also lightening the burden on industrial areas
in terms of services needed. Additionally, removing the children from danger would
ensure that parents, freed from worry, could focus their attentions on contributing to the
war effort. While hundreds of thousands of children were ultimately evacuated, a
persistent return of evacuees and re-evacuation ultimately makes it difficult to determine
how many lives were successfully saved by such schemes.
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Conclusion - “Civil Defence is Common Sense”
At the end of the war in 1945, British civil defense had proven a relative success.
The various services, from the volunteer firefighters and demolition teams disregarding
their own safety to put out flames and rescue survivors, to the WVS volunteers braving
bombs to supply hot tea, had saved both civilian lives and infrastructure and had
preserved morale. Despite occasional problems, long hours, understaffing, and an
increasing lack of supplies as the war continued, all of the civil defense services had
succeeded in performing their duties. Civil defense workers, however, were much more
likely to suffer injury or death than the average civilian in the pursuit of their duties.
Volunteers who sustained “war service injuries,” that is physical injuries suffered while
on civil defense duty, were eligible for free treatment in all general hospitals, or at first
aid posts for more minor injuries.1 As indication of the risks faced, the London
Ambulance and Rescue Services had lost over 30 volunteers killed by March 1941.2
The other aspects of civil defense enjoyed similar successes, albeit often hampered
by issues of organization or supply, but ultimately providing the protection they were
intended to. In the end, chemical weapons were not used in WWII and none of the antigas protective measures were put to the test. The psychological impact of poison gas on
civil defense and the population, however, was significant. Not only did gas masks
reassure the population that the government was taking steps to protect them, but the
masks also served as a reminder of a citizen’s responsibilities in wartime Britain. Gas

1

LMA: CL/CD/247, Ministry of Home Security, Home Security Circular No. 165/1940, Medical
Treatment of Civil Defence Volunteers for Injuries Sustained on Duty, July 8, 1940, 1.

2

LMA: CL/CD/1/265, London County Council, Return of Casualties to ARP personnel for the periods 3rd
September, 1939 to 28th February 1941, March and April 1941, 1941.

299

masks were a consistent, physical reminder of civil defense and the threat of poison gas,
offering both a means to ease anxiety while simultaneously ensuring anxiety was present
in the right amount needed for participation in civil defense. The shelters, although not
proof against a direct hit, offered protection for millions of civilians during air raids. The
underground sheltered many Londoners for the duration of the war, offering not only
protection, but also companionship, entertainment, and hot meals or drinks. The
government’s policy of dispersal in sheltering proved generally successful to the extent
that even when there was a direct hit on a shelter, the numbers of casualties were not
shockingly high. Some of the highest single-event casualty figures of the war occurred
later on, when people had become more complacent about sheltering and many
entertainment venues were open again. In 1943 a bomb dropped on a cinema in East
Grinstead, collapsing the roof and sidewall, and caused 190 casualties, 69 of them fatal.3
The V2 rocket, lacking the distinctive sound of the V1, exploded without warning and
left civilians no opportunity to seek shelter, undermining the government’s attempt at
effective dispersal and low casualty numbers. It was estimated that over 1,000 V2 rockets
fell on southern England between September 1944 and the end of the war.4 One V2 fell
on a row of flats, killing 134, while another killed 110 shoppers at a market.5 Over 160
people died at a Woolworth’s department store when a V2 exploded in the store during a

3

TNA: HO 199/262, Incident at Whitehall Cinema, East Grinstead, 9.7.43, July 14, 1943.

4

“1,050 V2’s Fell, One Rocket Killed 160 People,” Western Daily Press, April 27, 1945.

5

ibid.

300

sale.6 None of these major incidents received newspaper coverage at the time, however,
partially because of the morale-lowering effect of mass casualty figures, but also because
the government censored all reports of V weapon damage to prevent the Germans from
knowing their successes and improving targeting.7
Despite the best efforts of civil defense personnel, German air raids did cause
significant casualties among the British civilian population. During the first month of the
Blitz in London alone, there were over 14,000 casualties, of which nearly 6,000 proved
fatal.8 By June 1944, when the V rockets added another element of danger, 51,822 British
civilians had been killed in the war, with another 63,000 injured seriously enough to
require hospital admission.9 57,298 civilians had been killed by August 1944, over 7,000
of them children.10 A final total of 146,760 British civilians became casualties of WWII,
with over 60,500 killed, among them nearly 8,000 children under the age of 16.11 Air
raids also significantly impacted the infrastructure of the country. Out of 13 million
houses in Britain at the start of the war, 4.5 million had been damaged by enemy action,
with many completely destroyed or damaged beyond repair.12
Civil defense as a topic enjoys much popular and academic recognition, with a
large literature being devoted to the issue. The image conjured up at the mention of civil
defense, however, is that of Cold War America and the often humorous aspects of
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American civil defense procedures, such as the much-ridiculed ‘Duck and Cover.’ In
Cold War Britain, civil defense also played an important role and the creation of the Civil
Defence Corps in 1947 sought to ensure civilian protection in the case of atomic war.
What accounts of Cold War civil defense fail to fully address, however, is that its
practices and idiosyncrasies have their roots in WWII Britain and its successful, and wartested, civil defense services. Additionally, the impetus that drove much of civil defense
creation (and which was consistently used as a means to alarm the population sufficiently
for participation in civil defense) was the threat of poison gas. Most of the major themes
of Cold War civil defense are direct reflections of its earlier counterpart. Cold War civil
defense, and even modern-day schemes, are evolutions of British WWII civil defense
adapted for new or different threats.
Fear and anxiety drove the creation of civil defense programs. As it was clear to
government officials in the 1930s that a future war would see devastating attacks on
civilians, the potential destruction that could be wrought on civilian populations by a
nuclear war was even more evident after 1945. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
made it clear to all observers that if atomic bombs were used in a future war the danger to
civil populations was higher than ever before. Civil defense had been a successful tool in
Britain during the war as it not only reassured the population, but also made them useful
tools in the war effort. Civil defense programs could once again be useful to governments
in soothing their populations’ anxieties and fears. Additionally, a new type of invisible
terror now loomed. Where poison gas had been the concern that informed every aspect of
civil defense, after 1945, when the true realities of the atom bomb became apparent, the
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invisible and terrifying enemy now became radiation and fallout.13 In mid-1945 a
Committee on Chemical Warfare considered the future use of gas against Britain
“extremely remote,” although they concluded that gas could potentially be used in
conjunction with the atomic bomb.14 The Committee also concluded that the use of a
biological weapon could not be ruled out, either by itself or in conjunction with the
atomic bomb, suggesting that poison gas had now been replaced by two new threats.15 A
recruitment pamphlet for the Civil Defence Corps suggested that “survival might depend
on CIVIL DEFENCE,” presenting the reader with a horrifying scenario of a burning and
demolished city and a “trail of radioactive dust downwind.”16 Wardens, previously on the
frontline of a potential gas war, were now trained to use radiation-measuring equipment
instead of testing for gas.17 The Civil Defence Pocketbook No. 3 contains sections
dealing with radiation dangers, fallout, and protection therefrom, but makes no mention
of the poison gas that had been such a popular topic prior to 1945.18 While WWII
pamphlets had provided instruction on making shelters gas proof, Cold War pamphlets
instructed civilians on how to protect themselves from fallout.19 The American booklet
Survival Under Atomic Attack sought to negate the fear of fallout and radiation, arguing
that it ought to be less feared than blast or heat and that only 15 percent of deaths would
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likely be due to radiation.20 The use of such fears, particularly stressing the invisible
nature of the threat, was vital to achieve compliance among the population with civil
defense measures. Objects such as gas masks served as a reminder of this threat, but also
soothed anxieties with their mere presence, ensuring that the population was anxious
enough to participate in civil defense, but not so anxious that panic would ensue.21
Civil defense was the face of the war on the home front. While Cold War programs
consistently broadcast this idea, in WWII civil defense was quite literally fighting the war
in the domestic sphere. In recruitment campaigns, civil defense services were consistently
equated with national and war service, suggesting that what a civilian could do at home
was often just as important as what British soldiers could do overseas. Cold War civil
defense schemes adopted this idea of civilians fighting the war at home, particularly as a
nuclear war would have mostly targeted the home front.22 A 1955 advertisement in a
British newspaper calling for civil defense volunteers is reminiscent of those of WWII,
suggesting there were jobs only civilians could do and that civil defense was a way for
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everyone to play a part in national defense.23 The British Civil Defence Corps advertised
for recruits in local and national papers, urging readers to “join now” as volunteers were
urgently needed.24 Another advertisement called for “many thousands” who were needed
to staff the various civil defense services, similar to recruiting posters from before and
during WWII.25
Civil defense was a tool to control the population’s behavior. As recruiting ads and
government pamphlets often mentioned, civil defense sought to teach people certain
skills so they could then perform them without problem when needed, such as first aid,
fire fighting, or putting on a gas mask. Civil defense training thus ensured that civilians
could perform the actions necessary to save their own and others’ lives in a crisis. In
WWII, this training was repeatedly and successfully put to the test, not only by the
volunteers of the civil defense services, but by those civilians who sought shelter at the
sound of a siren, those who could use a stirrup pump to extinguish a fire, and those who
could quickly don their gas mask upon hearing the gas rattle. Cold War civil defense
volunteers never used their skills during an actual crisis, but repeated exercises
nevertheless ensured the behavior was ingrained and could be performed without
problem under duress.26 Both volunteers and regular civilians were then expected to react
in a specific, desired way should war come, without becoming frightened, disoriented, or
creating chaos. Offering prescribed actions in the event of an emergency also served to
redirect civilian attention away from fear of death to a more useful set of behaviors.
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Civil defense sought to ensure the psychological soundness of civilians as much as
it aimed to protect physical bodies. The idea that civil defense offered psychological
benefit to the populace was a major component of the British scheme in WWII. Through
controlling civilians’ behavior, the government hoped to also sustain morale and control
panic. Both were consistent concerns among government officials, as low morale could
severely undermine the population’s willingness to endure war and panic would create
chaos. Civil defense also reassured civilians that there was something to be done in the
face of danger, offering action instead of fatalism. This was even more important during
the Cold War, as the potential for mass annihilation was a serious threat to public morale.
While WWII civil defense volunteers actually engaged in valuable work that saved lives,
Cold War civil defense workers had to derive their morale from being reassured that they
could do something if war did happen.27 Giving civilians specific tasks to do if atomic
war occurred, such as filling containers with water to carry to the shelter, allowed them to
concentrate on something other than certain annihilation. Objects sometimes also served
this purpose of reassurance. In WWII, the gas mask was a visible and tangible reminder
that civilians could protect themselves from gas, as long as they followed the prescribed
steps. During the Cold War the objects of civil defense were much more symbolic,
generally offering limited protection unlike their WII counterparts. Cold War gas masks
and shelters did offer some protection, against fallout and blast, but were unlikely to
actually save lives in a nuclear war. These objects thus served mostly to reassure civilians
that they could be protected.28 Although officials had realized by the mid-1950s that
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existing shelters left over from the War provided only limited protection against an
atomic bomb, they nevertheless decided not to demolish existing structures because of
the anticipation that the population would expect the government to provide some form
of protection.29 While civil defense recruitment pamphlets painted horrific images of a
hydrogen bomb explosion, they were also quick to reassure people that there was
something to be done and that passive acceptance was unacceptable. 30 Civil defense was
still important, one pamphlet argued, because although a nuclear attack on Britain would
be devastating, millions of people would nevertheless survive and need help afterwards.31
Such messages served both as a reassurance that survival was possible and also redirected
the civilian towards a useful task—civil defense.
The government used civil defense to gain support for its policies. By ensuring the
physical and psychological soundness of civilians, civil defense in turn also offered
support to the government’s policies. In WWII, providing a scheme of civil defense that
would see civilians sheltered, rescued, treated, fed, transported, and generally protected
ensured that the British government could enter the war knowing an attack on its civilian
population was likely. Civil defense also reassured the population that the government
was there to take care of them, helping to create a more positive image of government in
a time of war. During the Cold War, civil defense was a vital tool that allowed the
American government to undertake its policy of deterrence and mutually assured
destruction. The government thus used civil defense as a means of reassuring the
populace and negating people’s fear of a nuclear war by offering solutions for survival
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and life after the bomb.32 The British government, too, posited the need for the hydrogen
bomb as a tool of deterrence and suggested that civil defense was the solution to deal
with the threat of the bomb.33 One pamphlet suggested that for deterrence to work, the
country needed not only a strong military, but strong civil defense, as well.34
Ideas of self-help and personal responsibility permeated civil defense. As much as
civil defense was the government’s scheme to protect its population, civil defense relied
on every civilian’s desire and willingness to participate. While the British government
offered protection in the form of gas masks and shelters, people needed to be actively
engaged to make full use of what the government provided. A significant part of the
responsibility for protecting oneself thus lay with the civilians themselves and the
government actively encouraged civilians to be prepared for emergencies beyond just the
minimum. For the civil defense services to work, civilians also needed to be encouraged
to participate and to be reminded that they had a duty to their nation to serve. Urging
civilians to take their own precautions, in accordance with government instructions, also
removed some of the burden of responsibility from the government. During the Cold War,
British civilians were encouraged to form domestic self-help parties under guidance of
their local warden.35 In Cold War America, the burden of providing protection fell much
more heavily on the civilians themselves, who were encouraged to build their own
shelters and stock them with supplies, making self-help a primary theme of American
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civil defense.36 As it had been during WWII, ideas of self-help were heavily reflected in
government issued pamphlets on how civilians could protect themselves. The U.S.
Government’s In time of Emergency was a handbook for citizens intended to teach them
about nuclear attack and offer various means of protection from fallout.37 The handbook
suggested that preparedness would raise the chances of survival and urged readers to
follow a checklist that included knowing the warning signals, knowing what to do in case
of attack, building a fallout shelter or improvising one in an emergency, learning first aid,
and stocking supplies in the shelter.38
Dispersal was a key component of civil defense programs. In WWII Britain
dispersal worked on a much smaller scale than would be the case during the Cold War.
Here, the government had actively sought to disperse the population to avoid large
clusters of casualties that could have the potential to seriously undermine morale and the
war effort. Additionally, those elements of the population who could not directly
contribute to the war effort, such as children and invalids, were dispersed by being
removed from areas of danger. During the Cold War, dispersal operated on a much larger
scale, as the potential radius of destruction of an atom bomb was significantly larger than
conventional bombs.39 The British evacuation scheme called for the evacuation of

36

For more on self-help as a theme of American civil defense see Krugler, Only a Test; Grossman, Neither
Dead Nor Red; McEnaney, Begins at Home; Boyer, Bomb.

37

Office of Civil Defense, in time of Emergency, a citizen’s handbook on nuclear attack, natural disasters
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1968).

38

ibid, 6-7.

39

For more on themes of dispersal in American civil defense see Boyer, Bomb; Vanderbilt, Survival City;
Krugler, Only a Test; Monteyne, Fallout Shelter; Rose, Underground; Garrison, Armageddon.

309

everyone 18 and younger, largely because of the susceptibility of youths to the hazards of
radiation.40
While American civil defense post-1945 was created almost entirely from scratch,
British Cold War civil defense could build upon existing structures and schemes. WWII
civil defense had not only proven successful, but had also put a significant financial
burden on the British government, which saw no reason after the war not to make use of
existing objects and structures. As early as 1944, the War Office and Home Office
considered the preservation of existing civilian respirators for a few years after the end of
the war.41 Initially after the war the Home Office ordered local authorities to collect all
special types of gas masks, such as the child’s mask and baby’s helmet, which were to be
kept alongside existing stores of civilian and service respirators to form a strategic fiveyear reserve.42 The poor result, in both numbers and condition, however, coupled with
new fears of nerve gases and biological weapons, led officials to conclude new types of
respirators needed to be developed.43 The existing stores of 34 million were nevertheless
kept as a basic precaution.44 A 1954 experiment tested the ability of various gas masks to
withstand the heat flash of a nuclear bomb.45
The shelter program had protected millions of Britons from German air raids during
the war, but government officials now wondered if the same program, reworked, could
40
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protect the population against a nuclear bomb. While immediately after the war domestic
and communal shelters were demolished, by 1947, on economic grounds, shelters were to
be demolished only where it would result in the recovery of steel.46 The Berlin Crisis in
September 1948 led to the decision that shelter demolition ought to be stopped entirely.47
Since it was considered impractical to embark on a new program of shelter construction,
the old shelters were expected to serve a useful purpose in the case of future hostilities.48
Not even the introduction of the hydrogen bomb changed this perception and officials
argued that, outside of areas of complete devastation, shelters from the last war “should
give reasonable protection against blast and heat and radiation […].”49 There was some
consternation, however, that such shelters were taking up space in public parks and fields
and by the late 1950s it was decided that where a shelter obstructed playing fields it could
be demolished.50 Based on information gathered in a shelter survey, officials determined
that in 1955 roughly 100,000 domestic shelters and 10,000 communal shelters remained
across the country.51 In 1954 the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment tested the
value of the Anderson shelter as a form of protection against the atomic bomb.52 The
Anderson shelter was chosen in part because of its efficacy against HE bombs, but also
because it was assumed that the shelter would play a large role in any emergency shelter
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program in the future.53 The tests found that the Anderson shelter was extremely efficient
at protecting against blast, allowing survival as close as 460 yards from a nuclear
explosion.54 Unsurprisingly, however, the tests also showed that 100% of potential
occupants would have died from radiation exposure, undermining the use of the shelter in
an atomic world.55 By 1961, the Minister of Defence told an audience concerned about
the government’s plan for nuclear attack that air raid shelters were of no use in the next
war.56 The government’s policy was nevertheless the maintenance and development of
existing shelters as a primary task of civil defense.57
The civil defense services were restructured during the Cold War, but retained their
original purpose. Air raid wardens, a cornerstone component of the civil defense services,
were again recruited as a vital asset to safeguard British civilians. Wardens were to be the
link between the civil defense services and the public at large, as they had been in WWII,
and were to reconnoiter, report, and organize their communities.58 The Rescue and
Ambulance Services retained their former purpose and names, with the same eligibility
requirements.59 First Aid Parties remained a part of civil defense to provide emergency
medical care.60 A new Pioneer Section was created for men who would help restore and
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rebuild infrastructure in an emergency.61 For women volunteers, the Welfare Section
combined several of the WWII jobs under one heading, such as assisting with evacuation,
working in rest centers, and running mobile canteens and emergency feeding centers.62
As in WWII, civil defense workers were issued pamphlets or pocketbooks that
offered written instructions on civil defense.63 The AFS remained a separate, but
complementary, part of civil defense during the Cold War, continuing its wartime
mission.64 The service did, however, now seek to recruit “men—and women— of
courage and intelligence,” the intelligence now necessary to handle the equipment
designed to fight fires caused by nuclear attack.65 While in WWII employers had been
encouraged to create their own civil defense sections at their factory or place of business,
for the Cold War the government created an entire section specifically for industrial civil
defense. The Industrial Civil Defence Service had its own headquarters section, wardens,
rescue and first aid parties, welfare section, and fire guards.66 Volunteers trained directly
at their place of work, so as to be immediately prepared and available in the case of
emergency.67 The WVS, too, continued their civil defense work after the end of the war,
engaging again in the welfare type of work which they had performed during the war.68
British Cold War civil defense also found it difficult to recruit new members, as door-to-
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door canvassers encountered repeated arguments from civilians who had learned about
the hydrogen bomb’s effects from scientists, which seemed to undermine the purpose of
civil defense.69 While the civil defense services had plenty of wartime experience, they
lacked necessary data on atomic explosions to prepare for the aftermath of a nuclear
attack. In order to provide such data Britain simulated an attack on the Port of London by
detonating an atomic bomb in a ship off Australia’s coast in October of 1952, titled
‘Operation Hurricane.’70 In America, the most important finding in a report on a
simulated nuclear attack with over 200 targets was that civil defense preparedness could
reduce the casualties of the assumed attack from approximately thirty percent of the
population to just three percent.71
Civilians continued to receive civil defense instruction from the government, with
the primary focus now on an atomic bomb. Government officials still worried about
finding the balance between scaring the population enough to take action, but not so
much as to create panic and fatalism. In 1959, civil defense officials considered whether
using the 10 megaton bomb as an example in the Householder’s Handbook was excessive
and whether or not a two or five megaton bomb should be used to explain the atomic
bomb’s effects.72 The government once again invested time and money into civil defense
recruitment, using films, posters, pamphlets, and newspaper advertisements. In post-1945

68

TNA: HO 322/161, Conference of Principal Officers held on Tuesday, 6th July, 1954, at Horseferry
House, 3.

69

TNA: HO 322/161, Conference of Principal Officers held on Tuesday, 6th July, 1954, at Horseferry
House, 4.

70

TNA: PREM 11/563, Statement by Dr. William Penney; Statement by Winston Churchill.

71

ibid, 8.

72

TNA: HO 322/161, Home Office, Conference of Regional Directors of Civil Defence, Minutes of a
Conference held in Room 530, Horseferry House, March 10, 1959, 1.

314

Britain civilians were now to be convinced to join civil defense with a catchy slogan:
“Civil defence is common sense.”73
In America, civil defense permeated every aspect of Cold War life, much as it had
done in wartime Britain. Artists, especially, incorporated themes of civil defense into
their works. In WWII Britain, George Formby’s popular songs, such as “I Did What I
Could With My Gas Mask” and “Mr. Wu’s an Air Raid Warden Now,” made humorous
occasions of civil defense.74 Florence Desmond’s “The Deepest Shelter in Town”
managed to turn an everyday part of wartime life into a racy metaphor.75 In WWII
Britain, artists who painted or sketched scenes on civil defense could have their works
purchased by the Artists’ Advisory Committee and exhibited publicly.76 American artists
during the Cold War focused either on the humorous side of atomic civil defense or used
their art as a form of protest. Tom Lehrer’s “We Will All Go Together When We Go,”
made fun of the idea that civil defense could protect the population against an atomic
bomb, while one of Bob Dylan’s earliest songs, “Let Me Die in My Footsteps,” protested
the idea of going underground for safety.77
Since its inception as a scheme to protect civilian populations from modern war,
civil defense has existed in some type or form in many societies. After the end of the
Cold War interest in civil defense waned as there seemed to be no more need for it, but
73
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the events of September 11, 2001 brought a resurgence of civil defense thinking,
particularly in the United States. While contemporary preparedness lacks the
governmental civil defense structures and schemes, the focus has entirely shifted to the
self-help and personal responsibility aspects, urging civilians to prepare for potential acts
of terrorism. Preparedness instructions, posters, and pamphlets nevertheless are
reminiscent of the civil defense instructions of WWII and beyond. An American Red
Cross pamphlet on preparing for terrorism instructs civilians to make a plan, stock
supplies, familiarize themselves with local emergency schemes, learn first aid, and to
shelter.78 Instructions for sheltering in place post-9/11 are similar to instructions for
creating a gas proof refuge room prior to WWII.79 A terrorist preparedness booklet
published by a U.S. Congressman reiterates the idea of civil defense as psychological
preparedness, suggesting that knowing how to respond to an emergency will allow the
reader to remain calm and avoid panic.80 Additionally, the threat of terrorism has also
renewed fears of chemical weapons, with the advocation of protective measures such as a
modern-day gas-proof refuge.81 Since its inception in the 1930s, civil defense has played
a significant role in western societies in various iterations and schemes, with many of the
basic themes and elements remaining similar over the years. Fear was always a driving
factor of civil defense programs, both the fear of physical attack on civilians, such as air
raids, but also the fear of something that appeared more gruesome or terrifying. Prior to
and during WWII this fear revolved around poison gas and influenced every aspect of
78
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British civil defense, serving both as the impetus for civil defense and as a persistent
reminder of its necessity. During the Cold War, radiation took the place of poison gas, but
civil defense schemes in both Britain and America built on the very principles and ideas
that had worked successfully in WWII Britain. Even modern-day schemes of civil
defense, less organized and intense, nevertheless use the imagery of both of these terrors
to create in civilians a need for urgency and participation.
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